NAP 
north of Italy, had been returned by a treaty of friend- 
fhip and alliance with the Auftrian emperor, yet the 
terms on which he Hood with the other powers were far 
from fatisfaftory. The Bourbon fovereigns had a family- 
intereft to replace the crown of Naples on the head of 
the king of Sicily ; and the court of Great Britain, in clofe 
alliance with the latter, had never recognifed the title of 
king Joachim, and had only agreed to a fufpenfion of 
hoftilities againft him, when his co-operation was of ad¬ 
vantage to the common caufe. The Britilli cabinet did, 
indeed, confider that this was preliminary to a treaty 
with him, but it was upon the condition that a compen- 
fation fliould elfewhere be found for the king of Sicily. 
Joachim was long in anxious expectation of the fignature 
of fuch a treaty by the Englilh minifter ; and, on the 29th 
of December, 1814, his minifters at Vienna delivered to 
lord Caftlereagh a memorial, requefting the fpeedy con- 
clufion of a definitive treaty of peace between the two 
crowns. 
Long before this time, however, Murat had become an 
objeCt of fufpicion ; and lord William Bentick, who had 
clofely obferved him, gave, in a letter to lord Caftlereagh, 
dated the 7th of January, 1815, the following, among 
other, remarks on the fubjeCt:—“ There can be no doubt 
that all the advantages contemplated in the alliance with 
Murat, by Auftria and the allies, would have been realized, 
if he had embarked honeftly and cordially in the caufe ; 
but his policy was to fave his crown, and to do this he 
muft always be on the fide of the conqueror. His firft 
agents were fent to me after his return from Leipfic. He 
then thought Napoleon’s affairs defperate. His language 
was plain and fincere. He laid. Give me an armiftice, 
and I will march with the whole of the army againft the 
French. Give me the friendftnp of England, and I care 
not for Auftria, or the reft of the world ! Subfequently, 
when Auftria came to feek his alliance, he naturally dif- 
covered both his own importance, and the uncertain iflue 
of the conteft. He then began to entertain views of ag- 
grandifement; and, by polfeffing himfelf of the whole 
fouth of Italy, he feemed to think he could render him¬ 
felf independent, whatever might be the event of the 
xvar.” His lordlhip proceeds to fpeak of the counfels by 
which Murat was governed. He defcribes him as equally 
remarkable for his courage in the field, and his indecifion 
in the cabinet, which difpofition was worked upon by 
two contending parties in his court, the French and 
the Neapolitans. His attachment was manifeftiy to the 
former; and he was anxious to keep with him his French 
officers, who were continually magnifying the fuccefs of 
the French army, and endeavouring to fix him in alliance 
with their country. It further appears, that lord W. 
Bentinck entertained ftrong fufpicions of the good faith 
of Murat even whilft adting with the allies, and that he 
had a ferious difference with him on that account; and 
alfo that the Auftrian general Bellegarde was fully of the 
fame opinion. 
In the latter part of the year 1814, Murat had put in 
motion a confiderable body of troops, with the apparent 
intention of occupying an additional lhare of the territo¬ 
ries of the church ; and, at the end of January 1815, a Nea¬ 
politan army, confifting of about 25,000 men, was polled 
near Rome, fo as in a manner to blockade it on the fide 
of Naples. The pope, who had fent a memorial of his 
complaints to the Auftrian court, remained in the city 
with his cardinals, trailing to the fandlity of his character 
for his foie defence. About this period, the duke of 
Campochiaro, the Neapolitan minifter at the congrefs, 
prefented a note to prince Metternich, in which, after 
reprefenting that his fovereign confidered himfelf as in¬ 
cluded in the peace of Paris, among the allies of the 
coalefced powers, he complained of the delay of his molt 
Chriftian majefty torecognife him, and urged the emperor 
of Auftria to exert his influence with the court of France, 
in order to procure him this juftice. That the French 
cabinet had before this time formed the defign of oblig- 
Vol. XVI. No. 1135. 
L E S. 553 
ing Murat to refign the crown of Naples to king Ferdi¬ 
nand, was rendered apparent by the following letter from 
the prince of Benevente (Talleyrand) to lord Caftlereagh, 
propofing a plan of attack upon him. 
“ My Lord; You defire me to make known to you in 
what manner I conceive the affair of Naples ought to be 
fettled in congrefs ; for, as there is a neceffity of fettling 
it, it is a point upon which there ought not to be one 
moment of uncertainty in a mind like your’s. It would 
be for ever a fubjedl of reproach, and I will fay even an 
eternal fubjedt of fharne, if, the right of fovereignty over 
an ancient and fine kingdom, like that of Naples, being 
contefted, Europe, united for the firft time (and probably 
for the laft) in general congrefs, fliould leave undecided a 
queftion of this nature, and, fandlioning in fome degree 
ulurpation by its filence, lhould give ground for the 
opinion, that the only fource of right is force. I have 
not at the fame time to convince your excellency of the 
rights of Ferdinand IV. England has never ceafed to 
recognife them. In the war in which he loft Naples, 
England was his ally. She has been fince, and is fo Hill. 
Never has (he recognifed the title that the perfon who 
now governs at Naples affumes, nor the right which this 
title l'uppofes; therefore, in concurring to affure the 
rights of king Ferdinand, England has only one plain 
thing to do—which is to declare in congrefs what Ihe has 
always recognifed, that Ferdinand IV. is the legitimate 
fovereign of the kingdom of Naples. 
“ Perhaps England, heretofore the ally of Ferdinand IV. 
defires ftill to be fo. Perhaps lhe may believe her honour 
demands that (he fliould affift, if need be, with her forces, 
for his regaining the crown of which he has been recog¬ 
nifed the fovereign; but this is not an obligation that 
can flow from a pure and Ample acknowledgment of the 
rights of this prince, becaufe the recognition of a right 
does not naturally carry with it any other obligation, 
than that of doing nothing that may be contrary to fuch 
right, and of not fupporting any pretenfion that may be 
fet up againft it. It does not carry with it the obligation 
of fighting in his defence. 
“ It may be that I deceive myfelf; but it appears to 
me infinitely probable, that a frank and unanimous de¬ 
claration of the powers of Europe, and the certitude of 
the perfon who now governs at Naples that he would not 
be fupported by any one, would render ufelefs the em¬ 
ployment of force; but, if the contrary fliould happen, 
thole only of the allies of king Ferdinand would be.ne- 
cefiary who fliould think proper to lend him their fup- 
port. 
“ Is it feared that in this cafe the war fliould fpread 
beyond the limits of the kingdom of Naples, and that the 
tranquillity of Italy fliould again be interrupted ? Is it 
feared that foreign troops fliould again traverfe Italy ? 
Thefe fears may be obviated by ftipulating that the king¬ 
dom of Naples lhould not be attacked by the Italian con¬ 
tinent. Auftria appears to be engaged towards him who 
governs at Naples, to guarantee him from all attack on 
this fide; and if, as we are allured, Auftria has only en¬ 
gaged herfelf for this, (how can it be fuppofed that the 
emperor has given his guarantee againft the rights of a 
prince, at once his uncle and his father-in-law, to the pof- 
feffion of a kingdom which he loft in making common 
caufe with Auftria?) lhe cannot be embarrafled in recon¬ 
ciling with juftice, and with the natural fentiments of 
affedlion, the engagements into which extraordinary cir- 
cumftances made her enter. 
“ It appears to me, therefore, that we may at one and 
the fame time fatisfy all our duties, and all our interefts, 
and all our engagements, by an article fuch as the fol¬ 
lowing :—‘ Europe, united in congrefs, recognifes his 
majefty Ferdinand IV. as king of Naples. All the powers 
engage to one another not to favour, nor to fupport, 
diredtly or indijredtly, any pretenfion oppofite to the rights 
which appertain to him in this title; but the troops which 
the powers foreign to Italy and the allies of his faid ma- 
7 B jelly 
