114 
PHILOSOPH Y. 
very liberally from it in fupport of my affertion, that the 
“Critic” contains “a complete analyfis of the Mental 
Powers .” 
After (trongly recommending to the learned of this 
country to encourage a correct tranflation of the “ Critic 
of pure Reafon and affecting that Kant treats of ob- 
jedts which interejl the whole human race, and that his Plii- 
lofophy is a well-regulated whole of Principles, not bor¬ 
rowed from preceding ages, Nitfch goes on to fay (page 5, 
et feq.) as follows. “The long fpace of time which I 
have employed in ftudying the Kantefian Philofophy, and 
the favourable opportunity which I have eiyoyed, of pe¬ 
netrating into its mere difficult arguments, by the imme¬ 
diate affiltance of the author, will, I hope, fecure me from 
the reproach of not being fufficiently prepared for what I 
intend to execute, as well as from the danger of aligning 
principles to Kant which he never adopted. The prefent 
Treatife is chiefly intended to fuggeft that preliminary 
knowledge which is indifpenfably neceffary, though not 
fufiicient to the underftanding of profeffor Kant’s prin¬ 
ciples concerning Man, the World, and tlie Deity, and to 
enable the reader, as far as is practicable in an introduc¬ 
tory view, previoufly to judge what he may e,xpeft from 
a more comprehenfive ftudy of the Kantefian fyltem.” 
After enquiring into the nature of the metaphyfical 
opinions that had exifted fince the commencement of 
fcience, he tells us, Plant fufpefted that, in all the contro- 
verfies that had occurred, it was extremely probable that 
the truth did not lie all on one fide, but that, each of the 
contending parties perceiving only the truth on its own 
fide, and the error on that of its adverfaries, they could 
never unite in one univerfal opinion as to the nature of 
the objedis under difeuffion. He then, as a cafe ftriftly 
parallel, very ingenioufly inftances the contradictory 
conception of a Square Circle, about which the conten¬ 
ding parties could never agree ; and adds, that profeffor 
Kant found the fame incongruity in the conceptions of 
all thofe engaged upon metaphyfical fubtilties: that he 
therefore confidered it a wafte of time to engage in inves¬ 
tigations regarding the nature of fuch objeCts as the Soul, 
the Deity, free Will, Sfc. until he had difpofed of the pre¬ 
vious queltion : Is it pofible for the human intelled to know 
ant) thing of imperceptible objetts? In order to determine 
this very important point with regard to the exiftence of 
Aletaphyfics as a fcience, he propofed to himfelf the Solu¬ 
tion of the following proposition, and his extraordinary 
merit confifts in his having completely fucceeded in this 
aftonifhing talk. 
“ Problem. What can be known by man, or what 
is the nature and extent of human knowledge ?” 
“ To this queftion (fays Nitfch) he found, indeed, a 
great many direft and indirect anfwers given in the va¬ 
rious eflays publiflied on the human mind, but not one 
among them which was completely fatisfaCtory. For, in 
fpiteof all the elegance, in point of method and diCtion, 
difplayed on this lubjeft, it appears that nothing decifive 
lias been brought out. For one part of the philofophic 
world profeffes to know only material objects, another not 
only material butalfo J'piritualobjeds, andathird pretends 
to know nothing at all, that is to lay, with indubitable cer¬ 
tainty. 
“ Profeffor Kant, defirous to eftablifh, as already men¬ 
tioned, a criterion of what is knowable in general, foon 
perceived that it would be vain to look for it in the vari¬ 
ety of corporeal and fpiritual objefts pretended to be 
already known ; for this might, perhaps, give us a crite¬ 
rion of what has been known, but not, as is here requi¬ 
site, of wdiat is knowable in general. He therefore con¬ 
cluded, that the materials for fuch a criterion mult lie 
within, and not without, man, that they mult refide in a 
certain capacity, which enables him to know things. 
“ Being convinced that lieafon muff either in part or 
wholly conlfitute the capacity of knowledge, he thought 
it indifpenfably neceffary to enquire into the nature of 
this faculty. And this enquiry feemed neceffary from 
more than one confideration. For there is perhaps no 
age in which Reafon has been more- adored, -or more 
condemned, than the prefent. By fome it is exalted as 
the Awful judge, before whofe tribunal alone the moft 
weighty concerns of. mankind can and ought to be de¬ 
cided ; by others it is reprefented as a being of contrafted 
views, and which, without the affiftance of Divine illumi¬ 
nation, would blindly hurry man into everlafting perdi¬ 
tion. But what then is the peculiar nature of this mighty 
or feeble faculty ? To this we find the following anfwers : 
It is a faculty which every body knows, without explana¬ 
tion ; it may be better felt than explained ; and defini¬ 
tions may here perplex, but they cannot inftruft. It is a 
faculty which diftinguifhes .man from the brutes. It is 
that in man which enables him to form defigns, and to 
clifcover the moft proper means. It is a power, which 
elevates the views of man beyond the conSnes of this 
globe, conduits him from one fyftem of worlds to ano¬ 
ther, and leads him to the firft of all beings. It is a power 
which, by the affiftance of organization, enables man to 
comprehend what paffes within and without him. 
“ All thefe various opinions comprehended in one no¬ 
tion, form the moft extenfive, and therefore the moft in¬ 
definite, fenfe, in which the term Rea/on has hitherto 
been ufed. There is, however, a meaning in this term, 
which is a little more confined, and according to which 
it implies thofe mental faculties that are oppojed to Senfe, 
and which difeover themfelves in judgments and reafon- 
ings. The term Reafon, taken in a more confined fenfe, 
will therefore comprehend, belides what is properly called 
reafon, the judging faculty or the Underftanding alfo, and 
exclude the faculty of Senfe. The term Reafon, confidered 
in the moft confined and definite fenfe it has ever been 
received, not only excludes the faculty of Senfe, but alfo 
that of judgment or Underflanding, and implies merely 
the faculty of reafoning or concluding, diftin( 5 ft 1 y confi¬ 
dered from all other faculties of the mind. When, there¬ 
fore, Reafon forms defigns, or difeovers means, when it 
traces the fyftems of immenfe worlds, where the eye fees 
only fmall luminous fpots, when it penetrates into the 
fecrets of invifible regions, and climbs up to the firft of 
all beings, it mu ft do this by means of conclufions. This 
affertion muft be granted, provided reafon fhall remain 
an aftive faculty. For, according to all logical difquifi- 
tions, there are only three different kinds of operations, 
by which the mind knows things, viz. fimple apprehen- 
fion, judgment, and conclufion. As the firft can belong 
to Senfe only, the fecond to the Underftanding only, there 
remains no other than the laft, or the conclufion for Rea- 
fon ; and, therefore, whatever this faculty may know, it 
muft neceffarily acquire that knowledge by the aft of con¬ 
cluding. 
“ In order to fix the bounds of what can be known in 
general, profeffor Kant thought it indifpenfably requifite 
to enquire, what may be known by this faculty of con¬ 
cluding. The works hitherto written on the various 
powers of the mind feemed to promife no inconfiderable 
affiftance in this attempt; and, indeed, the unanimity 
with which they had defined what we are to underftand 
by a conclufion, induced Kant to believe, that they would 
be as unanimous in defining what we are to underftand 
by Reafon. For, according to what has been already 
fiaid, when the faculty of concluding is rightly and 
univerfally underftood, the faculty of reafoning cannot 
be any longer mifconceived ; and, when the nature of 
Reafon is known, the bounds of human knowledge at¬ 
tainable by Reafon cannot of courfe be miftaken. But in 
thefe expeditions he found himfelf very much difap- 
pointed. A conclufion is indeed defined to be the per¬ 
ception of the agreement or difagreement of two ideas, by 
comparing them to a third j but, grant this definition to 
be corredf, and it will follow, tiiat Reafon, fo far from 
knowing any thing, can of itfelf know nothing. For how 
can a mere concluding faculty, as it has been juft de- 
feribed, give knowledge, when it fuppofes ideas, of which 
knowledge 
