PHILO 
knowledge is compofed, as neceflary to theexercife of its 
functions. If then the concluding aft of Reafon cannot 
make us know any thing, but by means of ideas, the 
queftion arifes, Whence Reafon acquires the ideas of 
which it forni6 its conclufions ? When thefe ideas refer 
to objefts which ftrike the fenfes, the anfwer will be eafy, 
and we may fay; From experience; but, when they 
refer to objects not perceivable by the fenfes, fuch as the 
foul, thefiifi caufe,&cc. whence does Reafon derive thefe ideas? 
“ Kant indeed doubted ofthe correftnefs of the opinions 
entertained by the adherents of Leibnitz and Locke, and 
clearly fuv, that, as long as it is not decided whence rea¬ 
fon derives the ideas of immaterial objeCls neceflary to its 
bold conclufions on immaterial exiftences, fo long it mud 
beabfolutely uncertain what we are precifely to under- 
ftand by Reafon, and much more fo, what kind of know- 
ledgewe may fafely expect from this faculty; but, being once 
determined to difcover,if poffible, fome mode of demonitra¬ 
ting the bounds of human knowledge, or human igno¬ 
rance, and believing that the Underllanding might per¬ 
haps contain fome data from which Reafon might derive 
the ideas of immaterial objefts, he attempted to invelligate 
the nature of this faculty. 
“The firlt queftion to be anfwered, in order to enfure 
fuccefs, naturally was; What is meant by the term Un- 
derltanding ? To this he found the following a-nd fimilar 
nnfwers : It is a faculty merely aridng-from fpeech ; it is 
a judging faculty. What is judgment ? It is an operation 
ofthe mind fo familiar to every man who has nnderlland- 
ing, and its name is fo common and fo well underltood, 
that it needs no definition. The molt exaft account 
which profeffor Kant could obtain of the Underjtanding, 
■was, that this faculty enables a man to perceive the 
agreement and difagreement of two ideas immediately, in 
dillinftion from Reafon, which makes him perceive the 
fame agreement and difagreement of ideas only mediately, 
that is to fay, by means of comparing them to a third. 
According to this account of things, it was clear at once, 
that the Underllanding, being a faculty of perceiving 
only the agreement or difagreement of ideas, or, what is 
the fame, of perceiving their common nature and fpecific 
differences, mult as fuch neceffarily fvppofe ideas itfelf, 
and receive them from feme other quarter, before it can 
exercife its functions upon them. And here a queftion 
arifes fimilar to that refpefting Reafon : Whence does the 
Underftanding receive the ideas referring to immaterial 
objects ?” 
“ If the mind is aftive with regard to the acquifition 
of knowledge ; if knowledge involves ideas of real exift¬ 
ences ; if, farther, the aftivity of the mind mull neceffarily 
confift in concluding, judging, and apprehending, fimpiy; 
it neceffarily follows, that, as the ideas of immaterial 
objefts cannot be derived from any concluding or judging 
operation, they mull: either originate in fimple apprehen- 
fion, or in the dreaming faculty of the imagination. In 
the laft cafe, it would be eafy to fix the bounds of human 
knowledge, becaufe it would be manifeft, that man can 
have knowledge cf material objects only. Profeffor Kant 
accordingly inveftigated the nature of fimple apprehenfion. 
He found, that to apprehend things fimpiy, means, in 
the prefent cafe, as much as to contemplate them imme¬ 
diately, and wiihout the aid of deduction. Lie farther 
obferved, that to contemplate things immediately, requires 
a man to have a Senfitive Faculty; becaufe, without fuch 
a faculty, man could not have objefts for his contempla¬ 
tion, any more than he co^ild have objefts for light with¬ 
out a faculty of feeing. This, however, is pretty gene¬ 
rally granted, and it would be well, if philofophers did 
as generally agree concerning what we are precifely to 
underftand by the faculty of SENSE. 
“ Profefl'or Kant, finding that, among the ellential con¬ 
ditions under which fimple apprehenfion is poliible, the 
Senfitive Faculty muft be numbered, and that, in confe- 
quc-nce, whatever contradifts the nature of ScnJ'e cannot 
be contemplated by any effort of fimple apprehenfion, 
SOPH Y. 115 
believed it to be indifpenfably requifite to penetrate 
deeply into the conftitution of the Senfitive Faculty, and 
to colleft all poffible information on this fubjeft. He 
took it for granted, that nothing was fo well known, and 
fo generally underftood,as the Senfitive Faculty; becaufe 
he found almoft every philofopber fnppofed it to be 
known, and confidered it as deferving only a fuperficial 
explication, and as requiring the mere mention of its name 
to make it direftly underltood; but, when he came to 
contrail their refpeftive opinions on this fubjeft more ac¬ 
curately, he was furprifed to find, that, within the whole 
compafsof Speculative Philofophy, there was not one ob- 
jeft lefs known and lefs underfcood than the nature of the 
Senfitive Faculty. Nitfch, p, 29-43. 
From the excellent account of the procedure of Kant 
as here given by Nitfch, it is evident, that that pliilofo- 
pher confulted every work he could obtain that treated 
on the mental faculties, in the hope of gaining fome alfilt- 
ance from the celebrated authors that had preceded him 
in the fame ftudy. Numerous as were thefe “ Analyzers 
of the Mind," what was his aftonifhment and furprife to 
find that no two of them agreed in fentiment regarding its 
three original faculties, Reason, Understanding, and 
Sense ! Much lefs had any of his predeceft'ors, in travel¬ 
ling this long-beaten path, dilcovered a fcience that would 
fatisfaftorily account for the whole of the mental pheno¬ 
mena, and of thofs important ideas that are perpetually 
obtruding themfelves upon us, in our melt ferious mo¬ 
ments, the Freedom of the Will and a Future State. Thus 
was Kant forced to fall back on the refources of his own 
mind, and by intenfe refleftion, and an accurate divilion 
of the Mind into its elementary p/rts, to try to find out a 
univerfal anfwer to the Problem with which he had talked 
himfelf. It was now that Hume’s doubts refpefting the 
fingle idea of Caufe and Effeft arrefted his attention. Lie 
clearly perceived, as well as LIume, that Caufe and Effeft 
are not derived fromexperience ; but unfortunately Hume, 
being totally unable to account for this notion in a fatif- 
faftory manner, concluded it to be a mere lafiard notion of 
the imagination, Kant, on the other hand, was not led 
away by this conclufion; but, perceiving the dilemna 
in which Hume had involved himfelf, by not taking a 
comprehenfive view of his whole Problem, he endea¬ 
voured to afeertain the precife number of thofe notions 
which, like that of a Caufe, are fo circumltanced as to have 
the appearance of being derived from experience, though 
in reality they are not fo derived. Kant himfelf fays, 
“ I endeavoured to afeertain their number; and, having 
done this to my fatisfaftion upon a fingle principle, I pro¬ 
ceeded to the deduftion of thefe conceptions. I now 
faw very clearly that they were not derived from expe¬ 
rience, as Hume fuppofed, but originated in the Under¬ 
ftanding itfelf. This deduftion, which appeared impof- 
fible to my acute predeceflor, had never entered into the 
mind of any one elfe ; for, although every body ufed 
thefe conceptions, no one thought of enquiring upon 
what their objeftive validity is founded. This deduftion, 
however, was the moll difficult talk that could be under¬ 
taken for the eftablilhment of Metaphyfics; and to this 
unfortunately no exifting Metaphyfics could afford the 
fmallellaid; for it is this very deduction that nnill firll 
conllitute the polfibliity of Metaphyfics itfelf. Having 
thus fucceeded in the folution of Hume’s problem; I could 
now proceed by fafe, though indeed flow, Heps, to deter¬ 
mine completely the entire compafs of Pure Reafon.” 
In his patient inveftigation of all the works on the 
Human Mind then extant, Kant found that they might 
be arranged under a very few dalles, even from the days 
of Plato and Ariftotle down to his own time. Thus lie 
could clafs the labours of every one of thole renowned 
philofophers who had luccelfiveiy obtained the highell 
admiration, and afterwards been attacked and rendered 
doubtful by an oppolite contending party, under the four 
heads of Matcrialifits, Idcalifts, Spiritualifis, and Sceptics. 
He proceeded, therefore, to conllruft a fyltem that Ihould 
3 embrace 
