116 
PHILOSOPHY. 
embrace the truth found in each of thefe oppofing fyftetns, 
and keep equally free from the errors that had fo long pre¬ 
vented any one of them from gaining a univerfal afcend- 
ancy over the reft. 
Though his comprehenfive genius was employed in a 
minute inveftigation of the labours of all thofe who had 
engaged in the fame purfuit, he never loft fight of the 
talk he had fet himfelf of determining the nature and extent 
of knowledge. To eft'edi thisgrand defideratum for fcience 
in general, he found he muft perfevereih his inveftigation 
of our primitive faculties, Sense, Understanding, and 
Reason. 
Profeffor Nitfch next proceeds as follows: “ From this 
view of the various opinions hitherto maintained con¬ 
cerning the faculties of Senfe, Under/landing, and Reafon, 
it will, I think, clearly appear; Firlt, that philofophers 
have not yet fucceeded in determining accurately and in 
an univerfally-evident manner, what we are to underftand 
by the faculty of Senfe; and that it is Hill uncertain whe¬ 
ther or not this faculty can furnifh fuch materials as can 
admit of being modified into ideas of immaterial exiftences, 
different from the operations of the human mind. Se¬ 
condly, that want of fuccefs in this attempt is the grand 
caufe why we have received to this day but very imperfect 
accounts of the intellect; and that it is extremely doubtful 
whether or not this faculty can form any folid judgments 
concerning immaterial cxifences. Thirdly, that the in¬ 
correct and ambiguous descriptions of Senfe and Intellect 
have produced as incorreCt and ambiguous deferiptions 
of Reafon; and that therefore we have no certain autho¬ 
rity for aftigning to this faculty a power of penetrating 
into the invifible regions of immaterial objects. And laftly, 
that as it is to Senfe, IntelleCf, and Reafon, that we are 
indebted for all our knowledge, and as thefe faculties are 
not yet completely underftood, we need not therefore 
wonder that the limits of what can be known by man are 
ftill unfettled, and of courfe either boldly tranfgrefled, or 
too fearfully (hunned, and this in matters which not only 
can but ought to be known. 
“Some may think that the diffenfions of philofophers 
are not fo great as I have deferibed them. Suppofe them 
not fo great; What is the reafon of this ? Has any one of 
thofe parties gained a complete victory over the others ? 
1 s evidence become flronger, orcouvidlionmore uvjhaken? No. 
The reafon of it is, the prevailing indifference towards 
the fcience of Metaphyfics ; a certain fear of lofingquickly 
thofe conquefts which it requires much labour and toil 
to make in this field, and a general defire of excelling 
rather in matters of Natural Philofophy, where a more 
certain reputation may be gained with more eafe and at 
much lets expenfe. It is thought by fome, that Material- 
ifm, Spiritualifm, Idealifm, and Scepticifm, muft die away 
of themfelves, now that we have formed the happy refo- 
lution of bringing every thing to the teft of experiment ; 
and that therefore the belt thing we can do is to leave 
them to themfelves and their fate, without meddling any 
further in thefe controverfies. 
“ But I have clearly fttown, that whoever would philo- 
fophife on the human mind, muft neceflarily fall into the 
hands of fome one or other of thefe feds; and when he 
comes to fee, that the very contrary is aliened by an op- 
pofite party to thofe truths of which he is perfuaded, it 
would be very unphilofophical not to examine who is 
wrong and who right; or to fuppofe, that the opinion of 
his opponent will die away of itfelf, merely becaufe he 
leaves him to himfelf and to his fate. The excufe that 
two men cannot be of the fame opinion is very fuperfi- 
cial when applied to the fundamental parts of a fcience, 
fuch as Senfe, Underftanding, and Reafon. Two oppo- 
fite opinions regarding any of thefe three points, if they 
admit of any plaufible defence, give a direSl evidence of the 
weak ftate in which the philofophy of the human mind Jiill lies, 
and loudly call upon every friend of truth and fcience feri- 
ovfly toinvefigate the cauj’e of that never-ceafing repugnance 
in fentiment, which muft neceflarily refide in the very vi¬ 
tals of the fcience, or in the moft hidden texture of hu¬ 
man thought. 
“To judge the better of what I am ftill to treat, I muft 
beg the reader to recoiled, that I have introduced thofe 
philofophic opinions merely with a view to point out 
fome of the occafions which have contributed towards 
the difeovery of the Kantelian principles. Profeffor Kant 
wanted to afeertain, among other things, the bounds of hu¬ 
man knowledge, particularly with regard to the exiftences 
of immaterial objedls; or, in other words, to find out a 
general criterion of what is knowable. He obferved, as 
already mentioned, that this criterion muft be looked for 
within, and not without, man ; and that, therefore, an en¬ 
quiry into the nature of the reafoning, judging, and fen- 
fitive, faculties, tnuft be attempted. He undertook this 
enquiry; but firft confulted the opinions of other philo¬ 
fophers concerning the precife nature of thofe mental fa¬ 
culties. Wherein thefe opinions conlifted, and in what 
light Kant has confidered them, I have already explained. 
It remains therefore, that, agreeably to the plan I have 
laid down, I fhould now acquaint the reader with thofe far¬ 
ther meafures which profelfor Kant thought the molt 
proper to adopt in order to anfwer the queltion, which I 
have noticed above, namely, What is knowable? 
“ Profelfor Kant above all confidered maturely how an 
anfwer to this important queltion muft be qualified, if it 
fhall be of any ufe to the world. He faw, that it muft ei¬ 
ther be fo framed in point of thought and exprelfion as to 
be univerfally underflood and acknowledged as true, by every 
thinking man who is no ftranger to the idiom of the lan¬ 
guage in which it is conveyed, or it will increafe the 
number of difappointments in metaphyfical purfuits, over 
which the fceptic triumphs, as a confirmation of his doc¬ 
trines. In Jhort, the anfwer muft be univerfally evident! 
The endeavours at univerfal evidence in principle, amidlt 
fo much contrariety of opinion, have indeed been ranked 
among the vain attempts fometimes made to unite the 
various religious creeds of the Chriftian churches under 
one head. But thofe men who entertain fo unfavourable 
an opinion of the poftibility of univerfal evidence in prin¬ 
ciple ought to confine this opinion to the lower clalfes of 
a nation, where the gradations of knowledge and igno¬ 
rance may render a difcordance of thought and principle 
unavoidable, although it muft be granted, that, even in 
thefe darker regions, certain truths regarding what is 
right and wrong, &c. are univerfally acknowledged and 
refpedled. If thofe men apply the fame opinion to the 
cafe of fpeculative philofophy, or the preceding queltion 
under confideration, and think that univerfal evidence is 
equally irnpoftible in both, they may be inftanced as the 
belt refutation of their own opinion. For, by thus freely 
declaring their opinion on a fpeculative point, which the 
poffibility of univerfal evidence certainly is, they clearly 
fliow that they muft be in pofleflion of l'ome arguments in 
favour of that opinion. Now, if thefe arguments are folid 
and completely true, they have, by their oum example, demon- 
ftrated the poffibility of univerfal evidence in fpeculative phi¬ 
lofophy ; if, on the other hand, they contain not the full 
truth, they will be of little ufe in demonllrating the con¬ 
trary, And, indeed, can any man fpeak, or write, 
or conftruft a fyftem of opinions, or corredl the 
opinions of other men, without at leaf, imagining, 
that the premifes from which he deduces his realonings 
are univerjally granted! If he does not imagine this, he 
cannot hope to be underftood, much lefs to give or re¬ 
ceive conviction. Befides, there is a fad! which moft un¬ 
equivocally proves, that fpeculative philofophy is fufceptible 
of univerfal evidence. Is not Logic (lee vol. xiii. p. 3.) 
a fpeculative fcience ? Is it not complete in its parts ; and 
has not each of its eflential parts-, for many centuries palt, 
been completely underftood and univerfally acknowledged 
as true ? Why then, fhould Metaphyfics, or that fcience 
which treats of exiftences inacceffible to theJ'enfes, and which 
has its place in Speculative Philofophy immediately after 
Logic, be incapable of equal evidence? Why may it not 
afford 
