117 
PHILOSOPHY. 
afford mankind a precife and clear knowledge, if not of 
the remarkable phenomena in the invifible world, at lead 
of the true bounds of our ignorance. The queftion, 
therefore, “What is hnowahle?" is certainly capable of a 
univerfally evident anfwer : and profeffor Kant very jujily 
demands that it Jhoulcl he Jo. 
“ But how is this poffibility to be realifed ? The firjl 
fiep which profeffor Kant took to realife it, was, that of 
endeavouring to fecure himfelf from mixing in his argu¬ 
ments the principles of Materialifm, Spiritualifm, Ideal- 
ifm, and Scepticifm, becaufe fuch a mixture can never 
produce univerfal evidence. The fecond jiep which he 
took was this ; ‘ he endeavoured to get, if poffible, at that 
point of delufion which has prevented thefe parties from 
an union in principle.’ And this point of delufion hedif- 
covered to lie in their refpeftive methods of philofophi- 
fing. 
“ In order to determine the nature and ftrength of the 
powers of Reafon, Underftanding, Senfe, and Know¬ 
ledge, 
I. The Materialifts have examined very minutely the 
knowledge which they have of external objedls and of 
the organization of man. To this they have joined an 
enquiry into memory and the affociations of the imagina¬ 
tion ; and, from the knowledge they had acquired of thefe 
objedts, they derived the nature and extent of the various 
mental faculties. 
II. The Idealifts, finding that the fenfes are liable to 
deceive, had nothing real left as objefts of enquiry, but 
the ideas in their minds ; they derived therefore the na¬ 
ture and extent of the mental faculties from their know¬ 
ledge of the world of ideas. 
III. The Spiritualifts, being perfuaded that they not 
only have knowledge of material, but all'o of immaterial, 
objedls, derived from this knowledge the nature and ex¬ 
tent of the mental faculties. 
IV. The Sceptics, from the inconfiftency and fallacy 
which they had obferved in human defcriptions of things, 
formed fuch notions of the mental faculties as diftinguifti 
the fed! to which they belong. 
“ Profeffor Kant obferved, that in explaining the Power 
of Knowledge, which comprehends Reafon, Underftand¬ 
ing, and Senfe, it would be erroneous to derive it from 
our pretended knowledge of the nerves, the brain, the 
vifible and invifible world ; and that ive ought firft of all 
to enquire into the true nature and conjiitution of this power, 
before we can pofiibly afcertain what the nature and ex¬ 
tent of that knowledge is, which we are able to acquire 
of the nerves, the brain, the vifible and invifible world. 
Thofe four fedis, as already mentioned, did not enquire 
firjl into the nature and conjiitution of the Power of Know¬ 
ledge, in order to determine thereby the nature and ex¬ 
tent of that knowledge which can be acquired of the ob- 
jedls in the world. They did juft the contrary. They 
firli formcd arbitrary notions of the effential properties of the 
things around them, and from thefe notions they derived 
the nature and extent of the.Power of Knowledge. The 
Materialifts, having difcovered that an effential property 
of the things we know is extenjion, converted the Power 
of Knowledge into a mechanical faculty of organization, 
and confined it to the field of extended beings. The 
Idealifts, obferving that extenfion can be no effential pro¬ 
perty of real objedts, denied the exiftence of the external 
world, and made the Power of Know ledge confift in Rea¬ 
fon, or the intelledf, which faculty, they think, can alone 
acquaint us with the true nature of objedls. It is on the 
fame principle, that the Spiritualifts, from their pretended 
knowledge of fpirits and immaterial objedls, whofe effen¬ 
tial property they have difcovered to be fimplicity, affert a 
power of knowing fpirits and immaterial objedls, as well 
as material, and make this power to be a compound of the 
faculties of Senfe, Underftanding, and Reafon. The Scep¬ 
tics, pretending to know nothing certainly of the true 
and eflential properties of things, do not agree concerning 
what they fhall make of the Power of Knowledge. Thefe 
•four fedls confounded two queftions which are effentially 
Vol. XX. No. 1355. 
different from one another; namely, the queftion, 
“Wherein confifts the Power of Knowledge?” with the 
queftion, “Wherein confifts the effence of the things 
which we know ?” Inftead of anfwering the firft, they 
endeavoured to anfw'er the laft. They thought the bell 
way to determine the power and extent of human know¬ 
ledge, was to penetrate as deeply as poffible into the ef¬ 
fence or nature of things, and to fee how far we could 
proceed in our knowledge of them. But this was the moll: 
perverted method they could have poflibly chofen ! For 
we muft evidently endeavour, firft, to get completely ac¬ 
quainted with thofe conditions in man which render 
knowledge poffible, or make the conftitution of the Power 
of Knowledge, before we can even think of determining 
what, and how much, this power can know of the effen¬ 
tial properties or effence of things. But thofe conditions 
which make knowledge poffible, muji lie in the knowing faculty, 
and not in the things known. It is, therefore, perfectly and 
completely vain, to inftitute deep enquiries into the ob¬ 
jects of the vifible and invifible world, into the nerves, 
fibres, and vibrations, in order to learn what the Power 
of Knowledge is. All thefe things are merely objedls of 
knowledge; they cannot even afford fo much information 
as to tell us wherein Knowledge confifts, much lefs where¬ 
in the Power of Knowledge may confift. 
“I have dwelt upon this topic for a confiderable time, 
becaufe I thought it of the laft importance to Philofophy, 
and becaufe I find, that even our greateft philofophers, 
for whom I profefs the higheft regard, and whofe names 
I fhall mention as foon as a more favourable opportunity 
occurs, have adopted the fame erroneous methods of phi* 
lofophifing. They indeed analyze the powers of the hu¬ 
man mind with great fkill and ingenuity, and deferve, on 
this account, to be diligently ftudied ; but it is a misfor¬ 
tune, that thefe great men could not give any defcription 
of thofe powers, without deriving it, at lead in part, from 
their fuppofed knowledge of material or immaterial 
objects. 
“ Profeffor Kant (hows, that, in defcribing or exami¬ 
ning the powers of Reafon, Underftanding, and Senfe, 
or the Power of Knowledge, we have nothing at all to do 
with a iimple fpirit, or the foul, and with compound fub- 
ftances, or the external things. We have only to confider 
certain faculties, by which we know, reafon, and judge, 
of thefe things. Thefe faculties are objedls of corifcioufnej's > 
and muft be confidered feparately from and independently 
of the qualities of thofe things which are known by means 
of them. If thefe faculties are completely examined, and 
accurately underftood, then, and only then, (hall we be 
able to judge, whether fuch faculties can belong merely 
to the organization, or to a fimple fpirit. 
“ When any work on the powers of the mind, there¬ 
fore, contains affertions of the following defcription—If 
we conceive the mind immaterial, of which, I think, we 
have very ftrong proofs, we (hall find it difficult to affix a 
meaning to impreffions made upon it; or, Thought is a 
property of the nervous fyftem—we may reckon upon it, 
that fuch a work, however acute and juft the dedudlions 
be which it contains, is yet built upon a foundation, 
which, involving an effential fault, muft make the whole 
fuperftrudlure totter, and for ever exclude it from univer¬ 
fal approbation. 
“ Is it then poffible to explain the Power of Knowledge 
in general, without having recourfe to an accurate and 
extenfive knowledge of things ? Can we get. well ac¬ 
quainted with any power, without examining very accu-- 
rately, and very minutely, thofe effedls which it produces. 
“Profeffor Kant by no means denies, that we know 
powers only by means of their effedls; he is far from 
afferting, that our examination of thefe effedls fliould not 
be accurate and minute ; but he is totally againft all 
accurate and minute examination of any fingle immaterial 
as well as material objedt, as far as it refpedls our prefent 
purpofe. An individual and minute knowledge of one 
or more individual bodies or fpirits, is perfedlly ufelefs 
towards afcertaining the power of Knowledge in general. 
H h To 
