118 
PHILO 
To find out the true nature of this 'power, we mnfi abftraCl 
from all particular knowledge of particular objeCls, and 
examine the properties of knowledge in general, or the com¬ 
mon nature of all our knowledge. 
“But, fay you, it Teems impoffible to examine the com¬ 
mon nature of knowledge, without having recourfe to 
particular knowledge of particular things. It really 
does feetn fo. But it is in faCt otherwife ; and I may 
boldly affert, that we have here a remarkable exception 
to the maxim, ‘ That every thing is eafy in theory, but 
difficult in prafti ce f for here really fomcthing appears very 
difficult, nay, almofl impoffible, in theory, which yet is very 
eafy in practice, as is ffiown in the extract of Kant’s Prin¬ 
ciples, which will prefently follow. 
“Suppofing, therefore, that it is poffible to examine 
the common nature of knowledge, without calling to our 
afliftance minute details of particular knowledge, re¬ 
garding a great variety of particular objeCls ; it will, I 
hope, be clear, at lead, that we ought, at all events, to 
begin withconfidering this common nature of knowledge, 
if ever we would get rightly acquainted with the fpecific 
difference of particular knowledge, and the power of 
knowledge in general. And this I affirm upon the prin¬ 
ciple, that to know the eflential properties of any power, 
and thofe we ffiould always examine firft of a power, we 
mud find cut the common nature of its eft'eCls. 
“ How then cun we difcover the common properties of all 
human knowledge, and exhibit them in a manner univerfally 
intelligible and evident? Upon a complete and accurate an¬ 
swer to this queftion, as I have juft fiiown, immediately 
depends all the poffibility of giving an univerfally intelli¬ 
gible and fatisfaClory explanation of what confcitutes the 
true and comprehenfible nature of the Power of Know¬ 
ledge, or the faculties of Reafon, Underftanding, and 
Senfe. For, if the moft common properties of all our 
knowledge be not afeertained, the moft common exer¬ 
tions, or the moft eflential nature of their caufe, which is 
the Power of Knowledge cannot be clearly and complete¬ 
ly underftood; and, if the Power of Knowledge remain 
in part a fecret, the notions we have of Reafon, Under¬ 
ftanding, and Senfe, the component parts of that power, 
cannot be accurate and complete, but muft, of courfe, re¬ 
main deficient and partial. 
“ I (hall therefore endeavour to exhibit that method of 
enquiry which profefi'or Kant has ufed in his attempts to 
difcover the common properties of human knoivledge. I 
doubt not but the reader will find his mode of philofo- 
phifing on this important fubjeCt highly interefting, and 
worthy of attention, efpecially as his principal aim is uni- 
verfal evidence, and as he is, of courfe, obliged to keep his 
arguments and views of things equally diftant from thofe 
of the four diflenting parties in the philofophic world. 
“ But, as I perceive that I cannot well avoid entering 
into fome detail of his fundamental principles of theoreti¬ 
cal philofophy, in order to particularife his method of en« 
quiringinto the common charafteriftics of human know¬ 
ledge, I muft beg the reader to remark, firft, that among 
the Kantefian Principles which I am going to adduce, 
lome more will occur than feem neceflary to this end ; but 
having promifed in this Treatife to give a general intro¬ 
duction to Kant’s Philofophy, and not merely to his fpe- 
culations on human knowledge; and finding it neceflary, 
for the fake of order and perfpicuity, to put his theoretical 
principles one near another as clolely as poffible, I thought 
it not improper to give a complete view of all his fpecula- 
tive principles, that is, as far as is neceflary to thofe refer¬ 
ences which are eflential in order to illuftrate the refults 
of his philofophy concerning Morals and Religion, as well 
as his manner of inveftigstin'g fpeculative objeCts. I 
muft remark, that the principles which I ffiall adduce are 
altogether founded upon the ‘ Critic of Pure Reafon,' 
fome of them being tranflated, and others derived from it 
as neceflary confequences, fo as to form a complete intro¬ 
ductory view of this important work, upon which all the 
other Kantefian writings are grounded.” Nitfch,p. 52-70. 
ProfelTor Nitfch then proceeds to lay before his reader 
SOPHY. 
Kant's Theoretical Principles, as the moft proper method 
of enquiring into the nature of the Power of Knowledge, 
and the Faculties of Reafon, Underftanding, and Senfe. 
Principle I. ftates, that by fetting out with that which is 
univerfally granted by the four fe&s, he forces thefe dif- 
fenting parties to coincide in one unffiaken fentiment 
concerning the nature of the Mental Faculties and their 
operations. Principle II. aflerts that All thefe feds per¬ 
fectly agree that man is confcious of thinking, conceiving, 
knowing, perceiving, judging, &c. Principle III. ftates, 
that, in order to explain the Power of Knowledge, it is 
requifite to analyze perception, conception, knowledge, 
&c. He then boldly aflerts, that “ If the four grand phi- 
lofophical parties, as they muft do, agree to the fecond and 
third Principle, they muft agree to all the reft and adds, 
“I need not mention that the principles which follow- 
after the fourth, are new, in the ftri&eft fenfe of the 
word.” (Nitfch, p. 72.) To my own aflent to the fecond 
and third Principles I have already alluded, where I ex¬ 
plained the pains I had taken to difcover fome hidden 
fallacy in Principle VII. but, not being able to fucceed, I 
felt myfelf forced to give my unqualified aflent to the 
whole of his principles; which form indeed a chain of 
fuch cl ofely-connected argument, that, as he juftly anti¬ 
cipates, whoever agrees to the fecond and third principle, 
if he ftriCHy adhere to found reafon and logical argument, 
will never be able to difengage himfelf from the pure 
truth of Traufccndental Philofophy. 
This is the groundwork of the conviction that has fo 
long, and, as I think, fo defervedly attached me to this 
Philofophy. And I do now moft folemnly declare, that, 
if I could be made acquainted with any teft by which I 
could try over again the truth of thefe do&rines, I would 
moft willingly avail myfelf of it; fuch is my averfion to 
adopting the appearance of truth for truth itfelf. De- 
fpairing of ever finding any thing to difturb my conviction 
on this fubjeCt, I muft content myfelf with believing that 
the “Critic of Pure Reason” is a Book containing 
truth and nothing but truth, in the fame manner as I 
confider “.Euclid’s Elements'' to contain nothing but 
truth. If either of thefe works is to be hereafter im¬ 
proved, I may venture to pronounce it will be in its 
manner, and not in matter. 
So grounded is my opinion of the value and importance 
of thefe 101 Principles of Tranfcendental Philofophy, as 
to our moral conduCt; and as to their fuccefs in fully fa- 
tisfying every rational mind on thofe important fubjeCls, 
the freedom of the Will, and a future ftale ; that I have 
conftituted them an eflential part of the early education 
of my children. I cannot help now and then indulging 
my fancy with a perfpeCtive view of fociety, when thefe 
principles ftiall not only have taken deep root in the minds 
of men, but when they fhall conftitute the elementary 
part of the education of the rifing generation. For, al¬ 
though the mental elements of which they treat are de¬ 
finite, and defy every attempt either to augment or di- 
miniffi them, ftill they are fufceptible of endlefs applica¬ 
tion, in the difeovery of truth, and the detection of fal¬ 
lacy. Were fociety actuated ftriCtly by thefe principles, 
it would exhibit fo much excellence and fuch admirable 
virtues as would render this world a paradife ! 
I hope I have now fo completely fulfilled my promife 
to the reader as to convince him fully that I am borne 
out in my aflertion, that the “Critic of Pure Reason” 
contains a complete Analyfis of the Mental Powers. In 
faCt, when Kant undertook the folution of Hume’s pro¬ 
blem, Whence is our notion of Caufe and Effect derived? 
he felt that he was plunging into the very depths of Me- 
taphyfics; but fo happy was his fuccefs in its folution, 
that it put him in pofleffion of a perfeCt analyfis of the 
Human Mind. He difeovered that Caufe and EffeCt was 
an eflential and conftituent part of the Intellect, which 
contains alfo eleven other parts, which he has claffified 
under his“CATEGORiES ;’’thefe alone conftitute the entire 
Underftanding, or Intellect. Having difeovered thefe 
twelve pure notions, that feem to be derived from expe¬ 
rience. 
