PHILO 
rience, but really are not, be found it no difficult talk to 
afcertain the nature of Sense. The elementary parts of 
this faculty he difcovered to be Time and Space, which 
are in fad our only Receptivities, or receptacles of know¬ 
ledge ; for it is not difficult to (how, that out of their 
fphere we can have no knowledge whatever. What fell 
to the department of Reafon was now more eafily afcer- 
tained. Thus fays this great mans “ I found myfelf in 
poffieffion of a fcience that was indifpenfable to mankind, 
and which could only be obtained by the ftrideft rules of 
fcholaftic precifion. In fad, I was in poffieffion of Tranf- 
cendental Philofophy,xs explained in my Critic of Pure 
Reason, which contains an entirely-new fcience, of wldchno 
one had previovfly conceived the thought, and to which nothing 
hitherto known could at all contribute, except the hint af¬ 
forded by the doubts of Hume, who himfelf however, 
did not forefee the poffibility of fuch a fcience.” 
In juftice to this great luminary of the eighteenth cen¬ 
tury, I may now declare that lie has fully folved the 
problem that he had propofed to himfelf, namely, “ What 
can be known by man, or what is the nature and extent of 
human knowledge /” 
The attentive reader of Nitfch’s valuable Introduction 
will feel that I have not faid too much in favour of the 
great founder of the only true Philofophy. By patiently 
ftudying the Theoretical Principles in the connexion 
there given, (p. 71.) when he has once familiarized him¬ 
felf with the new terms Kant was forced to coin, in order 
ro defignate the new phenomena he had brought to light, 
(a comprehenfive view of the Elements, Axioms, and 
Definitions, of Tranfcendental Philofophy, as well as a 
concife explanation of all the new terms that are employ¬ 
ed in that fcience, is given under the article Metaphy¬ 
sics, vol. xv. p. 236.) he will be irrefiftibly forced to ac¬ 
knowledge, that Nitfch has difplayed in the cleared 
manner, in thefe principles alone, a perfect analyfis of the 
Mind-, defined the notions of Time and Space j l'eparated 
the fenfitive Faculty, which is moftly paffme, from the 
Intelled or Underftanding, which is wholly aCtive, and 
only operates upon the matter furniftied by Senfe ; clearly 
pointed out the entire Elements of this Faculty, and 
proved the impoffibility of their being either augmented 
or diminiflied. In faCt, they are the Twelve Cate¬ 
gories, which alone render all experience poffible, and 
therefore might very naturally be fought after in experience, 
though indeed it required a genius of no common order 
to fucceed in their difeovery, “and to determine their 
proper office: it required Kant himfelf! Thefe prin¬ 
ciples alfo give an accurate definition of Judgment, which 
was wanting to Ariftotle’s admirable claffification of the 
judging ads ; they deduce thefe judgments immediately 
from their roots, the Categories, and (how their appli¬ 
cation to the laws of Nature, and to experience. They 
furnifli a complete definition of ConJ'cioufnefs, the definitions 
of which have hitherto been deficient} they diftindly 
feparate all objeds which can be known from tliofe 
which can never be known, and thus teach man where 
his ignorance begins. And laftly they enter fully into an 
account of that boafted faculty whereby man is chiefly 
diftinguifhed from the brute, and by which alone he con- 
fiders himfelf an accountable agent. Reason. Thefe 
principles prove this faculty to be, like the intellect:, en¬ 
tirely aCtive ; they (how that it alone enables man to form 
an idea of any thing abfolute or unlimited, fuch as the 
Deity, the Soul, and a future ftate. They further deter¬ 
mine the elementary parts of this faculty to confift of Six 
Ideas, from which fpring the fciences of Pfychology, 
Colmology, Theology, and laftly Morality. 
It mull: appear to be an Herculean labour to develop 
fo much interefting and important knowledge in 101 con¬ 
cife principles. But I put it to thofe who have atten¬ 
tively Studied thefe principles to declare if this is not 
acccmplilhed in them. Thus has Nitfch not only given 
a complete Analyfis of the Mental Powers in a very con¬ 
tracted fpace, but, in imitation of his great mafter, he has 
SOPHY. 119 
wound up his principles with a folution of the problem 
Kant had determined it to be neceffary to folve, before 
one ltep could be taken in the fcience of Metaphyfics : 
What is the nature and extent of Knowledge ? In com¬ 
pliance with which, in the laft principle, numbered 101, 
he Ihows, “ that all that man can know, is the objeds in 
Time and Space, and thofe conditions in the Mind 
which render fuch knowledge poffible.” 
Such is the treatife which I have elfewhere called a 
ferling work-, predicting that, “as time rolls on and 
prejudices moulder away, this work, like the Elements of 
Euclid, will ftand forth as a lading monument of pure 
truth.” I fliall now take leave of my excellent and re¬ 
vered friend and preceptor, profeffor Nitfch, with the fol¬ 
lowing quotation, wherein he Ihows why he has felefted 
the above principles from the “Critic,” and his opinion 
of their being firmly eftablilhed in that work. “The prin¬ 
ciples of profeffor Kant, which. I have juft laid before the 
reader, are fully demonftrated in the Critic of Pure 
Reafon. They do not, however, make one half of thofe 
important principles which that work attempts to efta- 
blifli, and which, in the opinion of the acuteft German 
philofophers and mathematicians, it has adually eftablifti- 
ed with extraordinary fuccefs. I have felefted the above 
principles, becaule they will enable me clearly to (how 
what influence the Kanteiian Philofophy will have on 
fome of thofe fciences which have a dired reference to the 
moft facred interefts of mankind, and which are the Phi¬ 
lofophy of the Human Mind, Morals, and Religion, con¬ 
sidered within the bounds of Reafon. The reft of Kant’s 
Theoretical Principles, contained in the above work, are 
equally important in another refped, becaufe they pre- 
cifely determine the number and extent of thofe of our 
fundamental dodrines of mechanical and experimental 
fcience, which have their origin in the mind alone, but which 
are (till generally and very erroneoufly derived from ex¬ 
perience. But thefe principles, for the fake of brevity, 
I have thought proper to omit in this introdudion.” 
I truft I have now fliown in the moft fatisfadory 
manner, that Mr. Stewart has occupied a great portion 
of his adive life in attempting to perform a ta(k that 
Profeffor Kant has accomplished forty years ago, namely, 
the Analyfis of the intellectual Powers. It muft be equally 
clear that I have not miftaken the objed of either of 
thefe writers} and, as I have before obferved, I conceived 
the Speculations of the one would have been highly inte¬ 
refting to the other. To whom was I therefore to look, 
in my own country, as a fit patron of dodrines that ap¬ 
peared to me of fuch vital importance to mankind ? 
Surely to np one with fo great a hope of fuccefs as to the 
philofopher who was ranked asthegreateft metaphyfician 
in England, and whofe reputation and celebrity were 
fuch, that, in that department, his judgment was con¬ 
sidered as the laft reference. It then occurred to me, 
that, as this writer had not Succeeded in the Analyfis 
of the Mind himfelf, it might be worthy his talents to 
inveltigate the fuccefs of another fpeculator in the fame 
field. I was alfo aware that his authority, as a writer oh 
the Mind, flood fo high, that, were he to recommend the 
invelligation of any work, it would effedually promote 
that objed; and I never could dived myfelf of the 
thought, that his moft Sincere wiffi was, to fee a perfect 
analyfis of the Intellectual Powers, by whatever hand it 
might be executed. It may eafily be imagined, therefore, 
with what avidity I perufed his Differtation in the Sup¬ 
plemental volumes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and 
with what pleafure I read fuch paffages as the following, 
(Differtation, Part I. p. 59.) where Mr. Stewart, fpeaking 
of the rapid advancement of intelledual cultivation in 
England, remarks, “ It is by the mediation of an im¬ 
proving language, that the progrefs of the mind is.chiefly 
continued from one generation to another} and that the 
acquirements of the enlightened few are infenfibly im¬ 
parted to the many. Whatever tends to diminiih the 
ambiguities of fpeech, or to fix with more logical precifion 
3 the, 
