122 
PHILOSOPHY. 
lofophy, which promifes to produce a permanent edabliffi- 
ment of opinion, that will no longer allow reafon to be 
the fport of prejudice and abfurdity. He dates, in page 
39 of the Introduction to which I have had fuch frequent 
occafion to refer: “Let us fuppofe for a moment that 
this happy sera were arrived, and that all the prepofieffions 
of childhood and youth were directed to fupport the pure 
and fublime truths of an enlightened morality. With 
what ardour, and with what tranfport, would the un- 
derftanding, when arrived at maturity, proceed in the 
fearch of truth ; when, indead of being obliged to druggie 
at every dep with early prejudices, its office was merely 
to add the force of philofophical conviction to impreffions, 
which are equally delightful to the imagination and dear 
to the heart! The prepofleffions of childhood would, 
through the whole of life, be gradually acquiring drength 
from the enlargement of our knowledge; and,in theirturn, 
would fortify the conclufions of our reafon againd the 
fceptical fuggedions of difappointment or melancholy.” 
The precedingpafTages, which I have extracted from the 
works of this accompliffied writer, afford an ample proof 
of his devotion to the philofophy of Mind, and fully de- 
mondrate the value he fets upon an accurate analyfis of the 
mental powers. I therefore felt that no apology was ne- 
cedary for obtruding upon his notice the great work of 
profelTor Kant, which he has called “The Critic of 
Pure Reason, ” and which actually contains the defired 
analyfis of the intellectual powers. It was with this view 
on a former occafion that I called upon Mr. Stewart to 
recommend an invejiigation of the principles contained in 
this work in the fecond part of his Differtation, upon 
which he was then occupied ; and, as fuch an invedigation 
could not have been productive of harm, and might have 
ed'eCted much good, I am totally at a lofs to account for 
the manner in which he has treated this fubjeCt. I had 
fully expeCted from his liberal fpirit that the innocent pro- 
cefsof examination would have been recommended. But I 
regret todiy that, on perufing SeCtion VII. and its copious 
notes, I have no-where been able to find this recommenda¬ 
tion, or any favourable mention of my admired author. 
Had Mr. Stewart profefi'ed to underdand the principles 
of this German Metaphyfician, and, from a conviction of 
their inutility or from their want of truth, felt it a duty 
to condemn this philofophy, then indeed there would have 
needed no remark. But in page 66 of the Fird Part of his 
Didertation he makes the following candid acknowledg¬ 
ment,alludingtothe manner in which the mind perceives, 
as explained in a padage extracted from Cudworth. “ I 
do not profefs to he an adept in the philofophy of Kant ; but I 
certainly think I pay it a very high compliment, when I 
fuppofe, that, in the ‘ Critic of Pure Reafon' the leading 
idea is fomewhat analogous to what is fo much bitter ex- 
prejj'ed in the foregoing padage.” I certainly could in¬ 
form this gentleman, that he is not only no adept, but 
that he is completely uninformed refpeCting the princi¬ 
ples contained in that extraordinary production ; and 
that his very high compliment ferves only to render this 
apparent. 1 well remember this author’s fentiments, in 
his “ Philofophical EjJ'ays," page 9S. they give a dill fur¬ 
ther proof of his inability to comprehend the philofophy 
of Kant; the padage runs thus: “As to Kant’s own 
works, I mud fairly acknowledge, that, although I have 
frequently attempted to read them in the Latin edition 
printed at Leipfic, I have always been forced to abandon 
the undertaking in defpair; partly from the fcholadic 
harbarifm of the dyle, and partly from my utter inability 
to unriddle the author's meaning. Wherever I have hap¬ 
pened to obtain a momentary glimpfe of light, I have 
derived it, not from Kant himfelf, but from my previous 
acquaintance with thofe opinions of Leibnitz, Berkeley, 
Hume, Reid, and others, which he had endeavoured to ap¬ 
propriate to himfelf under the deep dijguij'e of his new phrafe- 
ology." . . , 
It mud be quite evident to the mod common capacity, 
that the author of the above paragraph was, at the time he 
was writing it, not only wholly unacquainted with the 
valuable difcoveries made in the philofophy of Mind by 
profedor Kant; but that he was utterly unable to appre¬ 
hend that author's meaning, although he had made fre¬ 
quent attempts to underdand his works, a tranfiation of 
which he pofiefled in the Latin language. Now what is 
to be inferred from this? I apprehend it would be confi- 
dered very illogical to reafon as follows: Mr. Stewart has 
made many attempts to underdand Kant’s principles, and 
has always found it impoffible to comprehend them ; there¬ 
fore they are incomprehenfible, and unworthy to be fuelled at 
all! Yet if this be not the writer’s meaning, I confefs I 
am at a lofs to know why he informed the world, that he 
was utterly unable to underfand Kant's works! Would it 
not have been more liberal, and much more confident 
with the reputation of a philofopher, which this gentle¬ 
man pofieffes in a high degree, to have dated that as he 
had been unfuccefsful in his endeavours to comprehend 
the work of this German metaphyfician, which might 
probably arife from fome early afi’oeiations and the preju¬ 
dices of education ; but that, furrounded as he mull have 
been with dudents in the univerfity of Edinburgh, he 
would drongly recommend fome younger and more 
vigorous rnind to attempt the talk in which he had failed. 
If it could for a moment be doubted that what I have 
fuggeded above, was really his reafoning, the latter part 
of the paragraph ad'ords abundant proof that I have appre¬ 
hended him rightly ; for he adds, “ Whenever I have hap¬ 
pened to obtain a momentary glimpfe of light, I have not 
derived it from Kant himfelf, but from my previous ac¬ 
quaintance with thofe opinions of Leibnitz, Berkeley, 
Hume, Reid, and others, which he had endeavoured to 
appropriate to himfelf under the deep difguife of his new 
phrafeology.” 
Mr. Stewart therefore fird infinuates that Kant’s works 
areincomprehenfible,and wilhes to eltablilh this podtion on 
the ground of his own utter inability to underdand them, 
and becaufe he has always been forced to abandon this 
undertaking in defpair; and then afi'ures his readers, with 
great gravity, that this great metaphyfician, fo far from 
having made any difeovery in the philofophy of Mind, or 
having fucceeded in the analyfis of the intellectual pouters, 
the only fenfe he was able to difeover, in the perufal of 
the barbarous Latin trandation of his works, was, that by 
the deep dijguije of his new phrafeology he had appropriated 
the opinions of other philofophers to himfelf! Is this 
candour? Is this liberality? Is this becoming conduct 
in a renowned philofopher ? Is it common fenfe? As well 
might a fchool-boy, who had perplexed himfelf in the 
folution of a problem of Euclid, fay, I have endeavoured 
repeatedly to demondrate this propodtion, but I really 
cannot fucceed, therefore I am fure there is no J'enfe in it, 
and it is incomprehenjible. Give this fame propodtion to 
another youth ; let him carefully invedigate it; and he 
will not only perceive light at every dep of his procedure, 
but will difeover, when he has finiffied his talk, that the 
propodtion given him to l'olve, was a mafs of good fenfe 
and pure truth. Thisfis a cafe that mud have frequently 
occurred under the immediate eye of Mr. Stewart, when 
he filled the chair of the Univerfity ; and I may fafely 
venture to affirm, that he never deemed the want of fuc- 
cefs in the folution of a difficult problem a fufficient proof 
of the want of Jenfe in the problem itjef. It is therefore 
evidently unfair to infer, that, becaufe Mr. Stew -it had 
been unfuccefsful in his attempts to underdand the Cri¬ 
tical Philofophy, therefore the thing itfelf is incompre¬ 
henfible ! If I mud fubferibe to this doftrine, I fiiall be 
totally at a lofs to account for my having comprehended 
every propodtion, as delivered in the lectures of profedor 
Nitf'ch, when I was only eighteen years of age, and the 
truth of which all my fubiequent meditations and re- 
fiexions on this fubject have only tended to confirm. 
Still more lhall I be unable to account for the facility 
with which my fons at their early age comprehend the 
fird principles of this fublime philofophy. The remark 
mud 
