125 
PHILOSOPHY. 
But this diftindtion is altogether falfe and without foun- 
• dation. The Underftanding, as far as we can explore this 
faculty, ftill remains, even in its weakeft degree, ejfentially 
different from the Senfitive Faculty, and the molt perfect 
functions of the latter can never fupply the functions of the 
Underfunding. For, while the Senles receive the matter 
of the objects, the Underftanding combines the variety 
in that matter, and forms a determined reprefentation of 
an objedl, or an intuition. This diftinction, then, between 
the Senfitive and Intellectual Faculties, forms an effential 
feature in the philofophy of Kant; and is, indeed, the 
bads upon which rnoft of his fubfequent enquiries are ef- 
tabliftied.” 
With a view ftill further to (liow that this writer has 
been fomewhat more fuccefsfui in his examination of the 
Critic of Pure Reafon than Mr. Stewart, I beg leave to 
fubmit to the reader a paragraph from page 710! the fame 
work, where Dr. Willich is at fome pains to furnifh our 
Britifh philofophers with an idea of the contents and aim 
of this mafter-piece of human reafon. The words are as 
follows: “Kant, therefore, previoully analyfed the Sen¬ 
fitive Faculty, and endeavoured to difcover the necelfary 
conditions, without which our Senfitive Faculty cannot 
perceive any objects whatever. After having cautioufly 
feparated all that which, in the phenomena exhibited by 
the fenfes, either is merely accidental, or is owing to the 
funblion of the intellect, he difcovered, that two conditions 
only remain, without which, every where, neither our 
Senfitive Faculty, nor its objects, are conceivable. Thefe 
conditions are, Space and Time. They have ever been 
the ftumbling-block of all metaphyficians, and the fource 
of endlefs dil'putes. Kant confiders them in fuch a man¬ 
ner as will afford fatisfadtion to every cool and unbiaffed 
enquirer after truth, fince none but the moft inveterate 
fceptic, or the obliinate fyftematic, can withhold his 
affenr.” 
From the preceding extracts, and I prefume a very care¬ 
ful perufal of Willich’s account of the aim of the Critic 
of Pure Reafon, which the Doctor has given at fome 
length, Mr. Stewart takes occafion to deny to Kant any 
originality, and wonders how Willich could have omitted 
the name of Cudworth in his hiftorical fketch, who, he 
ftates, “J’eems to have advanced at leaf as far as Kant in 
drawing the line between the provinces of the Senfes and 
of the Underftanding;” and adds, “although not one of 
the moft luminous of our Engliih writers, he mufi he al¬ 
lowed to he far Juperior to the German metapliyfician, both in 
point of peripicuity and precilion. If this part of the 
Kantefian fyftem, therefore, was new in Germany, it cer¬ 
tainly could have no claim to the praife of originality in 
the eliimation of thofe at all acquainted with Englifh lite¬ 
rature.” (Differt. Part II. p. 149.) I am really at a lofs 
to know what Mr. Stewart can poillbly mean by this round 
affertion of the fuperiority of Cudworth to the German me- 
taphyfician. Would he inlinuate that this Englifh writer, 
whom he does not praife for his clearnefs, and of whom 
he fays, in the courfe of his (peculations, that he has 
broached feveral opinions to which he, Mr. Stewart, can¬ 
not affent, and not a few proportions that he is unable 
to comprehend ; would Mr. Stewart affert that this writer 
has really attained to the difeoveries which are attributed 
by enlightened Europe to Immanuel Kant? Does he 
mean to contend that Cudworth’s works contain 
“Transcendental Philosophy?” Will he venture 
to affirm that this -writer has actually accomplifhed the 
“ Analyfis of the Intellectual Powers ;” that he has com¬ 
pletely feparated Sense from Understanding, and thefe 
from Reason, and clearly pointed out the Elements of 
each of thefe faculties ? If Mr. Stewart can prove thefe 
bold pofitions, then indeed has Kant loft all claim to ori¬ 
ginality ; England will have gained the glory of the difeo¬ 
very that has been falfely attributed to Germany; and 
Mr. Dugald Stewart, late Profeffor of Moral Philofophy 
in the Univerfity of Edinburgh, the high honour of hav¬ 
ing firft brought this difeovery to light ! Cudworth’s works, 
Vol. XX. No. 1356. 
as Mr. Stewart informs us, were tranflated into Latin by 
Dr. Mofheim; and, as he further ftates, in page 147 of 
his Differtation, Part II. could not fail to be in the hands 
of every German fcholar. It may therefore be poffible 
that Kant’s Critic is a plagiarifm. The adjuftment of 
this point, however, I leave to the learned author to whom 
we are indebted for the difeovery that reflects fo much 
honour on England! It is about 150 years fince Cud¬ 
worth flouriffied; it is therefore no compliment to Bri¬ 
tain, that her philofophers have fullered difeoveries of 
fuch vaft importance to the human race to lie dormant 
for fo long a period, and at laft only to be brought to 
light, becaufe a high German quack has appropriated 
them to himfelf under the deep dijguije of a new phrafeo- 
logy! It is this that feems to have impreffed itfelf on 
the mind of Mr. Stewart, when he w’rote the following 
paragraph in his Differt. Part I. page 66. “ In the profe- 
cution of his very able argument, Cudworth difplays a 
rich ftore of enlightened and choice erudition, penetrated 
throughout with a peculiar vein of fobered and fubdued 
Platonifm, from whence fome Germanfyflems, which have 
attradfed no fmall notice in our times, will be found, 
when ftripped of their deep neological dijguije, to have 
borrowed their moft valuable materials.” 
If one iota of the whole of this pretended difeovery be 
true, then indeed is Mr. Stewart the moft extraordinary 
philofopher that ever took pen in hand to inftruct man¬ 
kind. For, fo far from availing himfelf of the labours of 
his enlightened and erudite predecefl’or Cudworth, more 
than a century, as he informs us, after the “ Analyfis of 
the Mental Powers'' was accomplifhed by this great oppo¬ 
nent of Hobbes, Mr. Stewart, inftead of profiting by the 
difeovery of his renowned predeceffor, quietly fits down 
to perform the fame tajk over again himfelf! Is not this the 
moft aftcnifhing perverfion of talent ever recorded ? How 
much more beneficial to mankind would it have been, for 
Mr. Stewart to have promulgated this vaft difeovery fome 
thirty years ago, that his contemporaries might have pro¬ 
fited by it, inftead of publifhing his own “ Elements of the 
Philofophy of the Human Mind," which has gone through 
fix editions, certainly without any very beneficial refult. 
In an ad vertifement to this work, dated College of Edin¬ 
burgh, March 13, 1792, Mr. Stewart ftates that, “Some 
additional chapters are ftill wanting to complete the Ana- 
lyfis of the Intellectual Powers.'l What? complete that 
which Cudworth had accomplifhed more than a century 
ago! Again, in the advertifement to his elegant volume 
of Effays published in 1810, Mr. Stewart fays, “I have 
not, however, abandoned the defign which I ventured 
to announce eighteen years ago, and in the execution of 
which I have already made fome progrefs.” This affords 
a clear proof that he is ftill labouring to perform that 
which he has fo roundly ftated to have been accomplifhed 
by the immortal Cudworth ! Why Mr. Stewart fhould la¬ 
bour fo hard to deprive Kant of every other merit as w'eli 
as that of originality, it is not indeed veryeafy to divine. 
Thirty years have elapfed fince Mr. Stewart made his firft 
promife to complete the “ Analyfis of the Intellectual 
Powers," and to this day I cannot conceive that he lias 
advanced a fingle ftep in this undertaking. It would have 
been better for the Philofophy of Mind, which has always 
been his favourite purfuit, if he had adted towards Cud¬ 
worth as he accufes Kant of having done ! In that cafe 
England might have vied with Germany in the poffeffion 
of a “Complete and Permanent Science of Me¬ 
taphysics.” [A concil’e account of this German Syftem 
of Metaphysics may be feen in this Encyclopaedia, vol. 
xv. p. 198.] The praife that Mr. Stewart has fo freely la- 
vifhed upon Cudworth feems to me to be a little infincere. 
For, in his Elements, page 2, fpeaking of the prejudice 
which is commonly entertained againft metaphylical fpe- 
culations, he fays, “ To this circumftanceis probably to 
be aferibed the little progrefs which has hitherto been made in 
the Philosophy of the Human Mind; a fcience fo 
interelfing in its nature, and fo important in its applica- 
K k tions. 
