126 
PHILOSOPHY. 
tions, that it could fcarcely have failed, in thefe inquifi- 
tive and enlightened times, to have excited a very general 
attention.” If Cudworth’s works really contained all the 
valuable information that Mr. Stewart feerns to attribute 
to them, I wonder he has not availed himfelf of thefe ad¬ 
vantages, inftead of amufing the public with vague and 
uncertain knowledge regardingthe who\e fcience of Mind. 
In page 98 of the fame work, Mr. Stewart lays ; “ With 
refpedt to the general queftion, Whether all our know¬ 
ledge may be ultimately traced from our fenfations ? I 
fliall only obferve at prefent, that the opinion we form 
concerning it, is of much lefs confequence than is com¬ 
monly fuppofed. That the mind- cannot, without the 
grofleft abfurdity, be confidered in the light of a receptacle 
which is gradually furnilhed from without by materials 
introduced by the channel of the fenfes, I have already 
faewn at fufficient length.” Am I to underftand that 
this abl'urd notion, as it is called, that the mind is a recep¬ 
tacle to beafrefted from without, is taken from Cud worth, 
or that it is Mr. Stewart’s own ? This I can pofitively 
affirm, that it conftitutes the very foundation of Kant’s 
fyftem. 
Upon the whole, I cannot give my aflent to the pofition 
fo boldly afierted by Mr. Stewart, that the Critic of Pare 
jReafon, when ftripped of its neological difguife, is con¬ 
tained in the works of Cudworth ; nor will I ever give 
credence to this ftatement, until Mr. Stewart points out 
the page in which that author has laid down Kant’s 
twelve Categories, his fix Ideas of Reafon, and the elemen¬ 
tary parts of the Sensitive Faculty, Time and Space. 
Until this is done, I muft be excufed for believing, that 
Kant is fully entitled to lay claim to originality. 
Mr. Stewart then proceeds to inform us, that, however 
new Hume’s Theory of Cavfation might have appeared to 
Kant, it is fundamentally the fame with that of Male- 
branche, and of a variety of other old writers, both French 
and Englifh. It is really very ingenious of this learned 
fcholar to make fuch ufelefs difcoveries, to fay nothing 
v/orfe of them. He informs us alfo that he has made a 
Hill more notable difcovery ; namely, that “ large unpub- 
lijhed manvfcripts of Dr. Cudworth are depofitcd in the Bri- 
tijh Mufeum." If I may venture to judge of their value 
by the extraft from the other works of this author with 
which Mr. Stewart has favoured us in page 153 of his 
Diflertation, Part II. which he conceives to bear fo 
llrongly on the point in queftion, and which he Hates to 
be “ precifely the language of the German fchoolf I [hould 
exclaim. In the name of Heaven, there let them remain ! 
As a proof of his aflertion that Kant’s fyfiem is funda¬ 
mentally the fame as that of Malebranche, and a variety of 
other old writers; Mr. Stewart quotes moH liberally from 
Dr. Wiilich’s Elements, (which fee,) page 10 to 14. I 
have rather chofen to refer the reader to this little work 
of the doctor's, becaufe Mr. Stewart has omitted fomany 
paflages in the extracts he has made from it, that appear 
to me to be important. I had another reafon for this 
reference; that it would afford the opportunity of in- 
Hituting a comparifon with the tranfiation I have made 
from the fame German original. Thefe tranfiations are 
made from the preface of “ Kant’s Prologomena to all fu¬ 
ture Metaphyfics This work appeared two years after 
the publication of the “ Critic of Pure Reason and 
was written with a view to obviate hally objections to 
his Syfiem, and to prevent its being finally condemned even 
before it was known. The tranfiation I have attempted 
from this excellent work, will be found under the article 
Metaphysics, vol. xv. page 209 et feq. and will enable 
the reader to judge of the fidelity of thefe two verfions. 
It appears to me, I muH confefs, that Mr. Stewart has 
completely failed in efiabliftiing his pofition from the 
proofs he has adduced; and his continued efforts to 
deprive Kant of “ a claim to the fiightefi originality ,” are, 
in my opinion, equally unfuccefsful. The additional 
attack on Kant’s originality made by this author, he pre¬ 
fumes he has jufiified by the following quotation from 
Dr. Cudworth’s work on “ Immutable Morality,” pub- 
liflied more than a century ago. (Difiert. Part II. page 
153.) “That there are fome ideas of the Mind, which 
W'ere not damped or imprinted upon it from the fenfible 
objefts without, and therefore muH needs arife from the 
innate vigour and activity of the mind itfelf, is evident, 
Firft, In that there are Ideas of fuch things as are neither 
affeCtions of bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed 
by any local motions, nor can be pictured at all by the 
fancy in any fenfible colours; fuch as are the ideas of 
wifdom, folly, prudence, imprudence, knowledge, ignorance, 
verity, fa/fity, virtue, vice, honefiy, dijlwnefiy, jufiice, 
injufiice, volition, cogitation, nay of fenfe itfelf, which is a 
fpecies of cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any 
fenfe; and many other fuch-like notions as include fome- 
thing of cogitation in them, or refer to cogitative beings 
only; which ideas mult needs fpring from the aCtive 
power and innate fecundity of the mind itfelf, becaufe the 
corporeal objeCts of fenfe can imprint no fuch things 
upon it. Secondly, In that there are many relative no¬ 
tions and ideas, attributed as well to corporeal as incor¬ 
poreal things, that proceed wholly from the activity of 
the mind comparing one thing with another. Such as are 
Cause, Effect, means, end , order, proportion, fimilitude, 
(liffiniilitude, equality, inequality, aptitude, inaptitude,J’ym- 
metry, afymmetry, whole and part, genus and fpecies, and 
the like.” Mr. Stewart then obferves, “ It is not my bu- 
finefs at prefent to enquire into the folidity of the doCtrine 
here maintained. I would only wijh to be informed what 
additions have been made by Kant to the reply given to Mr. 
Hume by our Englijh philofophers; and to direCl the atten¬ 
tion of my readers to the clofe refemblance between this 
part of Kant’s fyfiem, and the argument which Cudworth 
oppofed to Hobbes and Gaifendi confiderably more than a 
century ago.” 
I willingly ftep forward to comply with the wifli of this 
moft erudite fcholar, to Hate what additions Kant has 
made to Hume’s doubts, and to the replies given to them 
by our Englifii philofophers. But how Mr. Stewart can 
poffibly find any refemblance between the preceding jar¬ 
gon, quoted from Dr. Cudworth, and Kant’s “ Critic of 
Pure Reafon ,” can only be accounted for by his inability 
to read the “ barbarous Latin tranfiation of this work, and 
his utter ignorance of the German original /” It affords me 
infinite delight to have another opportunity, in obedience 
to Mr. Stewart’s wifli, of laying before the reader a concile 
view of Kant’s Analyfis of the Human Mind. This great 
metaphyfician acknowledges that Hume firff roufed him 
from his dogmatical [lumbers by his inveffigation of the 
Angle idea of CauJ'e and Effett, and by his challenge to 
Reafon to (how upon what ground this idea, though it is 
not derived from experience, is ftill- univerfally and neccf- 
fari/y applied to all the objedts of experience ? It was 
this thought that ffruck Kant, and occupied his deepeff 
reflexion. He perceived, as well as Hume, that the 
notion of Caufe and Effiett, differs eflentially from all the 
notions which are derived from experience; as, for in- 
ffance, blue, red, yellow, fyc. of neither of which could it 
be faid, that they were indifpenfably nccefiary to the fub- 
fiffence of Nature : for, if all our trees, and indeed the 
whole face of vegetation, were white, this accidental 
circumftance would not annihilate nature altogether. 
But, on the other hand, if you annul the notion of Caufe 
and EffeCl, what becomes of the ordinary courfe of nature? 
It is evident that nature itfelf muft ceafie to exift. Hume 
had (hown great fagacity in difeovering the cjfenlialdiffer¬ 
ence between this notion and all the ordinary notions 
derived from experience ; but, being unable to extricate 
himfelf from the difficulty in which he was involved, lie 
determined that this notion was a baftard of the imagi¬ 
nation; thus all his penetrating acutenefs, with regard 
to any improvement in the fcience of Mind, was thrown 
away, and Hume himfelf in confequence became a con¬ 
firmed fceptic. 
Kant, however, refumed the inveftigation regarding 
Caufe 
