PHILOSOPHY. 
127 
Caufeand EffeB; and foon difcovered the reafon of Hume’s 
difficulty. He perceived that this was by no means the 
only notion that had every appearance of being derived 
from experience, but in reality was not fo derived. He 
further difcovered a criterion by which to fearch after all 
fuch notions. This criterion was, that they mull poffefs 
abfolute neceffity and univerfality. With this guide to 
affift him in his fearch, he was enabled with great facility, 
to collect thefe peculiar notions from the mafs of our 
ordinary knowledge 5 for whatever was accidental or 
contingent, as hard, foft, thick, thin, &c. he threw away, 
and referved only thofe notions which pofTeffed the qua¬ 
lities above mentioned. Having now before him a col- 
ledlion of thefe peculiar notions, he proceeded to arrange 
them under their different claffes; and thus it was that 
hefucceeded in the aftonilhing difcovery of the complete 
“ Analyfis of the Intellectual Powers .” Of the merit of 
this dii'covery, Mr. Stewart has laboured very hard to 
deprive Kant; and he feems perfedtly indifferent upon 
whom he bellows it, fo long as he robs Kant of this honour! 
Sometimes he appears inclined to confer it on Cudworth ; 
at others on Malebranche, or in fadl any of the old wri¬ 
ters, no matter whom; for in page 150 of his Differt. 
Part II. fpeaking of Hume’s Theory of Canfalion, he fays: 
“ How new foever it may have appeared to Kant, it is 
fundamentally the fame with that of Malebranche, and a 
variety of other old writers, both French and Englifh.’’ 
The truth is, that Hume’s view of this Category of the 
Mind was new, but his antagonifts miffed the improve¬ 
ment that might have refulted from aflifting Hume out 
of his difficulty, had they been able to do it ; inftead of 
which, they preferred the talk of fairly writing him down. 
In defiance of Mr. Stewart’s affertions, I will venture to 
maintain with Kant, that Hume hadfallenupon an entirely 
new thought, in diftindtly feparating this peculiar notion 
from the general mafs of our knowledge. I really wonder 
that Mr. Stewart is content to go back only one century 
to fix the honour of the complete Analyfis of the Mental 
Powers. Would it not have had a much finer eft’edl, if he 
had at once travelled back two thoufand years, and given 
the honour to Ariftotle; becaufe he really made an 
attempt, well worthy fo acute a philofopher to fubjedt all 
nature to his Categories. This great Grecian, however, 
had puzzled himfelf by introducing into his Categories 
the notions of Quando, Ubi, Situs, which arofe from his 
having no fixed principle in his fearch; whereas Kant, 
having eftabMied the elementary parts of Senfe, Time and 
Space, at a very early period of his metaphyfical career, 
was not perplexed by the introdudlion of notions which 
did not harmonize with the genuine Categories. Arifto- 
tle’s ten Categories have remained fo long on record, that 
the merit of the illuftrious individual whole penetration 
has perfected the talk which the Stagyrite had commenced, 
mull be obvious to all the world. The reader will find a 
comparative view of the Categories of thefe two great men 
given in vol. xv. page 203, of this Encyclopaedia ; where 
the failure of thofe of Ariftotle is made quite apparent, 
and the abfolute completenefs of thofe of Kant is demon- 
ftrated. 
When Kant had diftributed the notions he had thus 
colledted under their proper heads, he found he was in 
poffeffion of a complete Analyfis of the Human Mind. 
Kant’s analyfis is as follows—The human Mind is divifi- 
ble into three primitive and original faculties, Sense, 
Understanding, and Reason. Senfe is a Paffive Fa¬ 
culty which receives the matter of Knowledge; Under- 
ftanding is an ABive Faculty that gives a form to the matter 
received by means of its twelve A< 5 livities, or Categories ; 
and Reafon is an ABive Faculty, free from Time and Space, 
that is divifible into Theoretical and Pradtical. Theore¬ 
tical Reafon, by virtue of its fix Ideas, llrives after the 
greateft fyftematic unity or connexion of all our know¬ 
ledge ; while Practical Reafon exerts itfelf to produce the 
greateft unity among our defires. Thefe notions of Kant, 
when exhibited in a Map or Table of the Human Mind, 
are as follows: 
SENSE. 
A Receptivity or Paffive Faculty, divided into two 
parts. 
~A._ 
Internal Senfe, 
or 
Time, 
which receives a 
Variety 
in fucceffion. 
External Senfe, 
or 
Space, 
which receives a 
Variety 
that co-exifts. 
UNDERSTANDING. 
A Spontaneity, or ABive Faculty, which produces 
Form or Unity by connedling Time and Space accord¬ 
ing to 
The Categories of 
Quantity. Quality. Relation. Modality. 
Unity, Reality, Subftance and Accident, Poffibility, 
Multitude, Negation, Caufe and Effect, Exiftence, 
Totality. Limitation. Adtion and Re-Adtion. Neceffity. 
REASON. 
A Spontaneity, free from Time and Space, which 
connects the Categories into the Ideas of 
Abfolute Abfolute Abfolute Abfolute 
Totality. Limitation. Subftance, Neceffity. 
Abfolute 
Caufe, 
Abfolute 
Concurrence. 
From a careful examination of Nature, it becomes quite 
evident, that there are only two general varieties which 
contain the immenfe number of objedls by which we are 
furrounded. In other words, the parts of every objedl in 
nature mull neceffarily conform to one or other of thefe 
varieties ; that is to fay, the parts of every objedl mull be 
either co-exijlent or fucceffive ; for where can you find an 
objedl that polfeffes neither of thefe properties? no fuch 
objedl is to be met with. In all bodies the parts lie one 
without and near another ; but there are objedls whofe parts 
never lie one near another, but all follow one after ano¬ 
ther in ftridt fucceffion ; as for example, Sound, &c. Now, 
however remarkable it may appear, it is neverthelefs a 
fadl, that all the matter that compofes this immenfe uni- 
verfe is ftridtly of this nature, for it either confifts of parts 
that remain permanently one by the fide of the other, orelfe 
are conftantly following each other. 
Upon a clofe examination into the nature of Space, we 
find that it confifts of a variety of. parts which perma¬ 
nently lie one near another; but this is precifely the na¬ 
ture of all the J'ubftances in the world, which may be 
called external, becaufe they are out of each other, and 
occupy a different point of fpace from that in which we 
exill. If we minutely inveftigate the nature of Time, we 
find that it confifts of a variety of parts that are in ftridl 
fucceffion; but this is precifely the nature of all the efffeBs 
in the world. Now, as our thoughts are evidently eff'eBs 
of the mind, and muftbefaid to be in the mind; and as all 
the effeBs in the world aflimilate themfelves to our thoughts 
in poffeffing the property of fucceffion; we may, by way 
of diftindlion, call them internal. Reprefentatives of all 
the fubftances which fill fpace, fo long as they are prefent, 
and affedt our fenfes, may be called Intuitions ; for we 
have an intuitive or immediate knowledge of them, that re¬ 
quires no adl of reafoning, but is at once equally good for 
the king, the peafant, and the philofopher. As however 
thefe intuitions occupy another part of fpace from that 
■which we fill, they may be called External Intuitions. 
Reprefentations of all the effedls in the world, fuch as 
emotions, actions, or paffions, in man, or the effedls arifing 
