128 PHILO 
from external fubflances, as for indance the report of a 
gun ; all of which, as they are mere feelings or alterations 
in the (late of the fentient being, cannot be faid to fill up 
any J'pace, fo as to form a breadth or plane, but mult be 
driftly confidered as in time only, and to have all their 
minuted parts clofely following one after another. Thefe 
by way of didinftion may be called Internal Intui¬ 
tions while they are acting upon our fenfes; becaufe 
they only inform us of the date of our own Mind. 
Hence whatever affefts our fenfes in any way, while it is 
prefent and adding upon us, may well be called Intuition, 
or immediate Knowledge, and readily admits of the divi- 
iion into external and internal; the former acquaints us 
with the exidence of things in Space, and the latter with 
the exidence of thofe effefts which are in Time only. 
Now, however remarkable it may appear, nothing is 
more .true than that, whenever we refer even in our 
thoughts to matter, we can never confider it othe'rwife 
than as a collect ion of parts either co-exifent or fuccefjive, 
and no other way is podibie ; therefore there are only two 
general varieties in all nature: and all the beautiful har¬ 
mony and variety of the furrounding world are abfo- 
lutely compofed of thefe two only podibie varieties. The 
quedion then very naturally occurs, Does Nature pof- 
fefs thefe qualities intrinfically and independent of our 
mind, or does the mind by a peculiar condruftion fird 
imprefs thefe varieties on nature, and then deceive itfelf 
by imagining it has difcovered them in nature ? This dif¬ 
ficulty is refolved the moment we fubditute the word 
Sensation for all our external and internal Intuitions. 
For all the knowledge we can podibly derive from exter¬ 
nal things and their effefts, can be nothing but Jevfation, 
however we m 3 y amufe ourfelves by fancying otherwife. 
In point of faft, a fenfation can only exid in a fentient 
being; and we can never arrive at any other knowledge 
of external things than is given to us through the medium 
of our Sensations. 
Having now refolved all external and internal Intui¬ 
tions into Senfations, u'e may with equal propriety apply 
the name of Phenomena, or appearances, to them ; and 
fay of Nature, or the external world, that it is only a col¬ 
lection of Phenomena, or appearances, which drike our 
fenfes and exid in the mind alone ; hence alfo the two ge¬ 
neral varieties, Time and Space, can exid no-where but 
in the mind. We mud not however fuppofe that this in 
any manner leads to Idealifm; for it is mod certain that 
in all this procedure the mind is passive, and is afted 
upon by fomething different from itfelf, and which it 
does not create ; namely, that which produces Senfution : 
and, from the happy difcovery that Time and Space really 
are the two Receptivities of the Senfitive Faculty, we are 
enabled to fay that this fomething is out of Time and Space, 
and may be called the Noumenon, or Caufe of the Phe¬ 
nomena, or the thing in itfelf independent of the mind. 
'Thus, while the fame caufes produce the fame effeCls, Na¬ 
ture will be as permanent and unchanged as it is at pre¬ 
fent, and the external world completely fecured. 
We have now (hown the necelfity of the mind’s pof- 
feding a Receptivity, or pa (five faculty, in order that 
it may receive impredlons, or be affefted by fomething 
external, and different from itfelf; which afts upon it, 
and produces the effeCl wdiich we call matter or fenfation. 
The matter thus produced mud be in Time and Space; 
and, while it is prefent to our fenfes, may be called In¬ 
tuition, or immediate knowledge. When we analyze 
this matter , we find it to confift of parts that either lie 
one near another, i. e. are co-exiftent, or follow one after 
another, i. e. are fucceffive. However much we may in- 
veltigate the matter that composes the univerfe, we (hall 
always find it impreffed with thefe properties. When an 
architeft condrufts a building, an artift paints a picture, 
or a (latuary carves a figure, he does nothing but occupy 
himfelf with intuitions or J'enfations, having as a foun¬ 
dation the varieties, or matter, as above defcribed. No¬ 
thing however can be more evident than that, as this 
SOPH Y. 
matter is not created by the mind, it mud confequently 
be given to it. This circumftance it is that completely 
fecures to us the reality of the external world, and guards 
it from all the attacks of Idealifm. 
The faCt being now eftablilhed that our knowledge of 
external fubftances is nothing but Sensation, and“rhat 
fenfation cannot exid out of the fentient being; it follows 
ot courfe, that the power of being affeCled from without 
mud be a fundamental power, or, in other words, an ef- 
fential, original, and primitive, Power or Faculty of the 
Mind. And fuch indeed is the paffive faculty We deno¬ 
minate SENSE, which has two modes or forms of being 
affeCled ; that is, either by a variety in fucceffwn, as in 
Time, or by a variety which co-exifts, as in Space. But 
thefe two peculiar modes or forms of receiving are always 
prefent to the mind, (for they are the very elements of 
the fenfitive faculty,) and may therefore be called Intui¬ 
tions ; but certainly not fuch as are given from without, 
and are in their nature contingent. Thefe two forms, on 
the other hand, are effential and condituent parts of the 
mind, confequently mud be always prefent to it. Hence 
they are abfolutely neceffary and univeri’al ; and on this 
account they may be called Pure Intuitions. 
All the matter of which the world is compofed being 
thus accounted for, it only remains to (how how this mat¬ 
ter is modified by the mind, in order to produce the im- 
menfe variety of forms or (hapes that conftitute the beau¬ 
tiful arrangement of objefts which we denominate Na¬ 
ture. That the mind is aCtive no one who reflects for a 
moment will doubt; for what is thinking but an aCtion of 
the mind ? But there are only two ways of being aCtive ; 
the one is to create the objefts with which we are occu¬ 
pied, both as to matter and form; and the other is merely 
to join and feparate the matter that is given to the mind, 
and thus to conditute the objects that prefent themfelves 
to it. The former pofition, however, is confeffedly be¬ 
yond the reach of our capacity, and belongs to the Deity 
alone. The latter then mud be the activity which the 
mind exerts. Now as the mind is prefented with given 
matter, nothing remains for it to do but to give a form 
to this matter. Let us here examine how the mind pro¬ 
ceeds to give a form or unity to the given matter. 
We have already dated that the Understanding is a 
Spontaneity or aCtive faculty, and it has been (hown that it 
is abfurd to fay the mind creates the objefts of furround¬ 
ing nature. What then is the fpecies of adivity that the 
Underfunding, or intellect, exerts upon this given matter, 
or Senfation, in order to produce that form or unity of the 
matter which we denominate an objeft of Nature ? Let 
us minutely examine the objefts of Nature, and I am 
firmly of opinion, that the mod fcrupulous invedigator of 
nature will admit, that all the objefts which compofe our 
world are abfolutely comprehended under the twelve 
unities, or elementary forms, or Categories; that it is the 
efforts of thefe twelve activities alone that can even ren¬ 
der the notion of an objeft of nature podibie ; and that 
the refult of the joint effort of thefe twelve aftivities is 
for this reafon called the objective unity of the Underfund¬ 
ing. We cannot pretend to the (lighted knowledge of 
any objeft whatever that is not comprehended under this 
objeftive unity. Hence it is evident that tjje fenfations 
by which our pafivc faculty is impreffed are elevated into 
tiie forms and //tapes of objefts by thefe twelve Aftivities, 
or Categories, which wholly and entirely conditute 
that very power which we call Understanding. The 
following procedure takes place from the natural con- 
druftion of the mind, and even without our being con- 
fcious of the faft: namely, when the Noumenon, or the 
thing in itfelf (which is out of time and J’pace'), afts upon 
our receptivity, we are compelled to fay we are in a date of 
fenfation, or, in other words, that our receptivity is affefted’. 
This fenfation is immediately modified by the twelve Clt- 
tegories, or by theUnderdanding in virtue of its objeftive 
unity ; and that thing arifes which we denominate an 
objeft of nature, which, in drift philofophical language, 
4 (hould 
