130 
PHILOSOPHY. 
we may find, that the mind itfelf, by virtue of its Cate¬ 
gories, is not only the real author of the laws of nature 
which govern the phenomena, but actually the author of 
nature itfelf, as well with regard to its beautiful and har¬ 
monious unities, forms, or fhapes, as to its lading and 
fubftantial appearance, and indeed even to its decay and 
regeneration. 
We have already proved that every objedt of nature 
muftconfift of a variety, or matter, and that this matter 
mud be given to the mind from without; confequently, 
if the mind is to be adtive with regard to this given 
matter, it can only be in giving to it a form or unity. 
Now, according to cur definition of the Understanding, 
or Intellect, it confifts of twelve A< 5 livities, named after 
Ari i\ot\e Categories-, and, if there were no matter, or variety 
of parts, given to this faculty, in what way could it be 
adtive? To create we have proved is beyond human ca¬ 
pacity; then its adlion mud confilt in connexion; and 
this is really the fadt. The Understanding connects the 
Scnfations, or matter received, by Senfe. When Senfe is 
affedted, Under(landing immediately arranges thefe affec¬ 
tions under the foul - claffes to which its own Categories 
belong: for inftance, if we are affedted from without, we 
are compelled to fay that, according to Quantity, it is 
either one thing, many things, or all things, that affedts us ; 
according to Quality, we muff aflert that it is a Real 
Thing bounded by Negations, confequently it is Limited ; 
according to Relation, we muff affirm that it is either a 
Sub/lance, -or the cffeCt of a fubftance, or the part of a whole. 
Thefe nine adtive powers of the underftanding are called 
conftitutive, becaufe they pofitively conffitute the various 
objects of Nature; for it is impoffible to difcover any ob¬ 
ject in the world in which thefe peculiar and elementary 
forms are not inherent. 
Let us, for example, take the objedt Man ; and we fhall 
find that all the knowledge we poffefs of him is, that when 
heis confidered, firff, under Relation, we find him to be 
a Subfiance having Accidents-, fecondly, that he is the Ef¬ 
fect of a Cavfe, that is to fay, he did not produce himfelf, 
but is indebted for his exiftence to his parents, as znEff'eCl 
refultingfrom theira6tivity as a Caufe ; and laftly, he Hands 
under ACliun and Rc-aflion, by which his fituation in fpace 
is determined by other fubflances. Secondly, confidered 
under Quality, he is evidently a Reality in Time and 
Space, whole extent is determined by Negations ; and thus 
he is completely Limited. Thirdly, confidered under 
Quantity, he can be only One, Many, or All-, but he 
belongs to the clafs of Unity, for he is but One Man. 
Fourthly and laftly, under Modality he is poffible, be¬ 
caufe he adtually exifts-, that is, fills up a determinate 
Time and occupies a certain portion of Space-, but we have 
no ground to fay that he is necefj'ary, or muff exifl in all 
time. Here we find him determined by the Category 
Exiftence. We may here remark, without the lealt fear of 
contradidtion, that our knowledge of the objedfs of nature 
confifts of nothing but Sensations modified by the Ca¬ 
tegories of Underftanding, as above deferibed; and thefe 
objedis areconfequently only Phenomena, orappearances. 
Thus all Nature is only a colledtion of Phenomena ; and 
the real objedfs, or the things in themfelvcs, are entirely 
concealed from our knowledge; being only the caufes of 
tile phenomena, and out of Time and Space, confequently 
out of the fphere of our knowledge : they are called Non- 
menu. Man therefore, properly fpeaking, muff be con¬ 
fidered at once as phenomenon and noumenpn. While we 
contemplate him as an objedt of nature, he occupies Time 
and Space, and is nothing but a collection of Jenfalions, 
arranged under the objedfive unity by the Categories, and 
is thus conffituted an objedf of nature. But, when we 
confider him as a nGumcuon, we feparate him from the 
fphere of nature, and refledl on him as a thing in itfelf, that 
is, as out of Time and Space, and beyond the lphere of 
the intelledf. But thefe twelve notions, w’hich render 
experience poffible, are effential conftituent parts of the 
mind; they are abjblutely nccejary and univerfal, for think¬ 
ing cannot be carried on without them; and on this ac¬ 
count they may be called pure Conceptions, or Catego* 
RIES. 
That Man is confidered as a noumenon depends entirely 
upon our third or Higheft Faculty, denominated Reason. 
This faculty by the definition is dated to adt free from 
Time and Space-, but, if it alls, and does not create, it 
muft have given matter to adt upon or unite. This indeed 
is the fadt; the matter that is furnifhed for this purpofe 
is no other than the Categories themfelves; for, as they 
are the elements of the Underftanding itfelf, they canfiot 
poflibly be in Time and Space, which are the Elements of 
Senfe. The matter, or variety, therefore, with which 
Reason is occupied, is of fo pure a nature, as to be al¬ 
ready free from the conditions of Time and Space. It is 
no wonder then that the unities formed of this matter 
fliould be alfo free from the Conditions of Time and 
Space. But thefe Unities are termed Ideas, and'nothing 
can be more true than that the objedfs of our ideas are 
out of Time and Space. Who will venture to aflert that 
the Deity is an objedf which the natural philofopher can 
analyze, or of which he can in any way take cognizance ? 
All information regarding the Idea of Cod, of our own 
Soul, and of a Future State, muft be fought for in Meta- 
phyfics alone; for the inveftigator of Nature will never 
fucceed in throwing any light upon thefe fubjedls. All 
the objedfs of thefe Ideas are out of Time and Space, and 
confequently out of the fphere of material Nature. 
Nothing now is more eafy than to diftinguifh the limits 
of thefe two fciences, and to determine, with the greateft 
certainty, to which the objedt under contemplation ftridtly 
belongs. If the objedf is an Intuition which muft necei- 
fiarily fill up a portion of Time and Space, it appertains to 
Physics. If, on the other hand, this objedf cannot be 
met with in Time and Space, and yet merits inveftigation, 
fuch as the immortality of the Soul, then it is an Idea of 
Reafon, and properly belongs to Metaphysics. In othe\ - 
words, Phyjlcs treats of all that can affedf the Senfes; Me- 
taphyfics of all that cannot affedf the Senfes. When 
Reafon applies its Ideas to the conceptions of objedfs in 
time and fpace, from its unreftrained power of adtion it 
conftantly extends the conception till it raifes it to the 
abfolute or infinite-, it however then ceafes to be Know¬ 
ledge, which is ffridfly confined to Time and Space, and 
becomes an Idea, which is abfolute or infinite: for in¬ 
ftance, every event in the world has a caufe, but this caufe 
is alfo an event, and has again another caufe, and fo oil 
ad infinitum ; and it is this procedure of Reafon that at 
laft raifes the Idea of a firft or abfolute CauJ'e. This faculty 
is perfedlly free ; it is not impelled by any thing external; 
the firft exertion of its power is toconnedf the Categories 
into Ideas, which muft evidently be free from the con¬ 
ditions of Time and Space. Thel'e Ideas are abfolutely 
necejfary to our thinking on all objedfs out of Time and 
Space, objedfs which are by no means indifferent to us, 
fiuch as God, tlie Moral Laws, a Future State, See. The 
Ideas thus raifed from the Categories form, therefore, the 
very elements of that Faculty which we term Reafon, 
and may be called Pure Ideas. 
How was it poffible, after the explanation here given of 
Kant’s Analyfis of the Mind, where it is proved that in all 
our knowledge, in perception, in conception, &c. the 
matter muft be given and the form produced by the mind-, 
I lay how was it poffible, when I felt the convidtion of the 
above, that I could difpute the truth of Principle VII. of 
Nitfch’s Introdudfion, and the confequent admiflion of 
the remaining Hundred ? But fomeihing of ftill greater 
importance refuited from this convidfion ; and that was 
the convidtion that tlieentire “Critic of Pure Reason” 
was a book like the Elements of Euclid, that contained 
Truth and nothing but Truth. 
Can any one read this plain ftatement of Kant’s Ana¬ 
lysis of the Mind, and ftill afk, what this immortal 
Man has added to the Philofophy of Mind ! Will Mr. 
Stewart ftill have the hardihood to aflert that the extradf 
from 
