PHILOSOPHY, 
131 
from Dr. Cad worth with which he has favoured us in 
page 153 of the fecond part of his DilTertation fo often 
alluded to, wherein Cudworth enumerates a vail number 
of relative ideas which Mr. Stewart feems to have miftaken 
for the original elements of the Mind, bears the leaft re- 
femblance to the doflrine of Kant ? Thus we have 
Wijdotn, Folly, Prudence, Imprudence, Knowledge, Igno¬ 
rance, &c. &c. See. The doftor then favours us with a lift: 
of his relative notions and ideas, among which occur the 
words Cause and Effect, to which Mr. Stewart feems to 
give a decided preference, diftinguifhing thefe two words 
by Capital Letters. He further ftates, that his objeft here 
is not to defend the folidity of this doftrine, but merely 
to diredi the attention of his, readers to “ the dole refem- 
blance between Cudworth and Kant.” In Mr. 
Stewart’s “ Elements of the Mind,” he ranks the Category 
Canfe and Effedl under his Section of natural prejudices. 
Whether this gentleman has fince thought proper to era¬ 
dicate this notion from his “ natural prejudices” I am at 
a lofs to determine by any thing that has lince proceeded 
from his pen. Confidering the above notions of Cud¬ 
worth as elementary parts of the human mind, there will 
need very little refleftion to determine under which of 
his own Ideas to clafs them, under Wifdorii or Folly. I 
ftiould be further tempted to fay that there was great 
folly in comparing this precious relic of the philofophy of 
the 17th century with that bold and perfeft theory given 
us by Kant in the iSth. If Mr. Stewart felt it a duty to 
direit the attention of his readers to the clnj’e rejemblance 
of thefe two fyltems, I muft confefs I feel it an imperative 
duty to warn his readers from being milled by his ftate- 
ment. 
Every candid reader will, I hope, feel that I have fuc- 
cefsfully vindicated Kant’s claim to originality, and all'o 
perceive the additions that have been made by Kant to 
Hume’s fuggeftion regarding Canfe and EffeM, as well as 
the ftriking difference between the accidental enumeration 
of an indefinite number of ideas, and the fyftematic and 
unchangeable clalfification of the elementary parts of the 
Human Mind, ns given in the foregoing Table. After 
all, it furely cannot fail to be very gratifying to Mr. 
Stewart to find the rapid advances that have been made in 
the Philofophy of Mind ; although he has, from fome un¬ 
fortunate circumftance, remained ignorant of their exift- 
ence. What will he fay when he finds himfelf prefented 
with a general Chart and Compafs to direit his future, 
wanderings among the attainable objefls of human curi- 
ofity ? He will no doubt feel the exftacy of the mariner 
who was inftru6fed in the ufe of the magnetic needle; 
fince, in his “ Elements of the Mind,” he dwells forcibly 
on the advantages to be derived from fuch a difeovery in 
the following very elegant language: “It is the Philo¬ 
fophy of the Mind alone, which, by furnifhing us with a 
general map of the field of human knowledge, can enable 
us to proceed with fteadinefs, and in an ufeful direftion; 
and while it gratifies our curiofity, and animates our ex¬ 
ertions, by exhibiting to us all the various bearings of 
our journey, can conduct us to thofe eminences from 
whence the eye may wander over the vaft and unexplored 
regions of fcience. Lord Bacon was the firft perfon who 
took this comprehenlive view of the different departments 
of fludy ; and who pointed out, to all the clafles oflirerary 
men, the great end to which their labours (hould confpire; 
the multiplication of the lources of human enjoyment, 
and the extenfion of man's dominion over nature. Had 
this objedt been kept fteadily in view by his followers, 
their difeoveries, numerous and important as they have 
been, would have advanced with ftill greater rapidity, and 
would have had a much more extenfive influence on the 
pradlical arts of life.” Elements of the Philofophy of the 
Human Mind, 3d edit. p. 47. The value of a difeovery 
of this nature has ftrongly imprelfed the mind of this 
elegant writer; for in the Firft Part of his Dilfertation, 
page 11, fpeaking of Bacon, he fays : “ It is impoflible to 
forbear admiring his fagacity in pointing out to future ad¬ 
venturers the unknown tracks ftill left to be explored by 
human curiofity. Nor muft it be forgotten, to the glory 
of his genius, that wli 3 t he failed to accomplifli remains 
to this day a defderatum in fcience-, that the intellectual 
chart delineated by him is,-with all its imperfections, the 
only one of which modern philofophy has yet to boaft.” 
What muft be the joy of this accomplifhed writer when 
this dejideratum inJ'cience is introduced to his notice; when 
he is prefented with an intelledlval chart delineated with 
fuch aftonifhing accuracy as to defy all attempts at future 
improvement, nay, in which the very impoffibility of this 
taking place, either by additions or fubtradfions, is de- 
monftrated ? Such is the Map of the Human Mind which 
the genius of Kant has enabled us to prefent to the world. 
(See vol. xi. page 608. of this Encyclopaedia.) When we 
refledt that we are now in pofleflion of a guide to our 
further refearches which pofterity can only admire for its 
perfedfion, but cannot improve, and whofe application 
and pradfical utility will have a tendency to confine the 
induftry and genius of future inveftigators to the real ad¬ 
vancement of the virtue and happinefs of the fpecies, and 
will communicate a dignity to the molt fubordinate pur- 
fuits which are in any way iubfervient to this end ; how 
can we beftow fufficient praife on the author of this dif¬ 
eovery ! Whatever glory is due to Bacon for pointing 
out to future adventurers the path they were to purfue, 
a ftill higher glory and renown muft attend the fuccefsful 
efforts of that individual who has accomplifhed this great 
achievement. Of this Map it may be faid with great 
truth, that, when it is fo univerfally adopted as to form 
the bafis of all our reafonings, (and, if truth is to prevail, 
this muft be the cafe,) there will be as much uniformity 
and agreement in fentiment on all fpeculative fubjedls as 
there is at prefent with refpedl to the axioms of geometry. 
The very difrefpedtful manner in which Mr. Stewart 
fpeaks of Kant’s Syftem on all occafions, would induce 
one to believe that he is in pofleflion of a better; inftead 
of which, the fadt feems to be, from his own confeflion, 
that he has no fyftem at all. I am fully borne out in this 
opinion by what occurs in the Second Part of his Differ- 
tation, page 68. He there relates an anecdote of Dr. 
Clarke when a child, which is as follows: “One of his 
parents afked him, Whether God could do every thing ? 
He anfwered, Yes ! Yet tvcll he remembered that he had 
even then a clear conviction in his own mind, that there was 
one thing which God could not do;—that he could not anni¬ 
hilate that Space which was in the room where they were." 
He then proceeds toftate, that “ The queftion concerning 
the necetfary exiftence of Time and Space formed one of 
the principal fubjedts of dilcuflion between Clarke and 
Leibnitz. According to the former, Space and Time are 
both of them infinite, immutable, and indeftrudlible. Ac¬ 
cording to his antagonift, /pace is nothing but the order 
of things co-exijliug, and time nothing but the order of 
things Juccefive! The notion of real abfolute fpace, in 
particular, ire pronounces to be a mere chimera and ftiper- 
jicial imagination ; clafling it with thofe prejudices which 
Bacon called idolatribus. As for the point here in difpute, 
I muft own, that it does not feem to me a jit fubjeSlfor 
argument; inafmuch as I cannot even form a concep¬ 
tion of the proposition contended for by Leibnitz. 
The light in which the queftion ftruck Clarke in his child¬ 
hood is the fame in which I am Jiill difpofed to view it; or 
rather, I/hould Jay, is the light in which I muft ever view it 
while the frame of my underfunding continues unaltered! 
Indeed I rather lean to the common theory , which fuppoles 
our firft ideas of Space, or Extenfion, to be formed by ab- 
ftra&ing this attribute from the other qualities eft matter.” 
This latter remark occurs in page 248 of the fame work. 
It is not to be f’uppofed that Mr. Stewart, after this 
candid acknowledgment, that he “cannot evenforma concep¬ 
tion of the propofilion contendedfor," relating to the fubjehlive 
reality of Time and Space, could apprehend the doflrine 
as maintai ned by Kant. He is equally alarmed at Berkeley’s 
arguments regard wgfpace, and feems to dread the anni¬ 
hilation! 
