PHILOSOPHY. 
j 32 
hilation of fpace as an external exijtence, anu as unhinging 
completely the natural conceptions of the mind. (Phil. 
Eflays, p. 93.) Berkeley by very folid and ingenious ar¬ 
guments had fucceeded fo far as to bring /pace into the 
mind ; but, having done this, he was at a lofs what to 
make of it, and thus he became an Idealijl. In his Prin¬ 
ciples of Human Knowledge, faction xxii. he fays: “ To 
what purpofe is it to dilate on that which may be dernon- 
ftrated with the utmoll evidence in a line or two, to any 
one that is capable of the leaft refieftion ? It is but look¬ 
ing into your own thoughts, and fo trying whether you 
can conceive it pofllble for a found, or figure, or motion, 
or colour, to exift without the mind, or unperceived. This 
eafy trial may make you fee, that what you contend for 
is a downright contradiftion. Infomuch, that I am con¬ 
tent to put the whole on this iffue ; if you can but con¬ 
ceive it pofilble for one extended moveable fubflance, or, in 
general, for any one idea, or any thing like an idea, to exifi: 
othenvife than in a mind perceiving it, I {hall readily 
give up the canfe.” Here we have two celebrated philo¬ 
sophers contending for diametrically-oppofite fyftems re¬ 
gard in g fpace ; the former dreadfully alarmed at the fup- 
pofition of overturning all his favourite views of nature, 
and all his early afl'oeiations; the latter not fearing the 
lead inconvenience from ftriftly following arguments that 
his antagonift cannot refute. Both thefe fyftems lead to 
abfurdities; the one t o Materialifm, the other to Idealifm. 
This, by ftriftly adhering to its own arguments, lofes the 
reality of the external world ; that, by converting every 
thing into matter and its mechanical effects, deprives us 
of a Deity, a Soul, and a Free Will! Yet, notwithftand- 
ing.ail thefe would-be fyftems, thank God, the u'orld is 
as fecure as ever, and the freedom of the will is not in 
the leaft infringed upon ! The difpute in queftion is not 
unlike that concerning the phenomenon of day and 
night, whether it is caufed by the revolution of the Earth 
round the Sun, or vice verfa. In all thefe cafes the phe¬ 
nomena proceed with their accuftomed regularity, how- 
over defective the theory may be that is invented for their 
explanation. Thus, though we loft the external world by 
Berkeley’s arguments, yet no one can run his head againlt 
a poft with impunity : and, though Stewart defends ex¬ 
ternal Space, vve will not fink fo deep into materialifm as 
to give up the freedom of the wili, and our moral ac¬ 
countability. Heaven be praifed ! xhefe pretended fyftems 
have not bereft us of our confcioufnefs to aft' in either 
cafe .according to the diftates of Reafon. In both thefe 
cafes, therefore, the plain man is the beft philofopher. 
Being, however, prefen ted with a philofophy which 
embraces all the truth in the pretended fyftems of thefe 
contending parties, and rejefts all the errors, abfurdities, 
and contradiftions, to which they inevitably lead ; can it 
be fuppofed for a moment that this fyftem, however new 
and contradictory, as it may at firft fight appear to our 
ufual mode of coufidering nature, will not poflefs very 
extraordinary attraftions for the refiefting mind, more 
particularly when, upon a clofe application of its prin¬ 
ciples, it is found in all cafes'to realize what it promifed, 
and never to lead to abfurdity or contradiftion, but, on 
every point upon which we are capable to reafon, both 
fpeculative and praftical, completely to fatisfy the enquir¬ 
ing mind ? Being once fairly initiated into, and familiar¬ 
ized with, that part of this fyftem which appears to con- 
tradift common fenfe without really doing fo ; and per¬ 
ceiving its extenfive application, and the beneficial reform 
that muft naturally enfue from fo large a mafs of genuine 
truth being infufed into the minds of future generations; 
who, I fay, can enter into the beauties of fuch a fyftem, 
and not bean enthufiaft ! The rapturous delight afforded 
by the contemplations on the fublirner parts of our nature, 
induced by this fyftem, cannot eafily be exchanged for 
the vague, uncertain, and often-contradiftory, opinions 
on thefe points that are diftufed through all prior fyftems. 
When trutli is once difeovered, who can adopt error! 
That this immenfe fabric, Transcendental Philoso¬ 
phy, could never have been raifed if Time and Space had 
not been proved to be only modes of receiving the matter 
of all our knowledge, and confequently only fubjeClive 
realities, is moft true ; for thofe w'ho contend for external 
exitingfpace independent of the mind, not only put a ftop 
to all philofophy, but aftually pull down all geometry, 
and render the conviction we obtain from that fcience of 
no higher value than that which arifes from ail empirical 
fciences; namely, the higheft degree of probability. 
“ While,” therefore, “ the frame of my underftanding con¬ 
tinues unaltered I cannot withhold my aftent from the 
powerful truth, that Time and Space are only Subjective 
Realities. 
On the fubjeft of the Senfitive Faculty, it is now, I 
hope, fufficiently apparent, that Mr. Stewart has no 
fyftem whatever; and, as to the faft of the mind’s being 
a receptacle furnifhed with materials from without, which 
is the corner-ftone of Kant’s fyftem, I need only repeat 
his own words: “That the mind cannot, without the 
grofleft abfurdity, be confidered in the light of a recep¬ 
tacle which is gradually furniftied from without by ma¬ 
terials introduced by the channel of the fenfes, I have 
already (hown at fufficient length.” (Elements of the 
Human Mind, page 98.) It requires very little fagacity 
to determine whether it be not better to adopt even an 
imperfeft fyftem, than none at all. 
We will now fee what fuccefs has attended this philo- 
fopher’s efforts with regard to a definition of the Under¬ 
standing, the fecond of our intellectual powers , to the 
analyfis of which he has devoted fo much time. Perhaps 
here he may have been more fortunate, and the refult of 
his refleftions may have been more confiftent and fyfte- 
matic. In his work entitled “Elements of the Philofophy 
of the Human Mind,” I do not find any chapter devoted 
to the contemplation of the properties of the Underftand- 
ing, the fecond original faculty of the mind; and as, ac¬ 
cording to Kant’s fyftem, the office of this faculty is to 
form Conceptions, I was in hopes there might be fome 
coincidence of opinion on this head, as Mr. Stewart has 
entitled his Third Chapter in the work above mentioned 
“ Of Conception.” Now let us fee what here prefents 
itfelf. At page 133 of this work Mr. Stewart ftates, “ By 
Conception, I mean that power of the mind, which enables 
it to form a notion of an abfent objeft of perception ; or 
of a fenfation which it has formerly felt. I do not contend 
that this is exclufively the proper meaning of the word, 
but I think that the faculty which I have now defined 
deferves to be diftinguifhed by an appropriated name. 
Conception is often confounded with other powers - When a 
painter makes a pifture of a friend who is abfent or dead, 
he is commonly laid to paint from memory: and the ex- 
preflion is fufticiently correft for common converfation. 
But in an analyfis of the mind, there is ground for a dif- 
tinftion. The power of conception enables him to make 
the features of his friend an objeft of thought, 1 o as to 
copy the relemblance; the power of memory recognizes 
thefe features as a former objeft of perception. Every aft 
of memory includes an idea of the pad; conception implies 
no idea of time whatever. According to this view of the 
matter, the word conception correfponds to what was called 
by the fchoolmen Jhnple apprekenjion ; with this difference 
only, that they included, under this name, ourapprehen- 
fion of general propofitions; whereas I ftiouid wifh to 
limit the application of the word conception to our fenfa- 
tions, and the objefts of our perceptions. I {hall pot in¬ 
quire, at prefent, into the proper Englifh meaning of the 
words conception and imagination. In a ftudy fuch as this, 
fo far removed from the common purpofes of fpeech, fome 
latitude may perhaps be allowed in the ufe of words; 
provided only we define accurately thofe we employ, and 
adhere to our own definitions.” In this writer’s Philofo- 
phical Eflays, page 10. fpeaking of our perfonal identity, 
he ftates, that the words famenefs and identity are here ufed 
in different fenfes. “ Of the meaning of thele words, when 
applied to perfons, I confefs I am not able to give a logical 
3 definition; 
