133 
P II ILOS'OP II Y. 
definition ; but neither can I define fenfation, memory, m- 
lition, nor even exijtence.” 
I lament to lay, that the attempt at fyjlem heredifplay- 
ed is equally unfortunate with all this gentleman’s other 
efforts. I have fearched in vain for any thing like a de¬ 
finition of Human Reason, both in Mr. Stewart’s “Ele¬ 
ments of the Philofophy of the Human Mind,” and in his 
quarto volume of “ Effays.” In his “ Outlines of Moral 
Philofophy,” 3d edition, I find the following queftion at 
the paragraph marked 107. “ In what, then, does the 
difference between man and the brutes confift ? Do their 
faculties differ from each other in degree only ; oris there 
an effential diftinblion between the Rational and Animal 
natures?” Again, in the paragraph marked 73. “Not- 
withltanding the commonly-received dobtrine concerning 
the radical diftinblion between Intuition and ReaJ'oning , 
it may be doubted if the one of thefe powers be not im¬ 
plied in the other.” From thefe remarks, and what has 
iince fallen from his pen, it does not appear that Mr. 
Stewart has made any very great advancement in his fo 
long promifed Analyfis of the Intellectual Powers, although 
he mult have devoted confiderably more than thirty years 
to this favourite objebt. I have already adverted to the 
fingularity of the circumltance, that this gentleman fhould 
be Itill in quell of that which has been difeovered nearly 
Haifa century; a faff to which I have repeatedly endea¬ 
voured to awaken his attention. About ten years ago, 
I forwarded to him a fokrtion, on Kantefian principles, of 
the problem contained in the paragraph marked 322. 
Does the dijfolution of the Body necejfarily infer the extinc¬ 
tion of the Soul ? Anfwer No ! Proof: For the Soul does 
not exift in Time and Space. Therefore that which 
does not exift in Time ami Space cannot poflibly become 
extinct in Time and Space. Q. E. D. By dijfolution is 
implied merely the change of the fubftance called Body 
into another form. For the quantity of matter in nature 
is neither increafed nor dirainilhed, but only undergoes 
various changes as to form. But furely that which is out 
of the limits of Nature cannot be at all affcbted by the ope¬ 
rations of the Caufes which are ftribtly confined within 
thole limits. Mr. Stewart politely informed me that his 
numerous literary engagements prevented his attending 
to my communications. 
I ftiall now proceed to fliow more particularly what ad¬ 
ditions Kant has really made to Hume’s doubt, and to 
the replies of the Englilh philofophers on that fubjebt. 
Firft, then, Hume fell upon the fingle notion of Caufe and 
EffeCt-, and, being unable to fatisfy himfelf how he came 
by this notion, he abandoned his lyftem in defpair. Kant 
caught a glimpfe of what Hume was about; and, after 
many years deep inveftigation land intenfe thinking, he 
fucceeded in refolving Hume’s difficulty; and not only 
accounted for the legitimacy of the notion of which our 
acute countryman doubted, but added eleven more 
notions to the one in queftion ; and then he found him¬ 
felf in poffeffion of his boafted Categories. The anta- 
gonifts of Hume had not perceived the drift of his invef- 
tigations ; but, fearing the tendency of his dobtrine, they, 
from the belt motives, endeavoured to refute it. Little 
did they imagine that it contained the germ of fo won¬ 
derful and perfebt a fyftein. Kant remarked that they 
always admitted as a matter of courfe the very thing 
which Hume doubted, and proved with vehemence and 
great indilcretion that which never entered his mind to 
doubt, Belides thefe additions to Hume’s reflebtions, the 
fyltem of this great man furniflies ample replies to all Mr. 
Stewart’s difficulties, as well as to the innumerable per¬ 
plexities in which all prior fyftems were involved.' In the 
13th volume of this work, at page 17, will be found a lift 
of 26 definitions, which not only embrace thofe objebts 
which Mr. Stewart is unable to define, but many which 
he has not attempted to define; fucli as Sctjation, Con¬ 
ception, Memory , Sec. I mull not clals the word Sub¬ 
stance among the others; for that, although not per- 
Vol. XX. No. 1356. 
ceived by this writer, is of a very different ftnmp from all 
the reft. It is a Category, a full account of which has 
already been given. 
Fcr Mr. Stewart’s inability to define the words above 
enumerated, and the many other difficulties and contra- 
dibtions in which he is involved, he is fincerely to be 
pitied; but for the wilful or ignorant mifreprefentation 
of a word that ProfefTbr Kant has adopted to exprefs a 
fundamental part of his fyltem, he is not to be pardoned. 
In page 192 et feq. of the Second Part of his Diilertation, 
the following words occur: “Such, however, it would 
appear, is the fabt. The word Reprefentation (Vorftellung) 
is now' the German fubftitute for Idea ; nay, one of the 
molt able works which Germany has produced fince the 
commencement of its new philofophical era, is entitled 
Nova Theoria Facultalis lleprefentalivas Humana:. In the 
fame work, the author has prefixed, as a motto to the 
fecond book, in which he treats of the RepreJ'entalive Fa¬ 
culty in general, the following fentence from Locke, which 
he ieems to have thought himfelf entitled to affurae as a 
firft principle: ‘Since the mind, in all its thoughts and 
reafonings, hath no other immediate objebt but its own 
ideas (reprefentations), which it alone does or can con¬ 
template, it is evident that our knowledge is only con- 
verfant about them.’ (Locke’s Eflay, b. iv. ch. 1.) In a 
country where this metaphyfical jargon ftili pnffes current 
among writers of eminence, it is vain to expebt that any 
folic! progrefs can be made in the indubtive philofophy of 
the human mind.” 
Surely this gentleman might deal fairly with a philofo- 
pher who is now no more ! and who has left as the refult 
of a 1110ft abtive life in the department of literature, works 
that merit at lealt to be in veftigated, and not to be reviled. 
If Mr. Stewart, in his pretended criticifm of the “ Critic 
of Pure Reafon," has met with pofitions that are above 
his comprchenfion, he mull not be fuffered, by his high 
authority, to deter others from exerting upon them, that 
free gift of God, their own intellebts. The mifreprefen¬ 
tation above ftated is really not to be palled over without 
a remark. “ Representation is notv the Berman fuhjli- 
tutefor Idea!” This is the gentleman who is to bring 
Kant’s philofophy down to its proper level! If Mr. Stewart 
had obferved of his favourite author, Locke, that he claffed 
material and immaterial objebts under the term idea, he 
would have faid juftly, for this unfortunate confufion 
pervades his whole fyltem; and I do perfebtly coincide 
with Hume in opinion that Addifon will be read with 
pleafure when Locke will be entirely forgotten. Does 
this perverlion of Kant’s phrafeology arife from any 
mental incapacity in Mr. Stewart to comprehend plain 
Englilh, or in what way is ic to be accounted for ? I do 
well remember that, in order to obviate this confufion in 
Kant’s lyftem, for its confequences are abfolutely fatal, I 
conltrubted a Table exprefsly for the purpole of rendering 
this fubjebt perfebtly clear to Mr. Stewart’s own appre- 
lienfion. This Table of the Elements of Knowledge I 
afterwards publillied in the article Logic in this Ency¬ 
clopaedia, vol. xiii. page 18, where every one who can read 
will perceive that Reprefentation is a Genus comprehend¬ 
ing under it three Species, Intuition, Conception, and 
Idea, each of which is fo completely diftinguilhed from 
the others, that nothing but a mental defebt or a deter¬ 
mination to pervert plain fenfe can poffibly confound 
them. The treatife on Logic, which contains this Table, 
I had the honour to forward to Mr. Stewart in the year 
1813, the receiptof which was mol’c politely acknowledged. 
It is of the utmoft confequence to the new SyJ'tem to 
clear up this important word. This however could not 
have been effebted but from the matchlefs “ Map of the 
Human Mind” with which the genius of Kant has fur- 
nilhed us. It may be well to go a little into detail upon 
this fubjebt ; for, if this diftinbtion is not clearly com¬ 
prehended, no part of the lyftem can be underftood. 
Firft, then, the difeovery of this aftonilhing Map, oreo/n- 
M m s plete 
