134 
p n I l o s o p ii y. 
plete analyfis of the Mind, has enabled its author to raife 
that beautiful and fublime ftrudlure, Transcendental 
Philosophy, which has the following 
AXIOMS. 
i. Consciousness is the^power to diftinguifli ourfelves 
from furrounding objedls and from our own thoughts. 
а. Time is the Form of Internal Sense. 
3. Space is the Form of External Sense. 
4. Sense makes Intuitions. 
5. Understanding makes Conceptions. 
б. Reason makes Ideas. 
DEFINITIONS. 
1. Intuitions joined to Conceptions make Know¬ 
ledge. 
2. Conceptions joined to Conceptions make 
Thoughts. 
The refults of the three primitive and original Fa¬ 
culties of the Human Mind may be ftill further difplayed 
thus : 
INTUITION, CONCEPTION, IDEA, 
prefent in abfent in out of 
Time and Space. Time and Space. TiMEandSPACE. 
Now it does appear wonderful how any human being 
can poftibly confound thefe notions as above difplayed. 
Surely everyone who is at all acquainted with his verna¬ 
cular tongue cannot fail to diftinguifli between prefent, 
abfent, and out of. I beg to aflame the reader that there 
is nothing cabiliftical in thefe words. On referring to 
that very excellent work of Rein hold t’s, en titled, “ A Few 
Theory of the reprefenting Faculty ,” each of thefe notions 
is cloiely examined, and reduced to its minuteft elements. 
In imitation of fo excellent a model, I will purfue this 
iubjecl ftill further, and ftate as follows. 
1. INTUITION. Every thing prefent in Time and 
Space, that we can feel, fee, hear, tafte, and fmell. 
2. CONCEPTION. Every thing abfent in Time and 
Space, that we can think of only, but cannot touch. 
3. IDEA. Every thing out of Time and Space, that 
we can think of only, but which can never come into 
Time and Space. 
If the above explanation of three words is not to be 
uniformly comprehended by the individuals of one nation 
who ufe the fame language, we muft give up all attempts 
to make ourfelves underitood. After this explanation, 
one would not expedlto hear Idea confounded with either 
of the other words, or that “ Reprefentation is now the 
German fubftitute for Idea.” But how could thefe dif- 
tindlions have been made, if Kant had not completely 
analyzed the Mental Powers ? The confufion of Locke 
arifes entirely from a want of this Analyfis. 
We are now enabled to (how fome pradlical application 
of this admirable Map of the Mind. Firft then, as all 
the objedls of nature are prefent when they affedl our 
Senfes, in conformity to this fyftem they muft be termed 
Intuitions. But, when thefe identical objedts ceafe to 
operate upon us, and to produce in us SenJ'ations, we muft 
declare them to be abfent, and they are confequently 
Conceptions. It is now evident that we have arranged 
the whole of Nature under thefe two words, prefent and 
abfent in Time and Space. The above arrangement does 
not admit of a fingle exception ; for in what fituation 
can that objedt be which is neither prefent nor abfent! It 
really appears almoft childifh to endeavour to llluttrate 
this by an example. But, after the grofs mifunderftand- 
ing with regard to idea that we have juft noticed, clear- 
nefs itfelf cannot be made too clear. Who, when his 
friend has left him, and gone to fome diftant place, will 
fay he is prefent! Neither can he fay that he is adtually 
operating upon him and aftedling his fenfes; for he can 
neither feel, fee, nor hear him, confequently his friend is 
at the moment no Intuition, though lie may have a Con¬ 
ception that he is gone to London ; or, if the perfou 
forming this judgment is himfelf in the Metropolis, he 
may fay he conceives that his friend is gone into the 
country. Again, when I gaze on St. Paul’s cathedral, I 
call it an Intuition, becaufe the objedt is prefent to my 
fenfes; but, when I have left the fpot and find myfelf 
out of the fphere of its adtion upon any of my fenfes, then 
I have only a Conception of it; for the objedt, St. Paul’s, 
may have fuffered fome accident; it may have fallen 
down : it would not then be the Intuition I laft had of it. 
Secondly, we can never apply the term Conception to pre¬ 
fent objedts; for this would be a contradidtion in terms. 
By Conception , in conformity to Kant’s fyftem, we mean 
only that mental form which the underftanding generates 
the inftant an objedt affedts our receptivity, or our fenfes 
generally. This form, when abftradted from the given 
matter, is nothing but a combination of the twelve Cate¬ 
gories, whofe joint efforts produce the objective unity, and 
which is that part or the form of the objedt that we ftore 
up in the mind, and carry about with us. But who will 
afl'ert that we alfo carry the matter of the various objedts 
about with us. Hence we may fay that Intuitions with¬ 
out conceptions are blind, and Conceptions without intu¬ 
itions are empty, and that intuition joined to conception 
conftitute knowledge. 
Here we have all nature clafied under prefent or abfent, 
or under Intuition or Conception; and this not 
merely an arbitrary arrangement fubjedt to any capricious 
alteration, but claffed for ever, that is for all future ge¬ 
nerations. This beautiful refuit is a confequence of that 
unparalleled Map of the Mind that Kant has furnifhed 
us with. All the matter of the univerfe is now reduced 
to fenfation-, the difpute therefore with regard to Matter 
and Mind muft now be at an end ; for matter is fenfa¬ 
tion, but fenfation is not Mind. We have now dilpofed 
of all material objeCls. 
This Map of the Mind applies, thirdly, to the objedls 
of thought. Thus, whatever objedt the mind can occupy 
itfelf about, that is not to be met with in Time and 
Space, muft be termed an Idea. On a curfory view it 
really, feems as if it were abfurd to talk about things out 
of Time and Space, as things of this defeription are out 
of the fphere of our knowledge. Yet, when we delibe¬ 
rately refledt, we find that there is a variety of objedls 
which can never be met with in Time and Space, but 
which are ftill objedls that we cannot in any waydifpenfe 
with. Who will venture to fay there is no God! becaule 
he has never found hifn to confift of material fubftance, 
or to become fenfible in Time and Space ? Would any 
one fay he has no Soul, becaufe he has never either feen, 
felt, heard, or in any way found it addrefs his fenfes ? 
Thefe objedls are not therefore objedls of nature, but yet 
they are objedls which the Human Mind will never re- 
linquifh. There is then no alternative but to clafs them 
under the term idea. What a happinefs to have the dif¬ 
pute between material and immaterial fubftances for ever 
put at reft ! Well may we fpeak in praife of fo wonderful 
an effort of human ingenuity as this aftonifhing Map. 
How confolatory is it to refledt on the innumerable be¬ 
nefits that refuit from this new Theory of Time and 
Space, efpecially when we confider its advantages in regard 
to the higher part of our nature. The proof it affords 
of the immortality of the Soul is fo conclusive, and at the 
fame time fo eafy, that it is furprifing Mr. Stewart fhould 
not have been ftruck with it. On the contrary, he ftarts 
like one from a reverie, and fays : “ Indeed, the whole of 
Kant’s moral fuperltrudture will he found to reft ulti¬ 
mately on no better bafis than the metaphyfical CONUN¬ 
DRUM, that the human mind (coniidered as a noume- 
non and not as a phenomenon) neither exifts in Space 
nor Time ! (Difiert. Part II. page 157.) 
It really is high time to put an end to the abfurd 
notion of an abfolute external Space, the arguments in fup- 
port of which tend to deprive us of a Deity, of the Im¬ 
mortality of the Soul, of a Future State, of the Moral Law, 
and even of the entire fcicnce of Geometry . If an exter¬ 
nal space can be maintained, we muff bid a lading 
4 adieu 
