PHILOSOPHY. 
knowledge which it ftiows to be infinite, and at the fame 
time prompting us to regulate and arrange this knowledge 
by clafiing it under the Six Ideas which it fuggefts. Now 
as all knowledge is confined to experience, the efforts of 
this faculty are ftriftly limited to Time and Sface. It 
is an abufe of this faculty when it attempts to determine 
objects out of the fphere of its aftion; and this abufe 
is termed Jpeculation . Secondly, Practical Reason, 
which conilantly exerts itfelf to regulate and produce the 
greateft poflible confiftency among our defires by always 
commanding us to aft reafonably, that is to realize the 
mode in which Reason acts. Now it is clear that the ef¬ 
forts of this faculty do not lie in the territory of experience, 
for the mechanifm of nature admits of no interruption. 
But in following the diftates of this faculty we evince a 
perfedtfreedom from all the powers of nature, and foaron 
the wings of ideas even to the Godhead ! It is this 
faculty that furnifhes an abode for the Soul that can 
never be infringed upon by the chargeable objefts of 
‘ nature. It is this faculty that founds the Moral Law, 
and holds it up as a faft in every one’s confcioufnefs. 
But whoever fubmits himfelf to the authority of this law 
acknowledges the Freedom of his Will ; for, as this law 
fprings from himfelf, it requires no foreign impulfe to 
induce obedience, it only requires reverence for the law 
which he has himfelf made. In faft, Practical Reafon is 
no other than Free Will ; and with this familiar expla¬ 
nation all difficulty muft difappear. It is this faculty 
that eftablifties the belief in God and immortality ! 
Is it not unjuft, then, to fay of the great and immortal 
founder of the eternally true and perfect fyjlems of Meta- 
phyfics and Morals , that he introduces one of thegrandeft 
and moft important parts of his fyftem as an after-thought, 
and merely to gain a temporary viftory over an adverfary ? 
But Hume in truth is no adverfary of Kant’s ; for the 
philofopher who is occupied in the calm contemplation 
of, and diligent fearch after, truth, can have neither oppo¬ 
nents noradverfaries. Indeed Kant, fo far from confider- 
ing Hume in thelight of an opponent, acknowledges that 
he is greatly indebted to this penetrating, fincere, and 
original, inquirer after truth. “Hume,” fays he, “(truck 
the firft fpark that roufed me from my dogmatical (lum¬ 
bers, and gave a new turn to my future fpeculations.” 
I am perfeftly at a lofs to difcover how attacks of this 
nature can at all promote the philofophy of Mind; they 
appear to me to be calculated to ftifle enquiry, and to 
diminifli the zeal of thofe who are earneftly engaged in 
promoting knowledge. 
The Principia of Newton on its firft appearance met 
with fimilar treatment; not becaufe it did not contain 
truth, but becaufe it contradifted the faffiionable opinions 
of the day. Such conduft might be pardoned in the un¬ 
thinking multitude ; but it cannot be forgiven in the 
grave philofopher who undertakes to inftruft mankind. 
Newton’s principles now form the elementary part of 
the education ; and to be ignorant of them is tobedefti- 
tute of education altogether. Why may not Kant’s 
principles, which are equally true, one^day form an indif- 
penfable part of early education in this country, as they 
do at the prefent day In Germany ? What Newton’s bio¬ 
grapher has faid of the Principia applies with equal force 
to the Critic of Pure Reafon. “ In faft, the confequences 
in the work flow with fuch rapidity from the principles, 
that the reader is often left to I'upply a long chain to con- 
neft them. It required, therefore, fome time before the 
world could underhand it. The beft mathematicians 
were obliged to ftudy it with care before they could 
make themfelves matters of it; and thofe of a lower order 
durft not venture upon it, till encouraged by the teftimo- 
nies of the learned. But at laft, when its worth came to 
be Efficiently known, the approbation which had been fo 
flowly gained'became univerfal, and nothingwas to be heard 
from all quarters, but admiration of what feemed to be 
the produftion of celeftial intelligence rather than of a 
man.” 
130 
In Buhle’s hiftorical (ketch of this philofophy, lie does 
not appear to me to interdict inveftigation, though Mr. 
Stewart aflerts that “ the account there given has involved, 
td his apprehenfion, in additional obfcurity, that fnvfte- 
rious doftrine !” Buhle does not attempt to teach the 
fyftem fundamentally, nor do I exactly confider him qua¬ 
lified for this ta(k. He has not even given a table of thofe 
efiential Elements of the Mind, the Categories. We 
may therefore difmifs Buhle ; and fay of him, that he is 
an author who has produced neither a beneficial nor 
baneful influencewith regard toTranfcendental Philofophy. 
I come now to the moft painful, though at the fame 
time the moft important, part of my fubjeft ; painful, be¬ 
caufe it has the appearance of a defire to cenfure a philo¬ 
fopher of high reputation, as well as a man of great worth. 
But what can be more important to the caufe of Truth 
than to refcue from grofs mifreprefentation the venerable 
charafter of a departed fage, who has facrificed his whole 
life at her altar. 
At the commencement of Seftion VII. on which I have 
been forced to dwell fo long, Mr. Stewart fays, “ My 
readers will perceive that I have taken fome pains to 
atone for my inability to read Kant’s works in the origi¬ 
nal, not only by availing myfeif of the Latin verfion of 
Born, but by confulting various comments on them which 
have appeared in the Englilh, French, and Latin, lan¬ 
guages. As commentators, however, and even tranfla- 
tors, are not always to be trufted to as unexceptionable 
interpreters of their authors’ opinions, my chief reliance 
has been placed on one of Kant's own coinpo/itions in Latin, 
his Diflertation ‘ De Mundi Sehfibilis atque Intelligibilis 
Forma et Principiis,’ which he printed as the l'ubjeft of a 
public deputation, when he was candidate for aprofeffor- 
(hip in the Univerfity of Konigtberg.” (See Differt. Part 
II. page 141.) 
In Note E E to the fame Diflertation, he has given 
Kant’s own Latin ftatement of his notions of Time and 
Space, extrafted verbatim,as he profeffes, from his Differta- 
tio n De Mundi Senfibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Princi¬ 
piis. KonigJbergjiyyo. I cannot refrain from prefenting the 
reader with his luminous tranflation of tbefe principles, 
accompanied as they are by his inftruftive comments. 
Our critic appears now to be making his grand effort to 
cruffi the philofophy altogether. We might fafely ven¬ 
ture to appreciate the force of this mighty attack, and to 
foretel its ultimate fuccefs, from the perplexed manner 
of its commencement. It begins thus: “ What is meant 
by this 1 do not pretend to underJland ! To this I can annex 
no meaning 7 What is to be underfood by this, it is not cafi) 
to conjedlure /” It may be well, however, to premife, that 
this Diflertation was written in the year 1770, exprefsly 
for the purpofe of obtaining the Metaphyfic.nl Chair in 
the Univerfity of Kbnigfterg, and in conformity with the 
academical ftatutes was to be written in Larin, and pub¬ 
licly debated upon. Kant obtained the appointment to 
this important office, which he filled with great credit to 
himfelf and advantage to his auditors. 
This fmall work is divided intofive feftions, as follows: 
1. Idea of the world in general. 2. The difference be¬ 
tween fenfible and intelleftual things in general. 3. The 
principles of the form of the fenfible world. 4, The 
principles of the form of the intelleftual world. 5. The 
method of treating fenfible and intelleftual things in Me- 
taphyfics. Our worthy profeffor, after the formidable 
difeuffion on the 20th of Auguft, 1770, takes occafion to 
fpeak of this performance, in Eliciting the opinion of a 
friend prior to his completing it for publication. On 
this occafion Kant fays: “ About a year ago I arrived at 
fome ideas which I flatter myfeif I (hall never have occa¬ 
fion to change, but which I hope ultimately to extend. 
In the prefent treatife I confider the firft and fourth flec¬ 
tions of minor importance, but the remaining feftions, 
though indifpofition has prevented me from completing 
them to my fatisfaftion, I ltill think contain matter that 
is well worthy of more elaborate inveftigation.” 
This 
