140 P H I L O 
This Differtation I poffefs in the original Latin, as well 
as a very faithful German tranflation; but I am ftrongly 
led tofufpeft that my highly-gifted opponent has never 
gladdened his eyes with a fight of either. This Latin 
Differtation was publiftied eleven years before the “ Cri¬ 
tic of Pure Reason;” and a flight infpeftion will 
lhow how very much they differ. In the former, Kant 
had done much towards determining Time and Space to 
be forms of thefenfible world, and eftablifhing them as ej- 
J'ential conftituent properties of the mind itfelf; or, in other 
words, as Mental Receptivities, that is, forms or modes of 
receiving fenfation. In perufing this treatife,it is eafy to 
•'difcern that his comprehenfive mind is labouring hard at 
the erection of a fyftem ; but that he has not yet accom- 
plifhed this mod defirable objeft, is evident from his own 
confeffion, for he has not as yet difcovered his Catego- 
iues. 
Now, as we have already premiftd, it is upon this 
Differtation that Mr. Stewart places his chief reliance. We 
inuft not, however, fail to repeat, that the “ Critic” was 
not publifhed until eleven years after the memorable de- 
cifion had taken place on the comparatively trifling work, 
the Inaugural Differtation. Had our celebrated Scotch me- 
taphyfician devoted the whole of his aftivelife to theftudy 
of the De Mundi Sevjibilis, Sfc. he would have been as ig¬ 
norant of the complete and permanent fyltem contained 
in the “ Critic of Pure Reason” as he is at the pre- 
fent day. My opinion, however, is, that he has not even 
j’een this Latin work of Kant’s, on which he places his chief 
reliance, but that he has merely availed himfelf of Dr. 
Willich’s chronological analyfis of Kant’s works. Mr, 
Stewart’s Latin quotations in his Note E E, appear to be 
extradfed from Willich ; for, wdierever the Dodlorhas de¬ 
viated from the original, Stewart has done the fame. 
Thedodlor has merely given enunciations of general pro- 
pofitions, without either the introductory remarks or the 
fubfequent proofs. In the note referred to, the fame 
conrfe has been adopted. In the Propofition marked 6, 
there is a confiderable retrenchment of the original in 
Dr. Willich, and precifely the fame retrenchment in the 
note of Mr. Stewart; fo that in fa 61 Mr. Stewart’s Latin 
runs word for word with that of the doflor. Surely, if 
Mr. Stewart really pofleffed Kant’s original Latin compo- 
iition upon which he places his chief reliance, he would in 
lome one cafe have gone nearer to the original than Dr. 
Willich has done ; and he would probably have chofen 
fome one extradl at lead, different from thofe which the 
doCtor has feleCted. 
I (hall now introduce the reader to Mr. Stewart’s very 
inftruCtive and edifying remarks upon thefe extracts, by 
the ftudy of which he has qualified himfelf in fo eminent 
a degree to review, and finally to denounce, the “ Critic 
of Pure Reason.” In Note E E, page 247 of the Se¬ 
cond Part of Mr. Stewart’s Difi’ertation, he fays : “Kant’s 
notions of Time are contained in the following (even pro- 
pofitions : 1. Idea lemporis non oritur, fedfupponitur a Jen- 
ftbus. 2. Idea temporis ejl fmgularis, non generalis. Tern- 
pus enim quodlibet non cogitatur, nil! tanquam pars 
Urdus ejufdetn temporis immenfi. 3. Idea itaque temporis 
eft intuitus, et quoniatn ante omnem fenfationem concipi- 
tur, tanquam conditio refpeCtuum in fenfibilibus obvio- 
rum, eft intuitus, non fenfualis, fed punts. 4. Tempos eft 
quantum continuum et legum continui in mutationibus 
univerfi principium. 5. Tempos non eft objeSlivum aliquid 
et reale, nec fubftantia, nec accidens, nec relatio, fed (ub- 
jeCtiva conditio, per naturam mentis lnimante neceffaria, 
quselibet fenfibilia certa lege fibi co-ordinandi, et intuitus 
purus. 6. Tempus eft conceptus veriflimus, et, per om¬ 
nia poflibilia fenfuum objefta, in infinitum patens, intui¬ 
tive repraefentationis conditio. 7. Tempus itaque eft 
principium for male mundi fenfibilis abfolute primum. 
“With relpeCl to Space, Kant lfates a feries of fimilar 
propofitions, aferibing to it very nearly the fame meta- 
phyfical attributes as to Time, and running as far as poffi- 
ble a fort of parallel between them. A. Conceptus Jpatii 
SOPH Y. 
non ahftrahitur a fenfalionibus externis. B. Conceptus fpatii 
eft fmgularis reprafentatio omnia in fe comprehendens, non 
J'ubfe continens notio abftraCfa et communis. C. Concep¬ 
tus fpatii itaque e/l intuitus purus; cum fit conceptus fin- 
gularis ; fenfationibus non conflatus, fed omnis fenfatio- 
nis extern® forma fundamentalis. D. Spatium non eft 
aliquid objeflivi et realis, nec fubftantia, nec accidens, nec 
relatio; fed fubjeSlivum et ideale, e natura mentis ftabili 
lege proficifcens, veluti fchema, omnia omnino externe 
fenfa fibi co-ordinandi. E. Quanquam conceptus fpatii, 
ut objeCtivi alicujus et realis entis vel affeCfionis, fit ima- 
ginarius, nihilo tamen fecius reJpeBive ad fenfibilia quee- 
cunque, non folum eft veriffimus, fed et omnis veritatis in 
fenfualirate externa fundamentum. 
“ Thefe propofitions are extracted from a Differtation 
written by Kant himfelf in the Latin language. Their 
obfeurittj , therefore, cannot be aferibed to any mifapprehen- 
fion on the part of a tranflator. It was on this account 
that I thought it better to quote them in his own un¬ 
altered words, than to avail myfelf of the correfponding 
paffage in Born’s Latin verfion of the Critique of Pure 
Reafon. To each of Kant’s propofitions concerning 
Time and Space I (hall fubjoin a (liort comment, follow¬ 
ing the fame order in which thefe propofitions are ar¬ 
ranged above. 
1. That the idea of Time has no refemblance to any of 
our fenfations, and that it is, therefore, not derived from 
fenfation immediately and direCtly, has been very often 
obferved ; and, if nobody had ever obferved it, the fall is 
fo very obvious, that the enunciation of it could not enti¬ 
tle the author to the praife of much ingenuity. Whether 
‘this idea befuppofed in all our fenfations,’ or (as Kant 
explains himfelf more clearly in his third propofition) ‘ be 
conceived by the mind prior to all fenfation,’ is a queftion 
which feems to me at lead doubtful ; nor do I think the 
opinion we form concerning it a matter of the jmalleft impor¬ 
tance. One thing is certain, that this idea is an infepara- 
ble concomitant of every aft of memory with refpeft to 
pad events ; and that, in whatever way it is acquired, we 
are irrefiftibiy led to aferibe to the thing itfelf an exiftence 
independent of the will of any being whatever. 
2. On the fecond propofition I have nothing to remark. 
The following is the moft intelligible tranflation of it 
that I can give. “ The idea of Time is lingular, not ge¬ 
neral ; for any particular length of Time can be conceived 
only as a part of one and the fame immenfe whole.” 
3. From thefe premifes (fuch as they arc) Kant con¬ 
cludes, that the idea of Time is intuitive; and that this 
intuition, being prior to the exercife of the fenfes, is not 
empirical, but pure. The conclufion here muft neceffa- 
rily partake of the uncertainty of the premifes from which 
it is drawn; but the meaning of the author does not feem 
to imply any very erroneous principle. It amounts, in¬ 
deed, to little more than an explanation of fome of his 
peculiar terms. 
4. That Time is a continued quantity is indifputable. 
To the latter claufe of the fentence I can annex no meaning 
but this, that time enters as an effential element into our 
conception of the law of continuity, in all its various ap- 
plications to the changes that take place in Nature. 
5. In this propofition K.ant affiimcs the truth of that much- 
conlefted, and to me incomprehenftble, doGlrine which denies 
the objeElive reality of time. He leems to conliderit merely 
as a lubjedfive condition, infeparably connedted with the 
frame of the Human Mind, in confequence of which it ar¬ 
ranges fenfible phenomena, according to a certain law, in 
the order of fucceflion. 
6. What is meant by calling Time a true conception Ido 
not profefs to under fund ; nor am I able to interpret the re¬ 
mainder of the fentence inany way but this, that we can find 
no limits to the range thus opened in our conceptions to 
the fucceflion of fenfible events. 
7. The conclufion of the whole matter is, that Time is 
* abfolutely the firft formal principle of the fenfible world.’ 
I can annex no meaning to this; but I have tranflated the 
1 originalj 
