P H I L O 
original, word for word, and (lull leave rr.y readers to their 
own conjectures. 
A. It appears from this, that, in the opinion of Kant, 
the idea of Space is connate with, the mind, or, at lead, 
that it is prior to any information received from the fenfes. 
But this dottrine feems to me not a little doubtful. Indeed, 
1 rather lean to the common theory, which fuppofes our firjl 
ideas of Space orExtenfion to be formed by abf railing this at¬ 
tribute from the other qualities of matter. The idea of 
Space, however, in whatever manner formed, is manifeftly 
accompanied with an irrefiftible conviftion, that Space is 
neceffarily exiltent, and that its annilation is impofiible ; 
nay, it appears to me to be alfo accompanied with an irre¬ 
fiftible conviftion, that Space cannot poflibly be extended 
in more than three dimenfions. Call either of thefe pro- 
pofitions in queftion, and you open a door to univerfal 
fcepticifm. 
B. I can extrail no meaning from this, but the nugatory 
propofition, that our conception of Space leads us to 
confider it as the place in which all things are compre¬ 
hended. 
C. ‘ The conception of Space, therefore, is a pure intui¬ 
tion.' This follows as a neceffary corollary (according to 
Kant’s own definition) from Prop. A. What is to be un¬ 
derfood by the claufe which afferts, that Space is the funda¬ 
mental form of every external fenfation, it is not eafy to 
conjeilure. Does it imply merely that the conception of 
Space is neceffarily involved in all our notions of things 
external ? In this cafe, it only repeats over, in different 
and moft inaccurate terms, the laft claufe of Prop. B. What 
can be more loofe and illogical than the phrafe external 
SENSATION ? 
D. That Space is neither a fubfance, nor an accident, 
nor a relation, may be fafely granted ; but does it follow 
from this that it is nothing objeElive, or, in other words, 
that it is a mere creature of the imagination ? This, how¬ 
ever, would feem to be the idea of Kant; and yet I can¬ 
not reconcile it with what he fays in Prop. E. that the 
conception of Space is the foundation of all the truth we 
aferibe to our perceptions of external objefts. (The au¬ 
thor’s own words are— Omnisveritatis inJenfualitate externa 
fundamenlurn !) 
“Upon the whole, it appears to me, that, among thefe 
various propofitions, there arefame which are quite unintelli¬ 
gible; that others affume, as firft principles, doftrines 
which have been difputed by many of our moft eminent 
philofophers; that others, again, Jeem to aim at involving 
plain and obvious truths in darhnefs and myflery ; and that 
not one is exprejfed with the fimplicity and preeijion which are 
the natural refults of clear and accurate thinking. In con- 
fidering Time and Space as the forms of all fenfible phe¬ 
nomena, does Kant mean any thing more but this,— 
that we neceffarily refer every fenfible phenomenon to 
fome point of fpace, or to fome inftant of time ? If this was 
really his meaning, he has only repeated over, in obfeurer 
language, the following propofitions of Newton: * Ut 
ordo partium temporis eft immutabilis, fic etiam ordo 
partium fpatii. Moveantur haec de locis fuis, et mo- 
vebuntur (ut ita dicam) de feipfis. Nam tempora et 
fpatia funt fui ipforum et rerum omnium quafi loca. In 
tempore, quoad ordinem fuccejfonis; in Jpatio, quoad 
ordinem fitus locantur univerfu. De illorum effentia eft 
ut fint loca: et loca primaria moveri abfurdum eft.’ I 
have quoted this paffage, not from any defire of difplay- 
ing the fuperiority of Newton over Kant, but chiefly to 
fliow how very nearly the powers of the former fink to the 
fame level with thofe of the latter, when direfted to in¬ 
quiries unfathomable by the human faculties. What 
abufe of words can be greater than to fay, That neither 
the parts of time nor the parts of fpace can be moved from 
their places? In the Principia of Newton, however, this 
incidental difeuflion is but a fpot on the fun. In the Cri¬ 
tique of Pure Reafon, it is a fairfpecimen of the ref of the 
work, and forms one of the chief pillars of the wholefyflem, 
both metaphyfical and moral!" 
Vol. XX. No. 1357. 
SOPHY. 141 
From thefe. remarks it appears, that Mr. Stewart withes 
to perfuade his render that Kant’s performance is void of 
fenfe; he artfully infinuates, that, if it has any merit, it is 
that of “ involving plain and obvious truths in darknefs 
and myftery; and that not one propofition is expreffed 
with the fimplicity and precifion which are the natural re¬ 
fults of clear and accurate thinking.” What are we then 
to fay of the learned and excellent individuals at the head 
of the Royal Fredecianum College at Konigfbsrg, on that 
memorable day, the aoth of Auguft, 1770, when this dif¬ 
fertation, De Mundi Senfbilis, was publicly canvaffed, and 
Kant flood candidate for the Metaphyfical Chair, fupport- 
ing his claim to the high dignity upon this very differta- 
tion ! This learned body, in order to fill the vacant chair 
in a manner that fliould refledft credit upon themfelves, 
appointed Marcus Hertz, a Jewifli fcholar of reputation, 
asafiiftant to Kant, or, in the college-language, as his ref- 
pondens; and to thefe theyoppofed G. W. Schreber, J. A. 
Stein, and G. D. Schroter, all men of found erudition, as 
contra-opponentes, or, in other words, to attack and dif- 
pute every pofition of the work, while they fat on the 
judgment-feat, to decide whether its author fliould or 
fliould not be invefted with the honour of their profeffor- 
fliip. The refult of this deliberation is well known to 
the world. It would fcarcely beadmiffible, although half 
a century has rolled on fince that period, to fay, that, be- 
caufe the late Profefi'or of the Univerfity of Edinburgh 
has been unable to comprehend fome ext rafts from 
Kant’s Latin Differtation, it mull therefore be not only 
incomprehenfible, but abfolutely abfurd ! Would it be 
fair to place the opinion of this fingle individual again!! 
the mafs of penetration and colleftive wifdom of the mem¬ 
bers of the Great Frederick’s college ? 
If Mr. Stewart is difinclined to allow the gift of found 
intelleft: to the learned of Pruflia, we are quite fure that 
he attributes this quality to the great Lambert, a philo¬ 
sopher deeply interefted in the fpeculations which occu¬ 
pied the immortal Kant; for in his own Differtation, 
Part II. page 14.3, he fays: “ Lambert is perhaps the moft 
illuftrious name which occurs from the time of Wolff to 
that of Kant. As a mathematician and natural philofo- 
pher, his great merits are univerfally known and acknow¬ 
ledged ; but the language in which his metaphyfical and 
logical works were, written, has confined their reputation 
within a comparatively narrow circle. The publication 
of his Novum Organum would certainly be a moft accepta¬ 
ble prefent to the learned world.” Itmuftbe particularly 
gratifying to the ex-profeffor of the Scotch Univerfity, to 
learn that our German profeffor had, if poflible, a higher 
opinion of the great Lambert’s intelleftual powers and pe¬ 
netration than even himfelf. For, fays this great man, “ I 
confider him as the firft genius in Germany.” What a 
glorious fight for a country to behold two of its great- 
eft men uniting their efforts to promote all kinds of Sci¬ 
ence, and endeavouring to ereft a complete fyftem of me- 
taphyfics as a ftandard of knowledge for future ages. 
This was really the cafe in Germany with Kant and Lam¬ 
bert. Thefe two diftinguifhed individuals had been many 
years engaged in a philofophical correfpondence, when, 
on the memorable occafion of Kant’s being called to the 
profefforfhip, he felt anxious to have the opinion of his 
learned friend on the Differtation he had written for 
that purpofe previous to its being printed. Twelve 
days after our profeffor had paffed the ordeal at the chief 
college of his native country, he addreffed the following 
letter to his much-valued friend Lambert. 
“ Konigfberg, 2 Sept. 1770, 
“ 1 avail myfelf of the opportunity that offers to con¬ 
vey to you my Differtation, De Mundi Senfbilis atqae In- 
telligibilis Forma et Principiis, by Mr. Marcus Hertz, who 
was my refpondens at the univerfity. 
“ Nothing could be more gratifying to me than that a 
man of fuch acknowledged peneration and fuch compre- 
henfive views, in whole mode of thinking I have frequent- 
O o - Jy 
