142 
PHILOSOPHY. 
ly found a coincidence with my own, fhould proffer me 
his afliftance, fo that by our joint investigations and exa¬ 
minations a plan might be formed for a folid edifice. I 
could not make up my mind to tranfmit any thing fhort 
of a perfpicuous fketch of the form in which I behold that 
fcience, and a precife idea of the proper method to be pur¬ 
sued in it. The execution of this intention involved me 
in enquiries, which were new to myfelf, and which, with 
my arduous academical duties, impofed the neceffity of 
one delay after another. 
“ It is now about a year fince I arrived, as I flatter my¬ 
felf, at certain notions, which I am not apprehenfive I fliall 
ever have occafion to change, but which I hope to extend, 
and by means of which all kinds of inetaphyfical queftions 
may be tried, by perfectly lure and eafy criteria, and it 
may be determined with certainty how far they can be re- 
folved or not. 
“But, in an undertaking of fuch importance, the time 
employed upon it muft not be confidered as loft, efpecially 
if we can produce fomethi'ng complete and lafting. I 
muft intreat you not to relinquifh your intention of aid¬ 
ing thefe efforts, but to grant me fome time longer for 
putting it in execution. 
“I purpofe to recruit my ftrength after a long indifpo- 
fltion which has hung about me all this fummer, and at 
the fame time not to be without employment in my va¬ 
cant hours, to arrange and complete, this winter, my en¬ 
quiries on the fubjedi of pure Moral Philofophy, which 
muft be free from all empirical principles, and likewife 
the Metaphyfics of Morals. This will in many inftances 
prepare the way to the moft important objedls in the new 
view of Metaphyfics, as well as be beneficial to the, at pre- 
fent unfettled, principles of pra< 5 Ucal fcience. 
“ When I have completed this talk, I (hall avail myfelf 
of the permiflion which you fome time fince granted me, 
of fubmitting to you my metaphyfical attempts as far as I 
have proceeded in them, with the folemn afi'urance that I 
fhall not confider any pofition valid, which is not in your 
opinion completely eftabliftied ; for, unlefs this aflent can 
be obtained, I have milled my aim of grounding this 
fcience upon abfoiutely inconteftible principles. 
“ At prefent your penetrating remarks upon fome of 
the chief propofitions of my Diflertation would be ex¬ 
tremely pleafing to me as well as inftruflive, as I intend 
to prepare it for publication by the time of the enfuing 
fair, and to add to it a few pages, in which I hope to cor¬ 
rect the faults occafioned by hafte, and determine my 
meaning more precifely. The firft and fourth Sedlions 
may be palled over as of inferior confequence, but the fe- 
cond, third, and fifth, though, on account of my indifpofi- 
tion, I have by no means completed them to my fatisfac- 
tion, appear to me to contain fubjeft-matter well worthy 
of a more careful and llriCt inveftigation. 
Immanuel Kant.” 
A perufal of the precedingletter can leave no doubt of 
the veneration in which Kant held the mental endow¬ 
ments of the celebrated Lambert,, any more than it can 
of the limited value fet upon this inaugural performance 
by its author. He does not here fpeak in the bold and 
confident language which would imply that he even fan¬ 
cied he had accomplilhed the objeft of his wilhes, the erec¬ 
tion of a complete and permanent fcience of Metaphysics 
for all future ages; he merely expreffes a hope, that, with 
the afliftance of his able co-operator, he may one day be 
enabled to effe£l this. So true, indeed, was this anticipa¬ 
tion of his prophetic fpirit, that, at a period no farther dif- 
tan'c than eleven years, he actually fucceeded to the extent 
of his moft fanguine wilhes; and, as he fomewhere ex¬ 
prefles himfelf, has left as a legacy to pofterity a fcience fo 
complete in all its elements, that he defies future genera¬ 
tions either to add to, or to detrafft from, it. 
Now, let us view this very fame modeft profeflor after 
he was fully convinced that he had adlually made the diL- 
co very, the poflibility of which had fo long floated in his 
mind. We fliall fee him returning from his voyage, like 
another Columbus; but how changed his language ! all 
his hopes fulfilled, and all his doubts converted into cer¬ 
tainties! Eleven years after the publication of his Latin 
Diflertation, our profeflor gave to the word that moft in¬ 
valuable treafure, his “ Critic of Pure Reason,” or 
complete analyfis of the Mental Powers. It is in this work 
that he has developed his whole Syftem oPMetaphysics. 
Shortly after this period, with a view of familiarizing the 
reader with the moft aftonifhing and wonderful difeovery 
that the world ever beheld, he publiflied his Prolegomena 
to all future Metaphyfics. Nothing fhort of the fa6t of 
his having accomplilhed his long-fought object, could 
reconcile us to the altered tone and dictatorial manner of 
this once-diffident philofopher. This is the manner in 
which he then (peaks of his own labours: “ Till now the 
philofopher never had a fyftern. The Critic, and the 
Critic alone, comprifes the whole well-examined and well- 
attefted plan, pointing out at the fame time all the means 
of its execution, and by which Metaphysics, as a fcience, 
can alone be produced ; by any other means it is utterly 
impracticable. I will anfwer for if, that whoever has 
once penetrated and comprehended the principles of the 
Critic, will never return to the old fophifticated fcience 
of illulions ; he will rather look forward with confidence 
and delight to the Metaphysics which are now moft cer¬ 
tainly in his power; which admit of no farther difeoveries, 
and which alone can procure lafting fatisfaclion to Reason. 
For this fuperiority Metaphysics may confidently boaft 
over all other fciences, that it can be brought to abfolute 
completenefs, and into a permanent fate. Thus much is 
certain, that whoever has once tailed the Critic, loathes 
for ever all dogmatical trafii, which he only endured be¬ 
fore from neceffity, becaufe his Reafon flood in need of 
fomething, and could find no better entertainment. The 
certain profpeCl of a knowledge fo determined and con- 
clufive carries with it a peculiar charm, even indepen¬ 
dently of all advantage that may accrue from it. But, 
though the feafon of the decay of all Dogmatical Metaphy¬ 
fics is indubitably arrived, there is a long and dull period 
yet to pafs before the time of the adoption of a new fci¬ 
ence, the legitimate though tardy offspring of a found 
and complete Critic of Reafon, fliall fully arrive. Every 
tranfition from one propeniity to its oppofite, paffes 
through the fate of indifference ; a ftate certainly unfa¬ 
vourable to an author, but, as it appears to me, highly 
advantageous to fcience. For, after the entire diffolution 
of all former affociations, when party-fpirit is quite ex- 
tinft, the mind is in the very beft ftate gradually to receive 
propofals for new connexions agreeably to a new plan. 
That man fliould ever entirely relinquifh nietaphyfical 
inveftigations, is as little to be feared as that, in order not 
to breathe impure air, he ifiould give up breathing alto¬ 
gether. Metaphysics will therefore always remain in the 
world; and, what is more, will exift in the mind of every 
man, and particularly in that of the thinking man. But, 
as what has hitherto been called Metaphyfics can fatisfy 
no enquiring mind, and as it is impoffible to renounce 
Metaphyfics altogether, a Critic of Pure Reason it- 
feIf muft at laft be attempted ; or, if fuch a Critic be 
already extant, it must be investigated. It is cer¬ 
tainly difficult, and requiresfome refoiution in the reader 
to make himfelf acquainted with a fyftern which alfumes 
nothing as a foundation but Reafon itfelf, and which muft 
therefore endeavour to develop knowledge from its origi¬ 
nal feeds, without reflecting upon any faCl of experience. 
“Transcendental Philosophy, which muft necef- 
farily precede all Metaphyfics, is nothing but the fyftema- 
tic and complete folution of the queftion. How knoivledge 
from pure reafon is pojfible ; prior to our day there was no 
fuch thing as Tranfcendental Philofophy. Whatever bore 
that name was only a part of Metaphyfics ; hut .the very 
pojfibility of Metaphyfics depends upon Transcendental, 
Philosophy. Since, then, an entire fcience, wholly de¬ 
prived of every afliftance from all others, and abfoiutely new 
