147 
PHILOSOPHY. 
caufe I am thoroughly convinced, that the ftudy, or ra¬ 
ther the nnderftanding, of the new critical philofophy, 
would not only require of the majority, but alfo of many 
of the mod eminent academical philosophers, more zeal, 
application, and time, than of mere amateurs of the fci- 
ence, nay even of many a young beginner of talents. 
Whence fliould certain older profeffors derive the zeal to 
enter into a new inveftigation refpeffing their long-com¬ 
pleted and long-tried fyftem ; and in this inveftigation to 
follow a guide, who, they are told, rejects their molt 
firmly-eftabliihed pofitions ! The attention of their ju¬ 
niors is wholly occupied by their official duties, nume¬ 
rous le&ures, and literary purfuits, which mult not be 
broken in upon by any extraneous feries of ideas. Many, 
again, beltow at molt fingle hours fnatched from recrea¬ 
tion, with bialTed head and diftradled attention, to a ftudy 
to which the application of a whole undivided year w'ould 
fcarcely be adequate. Laftly, others may devote all their 
affiduity and all the leifilre left them by one daily ledture, 
to this ftudy; and they will be compelled, againlt their 
will, to tear in pieces, in each fucceeding ledture, the tif- 
fue of new convictions woven with fuch trouble in the 
hours of meditation. The fyftem which they are obliged 
to explain and to demonftrate from the chair is in contra¬ 
diction with the new principles, which mult neceffarily 
give way when they are compared, before their complete 
development and pofitive determination, with the ap¬ 
proved doCtrines of a long-received fyftem; and thus the 
tender (hoots of the future tree of univerfally-valid know¬ 
ledge is crufhed by the ponderous foundation-ftones of 
the ancient itruCture. 
“ Whoever confiders the want of univerfally-valid prin¬ 
ciples in fpeculative philofophy as eltablilhed, or merely 
probable, will not hefitate to admit with me that this 
want mult be connected with a general mifunderftanding 
common to all feCts, which renders it impoffible, even for 
the molt (harp-lighted and impartial enquirers, to agree 
in regard to the premifes on which the folntion of their 
problems is to be founded. May it not have been referved 
for the author of the Critic of Pure Reafon to difcover 
this mifunderftanding, and to remove it as far as lay in the 
power of a fingle individual? 
“So much at leaft is inconteftable ; that, if he really 
had this great objeCt in view, it was abfolutely neceffary, 
in order to its attainment, that he lliould do precilely 
what he has done. He could do no other than purfue an 
entirely new route, hitherto miffed by every feel, but 
croffing the particular trajfk of each ; and hence, as it 
really happened, he could not help being met by each, 
fometimes in its own path, and in others in that of its 
adverfaries. He was obliged to declare every preceding 
fyftem untenable, and at the fame time to proteCl each 
particular one againft all the reft; but above all to com¬ 
mence the great reformation of philofophy by an hitherto 
unattempted analyjisof the Knowing Faculty. 
“As the difputes of parties chiefly relate to the know¬ 
ledge of fuper-fenfible objeCfs, it was requifite to attempt 
to determine the conception of knowledge in general, 
more precifely and completely than had hitherto been done. 
In this new determination, neither innate truths could be 
prefuppofed with Leibnitz, nor objefts exifting out of the 
mind with Locke, as inconteftable objefts of knowledge; nor 
could, by any means, according to preceding cuftom, the 
conditions or laws of knowledge be deduced either from 
the one or the other, or from both together, without a 
ftatement of the contribution of each in particular. 
The new determination could not be expedled to fucceed 
better than its predeceffors, unlefs by prefuppoling no¬ 
thing but inconteftable premifes. In this refpeft it durft 
not rely on the reality either of thofe innate fuper-fenfible 
truths which are denied by the dogmatic fceptics, mate- 
rialifts, &c. or of the objedfs of experience which are de¬ 
nied by the idealifts, and with fome limitations by the 
fpiritualifts themfeives. Every attempt to determine 
anew the nature and the bounds of the Knowing Faculty, 
by which the objefts of knowledge, ftill partly difputed 
in the philofophic world, ffiould have been affumed as in- 
difputable, muft from this very circumftance have miffed 
its aim; it would have taken for granted what was yet to 
be demonftrated, and would rather have removed to a 
greater diltance than advanced the profpefl of a future 
agreement refpe&ing principles. Inftead therefore of de¬ 
termining the nature and extent of the Knowing Faculty 
by known objedfs, it was neceffary on the contrary to en¬ 
deavour to determine the knowledge of objefts itfelf from 
the mere knowing faculty. 
“ It was the Critic of Pure Reafon that actually lirft 
put forth and developed the conception of the mere 
Knowing Faculty; and from this development the know¬ 
ing faculty appears in a (hape the poffibility of which was 
never yet dreamt of in the philofophic world ; namely, on 
the one hand independent as well of experience as of in¬ 
nate fundamental truths ; but, on the other, as much 
cramped in the domain of experience in a theoretic ref- 
pedf, as elevated above it in regard to praffice. Thefe 
are enigmas which muft beconfidered asinfoluble till they 
really are folved, and the meaning of which, till then, 
will be incomprehenlible to many. 
“ By an analyfis which is ftill held by many of our acu- 
teft philofophers to be impoffible, that which in knowing 
belongs folely to the mind ffiould be moft ftriftly fepara- 
ted from what belongs to the things out cf the mind, 
and thereby the power of the mind thoroughly diftinguilhed 
from the power of the external things operating upon the 
fenfes. Who can doubt that fuch an analyfis, if fuccefs- 
fully made, would lliow how the mifunderftanding hi¬ 
therto prevailing in all the fyltems of fpeculative philofo¬ 
phy is connected with the undefined conception of the 
Knowing Faculty ! 
“ If what has been faid concerning this mifunderftand¬ 
ing be correft, it will be ealy to account, by means of it, 
not only for the ancient and ftill-c'ontinued difpute of 
philofophers concerning the limits of the Knowing Fa¬ 
culty, the fchifm of fefts on the great queftions relative 
to the fundamental truths of religion and morality, and 
the want of univerfally-valid principles in fpeculative phi¬ 
lofophy; but alfo for the unfortunate fate of the Critie 
of Pure Reafon, in being mifunderltood even by fo many 
of our moft profound thinkers. This general mifunder¬ 
ftanding of the Knowing Faculty could not fail to have a 
decifive influence on the lignification of all principles 
previoufly eftablilhed, on the definition of all metaphyfi- 
cal notions, and on the meaning of all technical terms. 
The man who firft railed himfelf above it, and who then 
beheld and exhibited the Knowing Faculty from a totally 
new point of view, was thereby neceffitated to give an en¬ 
tirely new lignification to many exifting forms and ex- 
preflions, to rejeft many of the moft common as unfer- 
viceable, and create abfolutely new ones in their ftead. 
Careful as he might be to explain thefe neceffary innova¬ 
tions, and to define with precifion the meaning of his new 
technical terms, ftill he could only do this in words, 
which, according to the mode of reprefenting followed by 
his readers, and warped by the ancient mifunderftanding, 
muft have a totally different meaning, which they could 
not lofe till after the total removal of the mifunderftand¬ 
ing, and in confequence of which even the moft acute cri¬ 
tics could not fail to ftumble fometimes on paffages in 
thofe explanations which were abfolutely unintelligible, 
and at others on manifeft abfurdities. This new fignifi- 
cation, which could neither be avoided in the Critic of 
Pure Reafon, nor be defined by explanations of detached 
words, was confequently to be made, not only by long, 
manifold, and laborious, com par if on of fingle paffages of 
the whole work ; it had in fome meafure to be gueffed and 
even invented ; all which could only be effe&ed with an 
uncommon expenfeof time and trouble, and even then by 
thofe alone who had either not yet adopted any Metaphy- 
fical fyftem, or were diffatisfied with that which they had 
adopted. 
“ The 
