PHILOSOPHY. 
titled “ Anthropology,” which was completed but a fliort 
time prior to his deceafe, and in which he takes a formal 
leave of the public. 
This intelligent Frenchman is Monf. Charles Villers, 
who in 1804 obtained the prize awarded by the French 
National Inilitute for a work, entitled, “ Efl'ai fur 1 ’Efprit 
et l’lnfluence de la Reformation de Luther.” He is alfo 
author of an interefting work, entitled, “Coup-d’oeil fur 
les Univerfites d’Allemagne, et la Mode d’lnltruftion ;” 
1809. and a great variety of other works, as well as of 
many of the articles in the Biographie Univerfelle. Du¬ 
ring a refidence in Germany he not only acquired that 
language, but his comprehenfive mind penetrated into 
what is termed the myfteries of Tranfcendental Philofo- 
phy. From the following (ketch, extracted from the Bio¬ 
graphie Univerfelle, article Kant, I leave my readers to 
decide whether this indefatigable philofopher has folved 
the problem which Mr. Stewart has pronounced infolu- 
ble, namely, to comprehend the Critic of Pure Reafon, 
I believe it will be feen that he has not only fully accom- 
plifheti this talk, but moft happily exhibited the applica¬ 
tion of the new theory to all its praftical ufes. This 
treatife is a fine piece of confecutive reafoning, and affords 
a comparifon of the excellencies and defers of our moft 
renowned philofophers, that cannot fail to prove highly 
interefting to all lovers of truth. Not fatisfied with giv¬ 
ing a faithful account of the origin and growth of the 
fcience of Tranfcendental Philofophy and Speculative 
Reafon, he enters molt fully into the claims of Practical 
Reafon, and (hows in a very diltinft manner the root and 
principles of morality, the proof of the Freedom of the 
Will and a future life; he then fhows how Praftical Rea¬ 
fon reveals the obligatory Moral Laws, as commandments 
of the Divine Will, and that man awards to himfelf only 
a Happinefs proportionate to his Virtue. 
This writer has fo thoroughly ftudied the entire works 
of the immortal Kant, that he is capable of difplaying in 
a concife and pleafing manner the contents and aim of 
each, fo as to give the reader a foretafle of whatever he 
may wifh to ftudy. In his explanation of the objeft of 
the “Critic of Judgment ,” he is particularly happy. It 
is here that he vindicates Kant from the charge of hav¬ 
ing neglefted to (how the connexion of the various parts 
of his fyftem, and difplays the Kantefian Theory of Tafte, 
which has obtained the fuffrages of the moft decided ene¬ 
mies of the other parts of his fyftem, in a mod fafcinating 
manner. This work alfo proves that the fentiments of the 
Sublime and Beautiful are engrafted upon the pre-efta- 
blifhed harmony in the play of the imagination with 
certain rules of the Underftanding and Reafon. This rare 
and unexpected difcovery is alfo the refult of Tranfcen¬ 
dental Philofophy. 
Monf. Villers next proceeds to give a moft cheering ac¬ 
count of Kant’s Religion; and eftablifhes the complete 
harmony, and, as it were, the perfeft identity, of Religion 
and Reafon. 
The “ Metaphyfical Elements of Law and Ethics” next 
occupy the attention of this admired writer. Here he 
fhows that, as man is confidered by Reafon as an end in 
himfelf, he can neither alienate his own liberty nor in¬ 
fringe upon that of others. The political reflections that 
arile out of the metaphyfics of right are doled by remarks 
on an excellent treatife on Perpetual Peace. Herein is 
fhoun, that, as Reafon unfolds itfelf, nations, like indi¬ 
viduals, will quit the (late of barbarifm, and unite, in or¬ 
der mutually to guarantee fecurity of perfonand property, 
by the eftablifhment of a central authority, fupported by 
irrefiftib'.e force. Monf. Villers concludes his review of 
Kant’s fyftematic works with remarks on the lateft pub¬ 
lication of this great philofopher, his “ Anthropology;” 
a work replete with profound, fubtle, and ingenious, ob- 
fervations, which prove its author to be as thoroughly 
acquainted with man in the world, as with man in meta¬ 
phyfics. 
Thus begins our enlightened Frenchman : t! In at- 
Vol. XX. No. 1358. 
149 
tempting to comprefs within a few' pages one of the no- 
bleft fyftems that the hiftory of the human mind prefents, 
we (hall confine ourfelves chiefly to the elucidation of the 
original development of its fundamental principles. To 
render this intelligible, it is neceflary to refer to thefceptical 
reafonings of Hume on the relation of Caufe and Efett, or 
the principle of Caufality, as he has prefented them in fac¬ 
tions 4, 5, and 7, of his enquiry concerning the ‘ Human 
Unde?fa tiding.' It was thefe reafons which firil roufed Kant 
from the flumberof dogmatifm,as he himfelf terms it. One 
event follows another; or, in other words, the perception 
of one fucceeds the perception of the otherin our confciouf- 
nefs. Let us fuppofe that the fecond could not have exifted 
if the former had not preceded, and we (hall conceive the 
idea of a Caufe. Whence proceeds this ? Was it 
given to us with the perception of thefe events? Locke 
and all the adherents to his analyfis of our faculties, an- 
fwered this queftion in the affirmative; and no one fuf- 
pefted, till Hume appeared, that this opinion tends to 
deftroy the certainty of the axiom, that every event muji 
have a caufe, to deprive it of its characters ox neee(fity and 
univerfality, and thus to (hake, to its very foundation, all 
human knowledge which refts upon its application. 
Hume diflinguifhes between necejfary connexion and the 
accidental fucceffion of two events; lie denies the poffibl- 
lity of difcovering the attual connexion of Caufe and Ef¬ 
fect. An Effeft, he (ays, is acknowledged to be a diltinft 
event from that which is termed its Caufe ; and we by no 
means perceive the germ of the one in the other. We fee 
a billiard-ball, for inftance, begin to move upon its being 
(truck by another ball; an arm railed on the determina¬ 
tion of the will ; the link of connexion itfelf is not, nor 
indeed can be, within the territory of our perceptions. 
If then, before and independently of all experience, the 
notion of the Caufe by no means includes that of the Ef¬ 
fect, it is evident, fays Hume, that we can only derive the 
notion of Caufality from experience; and this can only 
raife the expectation of a cuftomary or probable fucceffion 
of two events, but can never produce even the conception 
of a necejfary connexion, that is to fry, of a connexion 
whofe contrary is impoflible. Reid, one of the ableft and 
molt zealous adverfaries of Hume’s theory, candidly agrees 
to the truth of this obfervation. ‘Experience (fays he) 
does not give us any information of that which is neceflary 
or ought to exift. We only learn from experience that 
which is or has been, and we conclude, with more or lefs 
probability, that which will be under fimilar circumftances 
(for inftance, we believe that the liars will rife to morrow 
in the eaft, and fet in the weft, as they have done from 
the beginning of the world) ; but, as to what ought nccef 
Jarily to exift, experience is absolutely filent; (there is not 
a man who can perfuade himfelf of the impolflbility that 
the rifing of the fun might as well have been from the welt, 
and that the Creator might as well have made the revolu¬ 
tion of our earth from eaft to weft.) In like manner, even 
though experience has conftantly taught us, that every 
event obferved by us has been the effect of a Caufe, this 
naturally induces us to believe that it will be fo in future, 
but it by no means gives us the right to affirm that it 
rnujl be fo, and cannot be otherwife.’ An important con- 
ceffion, decilive of the fate of Locke’s doftrine ! Still 
however neither Reid, nor any of the philofophers who 
attacked Hume, perceived the extent of the conceflians 
that the fceptic had forced from them, nor the impoffibi- 
lity of repelling his attack, by flopping at the point at 
which the fchools of Locke and Leibnitz had arrived. 
By what right do tee affirm that there can be no change u ith- 
out acdufel If we limit ourfelves to the pofition that all 
changes which prefent themfelves to our obfervation, as 
well thofe attributable to an a£t of our will as thofe which 
are independent of it, have had without exception theire^?- 
cient caufe ; our aflertion is jollified either by our own ex¬ 
perience or that of others. If we declare our full perfua- 
fion that no fa ft will ever contradift this experience ; no 
man affuredly will ever deny the reafonablenefs of our ex- 
Q q peftation. 
