150 
PHILOSOPHY. 
peClation. But is this perfuafion merely the refult of an 
induction founded on experience? Kant maintains that 
it ts not. InduCfion, lie fays, (and here we trace the ge¬ 
neration of hisfyftem,) whatever univerfality is attributed 
to it, however extenfive its bafis, however numerous the 
aids afforded to it by the a&ivity of the mind or by exter¬ 
nal perception, ftiU indii&ion can never account for the 
expe&ation' which we are called upon to jultify at the tri¬ 
bunal of Reafon, nor produce that unfhaken conviftion, 
with which we refign ourfelves to this expectation, with¬ 
out being even able to imagine the poflibility that it can 
ever be difappcinted. If this conviction be a faCt 
of which we are confcious; if it manifeft itfelf in 
our earlieft infancy with the fame force and tenacity 
as after long habit; if on (taring the propofition, every 
event neceffiarily fvppofes an efficient caufe, we have the 
conviction of its truth in all cafes, as well thofe that have 
occurred before we were born as thofe which are to hap¬ 
pen in time to come; it is the duty of the philofopher to 
point out how we have acquired this univerfal conviction. 
If he admits it as a primitive fad, and declines its demon- 
ftration as the fchools of Scotland feem to have done ; 
If ill he does not violate confcioufnefs; there is merely a 
chafn in his analyfis of the mental faculties ; it may be 
accufed of wanting depth, and of not fulfilling the ends 
required of it. But, when the author of a pretended ana¬ 
lyfis profeffes to clear up the fad in queftion, and, inftead 
of explaining it, not only renders it inconceivable, but 
propofes a folution which direCtly contradicts the chief 
elements of the problem, as was the cafe with Hume, who, 
after adopting and developing Locke’s principles, em¬ 
ployed them to pervert and invalidate that of Sufficient 
Reafon, namely, Caufality itfelf, ill fupported, indeed, by 
Leibnitz, but (till left by him entire, and fuch as it an¬ 
nounces itfelf to our confcioufnefs; the author of the ex¬ 
planatory hypothefis, by thus denying a fad of confciouf¬ 
nefs, evidently pronounces the condemnation of his own 
doflrine. The relation of Caufe and Effed, Hume fays, 
exifts neither in the things nor in the events which we 
perceive ; this relation is never given to us by experience : 
in two fucceflive events, there is abfolutely nothing in the 
one which can be called Caufe, nor in the other EffeCf. 
From tins remark, correCt as it is profound, our Scotch 
philofopher draws the equally-juft conclufion, that this 
link of caufality which we eftablifh between events is an 
operation of our own mind, and proceeds entirely from 
ourfelves. Thus far, Flume, in unifon with Kant, pro¬ 
ceeds on the ground of inconteftable obfervation and 
reafoning. At this point they feparate. Hume, in order 
to explain this operation of'the mind, which eftablifhes the 
law of Caufality between events, inftead of fearching for 
its principle in the intrinfic nature of the Underftanding 
itfelf, (which was the path Kant purfued,) fought for it 
in the mete force of the imagination, which binds, as he 
conceived, in a fort of neccffiary connexion of its own, 
whatever we have conftantly feen joined together; and 
from the habit arifing from this repeated affociation of 
fuccefiive events, he derived the relation of mutual depen- 
dance, or of Caufe and Eft'eCh The infufficiency of this 
folution did not efcape Kant. How is it poflible to refer 
to the fame origin, propofitions, fame of which are felf- 
evident and ftrike the mind at once with irrefiftible force ; 
and others which we only adopt provifionally on the faith 
of experience, and which we are prepared to abandon as 
loon as experience fhail have fliown their fallacy ? The 
mind reje&s the thought of a poflibility, that ever, at 
any time or under any circumftances, an. exception (hall 
arife to limit the univerfal application of certain propofi¬ 
tions (for inftance, all geometrical truths); while others 
which reft merely on experience, were this experience 
repeated a thoufand times, can never obtain more than an 
hypothetical and conditional certainty, depending on the 
chances of further experience, which may ftill hereafter 
overthrow them. For inftance, when we aflert that every 
organized being mu ft die, that all wood is combuftible, 
and minerals incombuftible; we by no means pretend to 
maintain that it is repugnant to reafon to fuppofe, that at 
fome future time, an organized being that will never die, 
or aTpecies of incombuftible wood, or combuftible mine¬ 
rals, may be difeovered : we merely aflert the refult of 
obfervations made down to the prefent period, and the 
well-grounded belief, that no experience will ever contra¬ 
dict if. It immediately occurred to Kant, that thereafons 
alleged by Hume againft the objective reality of the 
principle of caufality, (that is to fay, a reality exifting in 
the things,) were equally applicable to a multitude of 
other judgments, which we form concerning things, and 
which we adopt with perfeCt certainty, without being able 
to difeover their elements in thefe things. Of this nature 
are all the propofitions of pure mathematics; all thofe 
which form the foundation of Phyfics in general, of Onto¬ 
logy, of Logic; in a word all thofe which poflefs the cha¬ 
racter of abfolute univerfality and neceffiity, and which, 
therefore, cannot arife from the accidental impreffions 
made by objeCts in experience. Hume confidered expe¬ 
rience as nothing but an aftemblage of infulated percep¬ 
tions, connected into groups by the imagination and the 
memory. Kant, diftinguifhir.g, in experience, elements of 
different kinds and origins, was careful not to exclude the 
Underfunding from the general faculty of experience as 
contradictory or heterogeneous powers, though Hu me had 
unfortunately done fo; but, confidering the underfanding, 
or judging faculty, as a very different thing from the 
mere faculty of perceiving, he difeovered that it is by 
their concurrence; that experience is generated; that the 
underftanding is the artificer, the intuitions (or fenfible per¬ 
ceptions) the materials ; and that the laws of arrange¬ 
ment, or the rules of conftruCIion, are identical with the 
modes of operation to which the underftanding is in its 
own nature originally and abfolutely reftriCted. We 
(hall now be able to comprehend why Kant, in his Critic 
of’Pure Reafon, expreffed the great problem which he un¬ 
dertook to folve, in the queftion fo often accufed of ob- 
feurity; How are Synthetical Judgments a priori poffiblc ? 
To fynthefize, is to put together, or to compofe. A fyn- 
thetical judgment therefore is one whofe parts are not 
mutually included in one another, and therefore cannot 
be drawn from one another by analyfis. We have feen 
that, according to Kant, there are propofitions which at¬ 
tribute to external things a certain mode of exiftence, 
the idea of which is not derived from the impreftion of 
thofe objeCIs upon our Senfitive Faculty, (called by the 
fchool of Kant receptivity.) Confequently we add to the 
impreffion received from without, forms and conceptions 
derived from ourfelves, and which are inherent in our 
intellectual faculties. Thus in this propofition, What¬ 
ever happens mnf have a caufe and produce an effed, we may 
exhauft on the idea of the Jubjed (the given event, that 
which happens) the refearches of the mofc profound ana¬ 
lyfis; in vain we may fearch, w’e (hall not find in the idea 
of foni'ething which happens the idea of fome other thing 
which mult neceftarily have preceded or of fome other 
thing which mult neceftarily follow'. Here then we have 
made an addition to the idea of the fubjed. But is the 
predicate, the additional element, which adds to the other 
term of the propofition, a quality that it did not previoufly 
poflefs, furnifhed by experience ? Certainly not. The 
fame thing occurs in the following propofitions : ‘ A right 
line is the fnorteft diftance between two points;—There 
is a God ;—The world is finite ;—The foul is immortal;— 
There is a llriCt connexion betw-een all objefts of nature ; 
—All the properties which we perceive, and which are 
conftantly changing, mult be the attributes of a thing 
which fupports them, and which cannot change; that is 
to fay, of a fubftance.’ There is in all thefe propofitions a 
fynthifis, or addition to the fubjed of a predicate, which 
lias not been derived either from the analyfis of the fub- 
jeft itfelf, or from any fenfation of experience. The judg¬ 
ments arifing from this combination are therefore called 
judgments a priori, or judgments independent of expe- 
f rience; 
