155 
PHILOSOPHY. 
feize upon him, balances the noblenefs of his own nature 
againft the objedls that feemed to infult his weaknefs ; 
and, rifing viftorioufly from a comparifon that at firft 
humbled him, foars, with the fentiment of his myfterious 
ftrength, above the gigantic forms that threatened to an¬ 
nihilate him. 
“ ‘Mqjtapliyjical Elements of Right.' —Having eftablifhed 
the exiftenc'e and legitimacy of the abfolute duties which 
reafon prefcribes to the will, by commanding it to realize 
the mode in which. Reafon aRs, Kant derives thence certain 
Rights-, and, in the firft place, that of never being con- 
ftrained to violate thefe duties, or of being prevented 
from obeying them. As the firft practical law of Reafon 
is, ‘That every rational being is an end in himfelf, and 
ought on no account to ferve merely as a mean to the will 
of another;’ it follows, that man cannot alienate his own 
liberty, nor infringe upon that of others. The ‘ Meta- 
pliyfical Elements of Right' form one entire work with 
the ‘ Metaphyfcal Elements of Virtue,' which is a conti¬ 
nuation of the fame fubjeft. Lefs copious perhaps in 
original and profound views than the other great works 
of Kant, his ‘Treatife on Right' is remarkable for inte- 
refting digreffions on legiflative and political queftions. 
He examines whether it is poffible to conceive a ftate of 
things fo hoftile to the effential ends of focial order, as to 
furnifh a motive for an infurreddion that could be juftified 
at the tribunal of enlightened reafon; and he denies that 
any circumftance could ever occur to juftify the author 
of a revolution. His opinion is chiefly founded on the 
intereft of civilization. But, if we owe obedience and 
fidelity to government fo long as it retains its power and 
influence, the very motive which muft make us condemn 
all revolutionary maxims, impofes on us, as citizens, the 
facred obligation to derive, for the fake of our country 
and of humanity, the greateft poffible advantages from 
any revolution which has actually occurred, whether it 
were brought about by crime or weaknefs. Kant watched 
with great intereft the different ftages of the French re¬ 
volution, and had a high idea of the ameliorations in the 
civil organization which he imagined it would produce; 
but no one expreffed greater indignation at its excefies. 
The treatife before us contains a paflage concerning the 
death of Louis XVI. which furpafles perhaps in energy 
and effeft the moft eloquent appeal that this atrocious 
deed has ever excited. 
“ ‘ Philofophical EJfay on Perpetual Peace.' —This trea¬ 
tife has nothing in common with the fentiments and re¬ 
veries of the benevolent St. Pierre. Kant expefts 
nothing from the immediate influence of reafon, but every 
thing from the force of things. Elevating himfelf to a 
ftation whence he furveys as a whole the actual relations 
exifting between nations and individuals, he difcovers and 
defcribes the facts or the neceffities which ought gradually 
to induce nations to quit that ftate of barbarifm in which 
they are at prefent, in the fame manner as the eftablifh- 
raent of focial inftitutions was originally formed, by the 
union of families, when they renounced the ftate of 
'nature, in order mutually to guarantee the fecurity of 
p'erfon and property, by the creation of a central authority 
fupported by an irrefiftible force. There reigns in this 
treatife a tone of keen fiinplicity to which the exalted 
views and fagacity of the author add a peculiar charm. 
This mixture of art, playfulnefs, and fevere purity, in the 
general tendency which rendered Kant’s converfation as 
remarkable for its point as its inftrudlion, is obfervable 
alfo in the laft wmrk that he publifhed, entitled 
“ Anthropology in a pragmatical view. —This work, 
replete with profound and ingenious obfervations, con- 
fiders man under the limitations which the difference of 
age, fex, conftitution, race, focial organization, climate, 
&c. impofe upon the exercife and cultivation of the human 
faculties. Here Kant fhows himfelf to be as thoroughly 
.acquainted with Men in general as with Man in the ab- 
ftradt in his metaphyfic works.” 
An attentive perufal of the preceding obfervations 
with which Monf. C.,ViHars has favoured us cannot fail 
to furnifh a comprehenfive view of the nature and ten¬ 
dency of the fyftematic works of Profeffor Kant, and af¬ 
ford another proof of the pnjfibilily of their being comprehend¬ 
ed, although Mr. Dugald Stewart has been unfortunate in 
this particular. However, the talk that devolves on me 
is entirely and completely to remove this fatal objection 
to the ftudy of the true Science of Mind. An additional 
proof of the comprehenfibility of this Philofophy is furnifh- 
ed by the fame author in his “ P hilofophie de Kant," pub- 
1 ifiled in 1801. This excellent performance is intended 
to introduce to the notice of his countrymen the noble 
truths which every-where pervade this fyftem. It is 
written in the moft popular ftyle ; all technicalities are 
avoided; and, indeed, fo thoroughly and clearly did Monf. 
Villers comprehend the whole of Kant’s philofophy, that 
his book is calculated to form an eafy introduction to 
whoever willies to engage in the ftudy of this acme of 
fyftems. So far from Metaphyfics being a dull and heavy 
fubjedl, he fhows it to be fufceptible of all the beauties of 
oratory, as well as all the intereft and charms of w'orks of 
a lighter kind. He is moft happy in fhowdngthe infuffi- 
ciency of all the pretended analyfes of the mental faculties 
up to the prefent time, and the neceffity of an entirely 
new one to account fatisfadlorily for all the mental phe¬ 
nomena. This complete analyfis he proves to beaccomplifh- 
ed by the immortal Kant. The difpute regarding Matter 
and Mind, which has fo long occupied the attention of 
the learned without either party gaining upon the other, 
is by this writer moft happily brought to a final clofe, and 
that in fo plain and intelligible a manner as to fatisfy the 
moft fceptical mind. The greateft affiftance may be ob¬ 
tained by confulting this animated little performance in 
eftablifhing all the Mental Elements, the origin and nature 
of knowledge, the difference between mathematical and 
philofophical knowledge, and the ultimate deftination of 
man. This whole procedure he (flows to be fubjedled to 
the ftridteft laws and limits, which are now as firmly fixed 
as thofe of any pure fcience in the mind of man. He 
gives an excellent account of the diltinflion between 
lytieal and fynthetical judgments ; (flowing the former to 
be always a priori, becaufe in them we only unfold what 
has been previoufly connected ; and the latter to be both 
a priori and a pojleriori, that is, judgments which precede 
experience and thofe which arife from experience. But 
the entire objedl of the Critic of Pure Reafon is to eftabiifh 
the fadt of Synthetical Judgments a priori, upon which 
alone the fcience of Tranfcendental Philofophy is eredled. 
He points out in the cleared and moft fatisfadlory manner 
the difference between JubjeRive, or that partof knowledge 
produced by the mind, and objeRive, or that which is 
furnifiled by the objefts out of the mind. In (flort, this 
little volume throws the ftrongeft light upon the nume¬ 
rous difcoveries of the author of this new and true philc- 
fophy, and furnifhes an abfolute proof that he fully com¬ 
prehended the fyftem upon which he has commented. 
I (hall now produce another inftance of the poftihility 
of completely feizing and perfectly comprehending every 
point of this vaft ftrudlure. What is dill more fatisfadlory 
in the prefent cafe is, that the venerable author of the 
“Crltic”has expreffed his unqualified approbation of thela- 
boursof the commentator in queftion, and pronounced 
moft definitively tl)at he has fully feized and thoroughly 
comprehended even the minuteft part of his fyftem. He 
adds, “ What affords me a great gratification is that, as my 
works can be underftood, they may not be totally un¬ 
worthy of being ftudied, in order to decide on their 
merits or demerits.” 
The work here alluded to is entitled, “An Elucidation of 
Kant's Critic of Pure Reafon ;” Konigfberg, 1791. In 
this mafterly performance, the new theory of Time and 
Space is treated in a very familiar manner, and adapted 
to the moft ordinary capacity; and the arguments are fo 
convincing, that even Mr. Stewart himfelf, could he but 
read German, would be unable any longer to maintain his 
favourite 
