158 PHILO 
of more fincere gratitude, to hitri than I; and I here can¬ 
didly acknowledge, that of afl human productions, I 
never admired any fo much as the inimitable works of 
the immortal Kant.” 
The value and importance of this philofophy has even 
made its way to that ancient republic of letters, Amfter- 
dam. In a work entitled ‘ A fuccind Expofition of the Cri¬ 
tic of Pure Reafon J. Kinker affords another proof of the 
poffibility of comprehending Tranfcendental Philofophy. 
In this little work he has difplayed great ability and 
found judgment; indeed fome of his explanations are 
drawn with fo mafterly a hand, that his work, which is 
tranflated into French, may fafely be referred to as a fa¬ 
miliar and eafy introduction to the very depths of this 
new Philofophy. He fays, “The nature, extent, and 
limits, of knowledge, problems hitherto undecided, will 
be found to be folved in the moll fatisfaftory manner in 
the Critical Philofophy of Immanuel Kant. This is a vaft 
and profound fyftem, and is developed with the greateft 
precifion in the Critic of Pure Reafon ; in which work, 
this extraordinary genius has completely analyzed the 
Knowing Faculty, and, in tracing it to its primitive 
elements, has fhown that it is poffible for man to acquire 
certain notions (Categories), notwithftanding he has 
determinate limits to his knowledge in the economy of 
his prefent exiftence.” 
Our learned Dutch fcholar has feized with aftonifhing 
accuracy the new Theory of Time and Space, and is peculi¬ 
arly happy in his manner of defcribing all its advantages; 
fo that the meaneft capacity cannot fail to follow and 
admit his arguments. He ftates that “ Time and Space do 
not belong to the objeCts of our knowledge, but only to 
our Knowing Faculty, though it is mod true that, in per¬ 
ceiving, we tranfmit all the qualities which are derived 
from thefe two forms of our Senfitive Faculty to the ob- 
jeCis perceived ; iuch as Extenfion, the dimenfions of 
length, breadth, and thicknefs, in fine divif bility, and all 
the fucceJJive variations. Thus the metal receives its 
form from the mould into which it is poured, for the 
mould neceffarily communicates its own form to the 
matter, without being on that account confidered as a 
property of the metal it receives. So that perception can 
only occur in us, as modified by the effential and inherent 
forms of our Paffive Faculty, upon which depend all re- 
prefentation of objefts. We are, in fad!, fo organized, 
that it is impoffible to receive any impreffions of objedls, 
and confequently to acquire any perception, otherwife 
than according to the order of connexion which depends 
wholly and entirely upon thefe primitive and effential 
forms of fenfe, Time and Space. But thefe perceptions 
can teach us nothing of the nature of the things in them¬ 
felves; they can only inform us as to the manner in which 
we are affe&ed by thefe things. But, this affedlion being 
fubjedled to the modifications of our fenfes and our un- 
derftanding, it is clear that whatever is thus tranfmitted 
to us can be nothing but phenomena and appearances of 
objefts; and confequently our perceptions do not indi¬ 
cate what the objects are in themfelves, independently of our 
mind, but only what they are for us, and that form alone 
under which they can appear to us. So that the knowledge 
of the phenomena is the only one poffible for us. Not¬ 
withftanding this ftatement is undeniably true, I acknow¬ 
ledge that at firft it appears fomewhat ftrange. Accuf- 
tomed, as we are, from infancy, toconfider the phenomena 
as fo many real things, it is only by an effort, and even 
long after we are convinced to the contrary, that we can 
refolve fully to fubfcribe to this decifion of found Reafon. 
As fentient beings, we are fo conftituted, that we attribute 
that to theobjeds in theynfelves which is only a modification 
cf our mode of perceiving. When we fee ourfelves in a 
glafs, or obferve that a ftick plunged into water appears 
bent at the furface ; in thefe cafes, indeed, we are not 
deceived, becaufe experience has taught us to diftinguilh 
appearance from reality. But, as our fenfitive faculty is 
fo conftituted as to prefent obje&s to us under a form 
SOPHY. 
which properly belongs to the faculty itfelf, experience 
cannot explain this illufion ; for it is experience itfelf, 
which forms the illufion, furniffiing perceptions which 
the underftanding takes as if they were really objective; 
that is, as if they exhibited to us in experience the real 
e(fence of things, and not their phenomena as conftituted 
by our peculiar organization. It is Reafon alone which 
teaches us that, as all our perceptions derive the very na¬ 
ture of their exiftence from the forms of our Senfitive Fa¬ 
culty, it is impoffible for them to have objedive validity ; 
and that all the validity they poffefs mult be merely fub- 
jedive, that is, depending entirely upon the ftate of the 
J'ubjed, or thinking being, and upon thofe mental forms on 
which the poffibility of experience itfelf depends. From 
our manner of being affected, therefore, refult phenomena, 
that is, appearances of things, but not things independent 
of the mind; of which w’e abfolutely know nothing, and 
can form no conception whatever. Suppofe, for inftance, 
we endeavoured by means of abftraftion to penetrate to 
the very effence of the things in themfelves by reafoning in 
the following manner: ‘By abftrafting from the matter 
of a perception, we arrive at a knowledge of its pure and 
primitive form; it then follows, if we abftraCt firft of all 
the form, there remains that part of the perception only 
which belongs wholly to the objeCl, or the matter.' Not¬ 
withftanding this reafoning, we have not advanced the 
leaft towards a knowledge of the things in themfelves. 
For, befides that it is eafy to lhow the abfurdity of this 
argument, which enquires what remains of the contents 
of a perception when we abftraft the forms by which alone 
they can occur in our thoughts? of what advantage, to 
us, who can only perceive in Time and Space, are things 
which neither exift in Space nor Time ? The poffibility 
even of fuch a mode of exiftence is inconceivable. Confe¬ 
quently a knowledge of the things in themfelves is quite 
impoffible, and the only knowledge we can acquire is that 
of the phenomena in Time and Space. Time and Space, 
therefore, are not attributes of the things in themfelves 
independent of our Knowing Faculty, but limply the 
forms with which our Knowing Faculty clothes the phe¬ 
nomena, and the only ones by which they can become 
known to us. It is the phenomena alone which have a 
real exiftence for us; they are the only objeCls of which 
we can have any experience, and about which we are 
permitted to occupy ourfelves, by virtue of the nature of 
our Knowing Faculty, at leaft in the economy of our pre¬ 
fent exiftence.” What a confirmation is here offered of 
the new Theory of Time and Space, as well as of the pecu¬ 
liar force of the arguments drawn from the for.rce of pure 
Reafon ! 
Holland has alfo produced other inftances of the com- 
prehenfibility of the Critic of Pure Reason. The 
learned Van Hemert has publifhed a work in four vo¬ 
lumes on Tranfcendental Philofophy, entitled, Beginfels 
der Kantiaanifche Wyfgeerte, which proves'that a native 
of that phlegmatic country could perfe&ly feize and tho¬ 
roughly comprehend the labours of the Philofopher of 
Kbnigfberg. But what is even ftill more honourable to 
this excellent character is, that he has ellablifhed a Maga¬ 
zine for the exprefs purpofe of receiving contributions 
from the learned on the fubjefl of this fublime philofophy; 
thus endeavouring to promulgate it for the benefit of 
mankind. 
We mull not, however, fuffer ourfelves to be deluded 
into a belief that the endowments of Mr. Dugald Stewart 
are to be confidered as the ftandard of the intellectual 
powers of Britain. However ably this elegant writer may 
have filled the metaphyfical chair in the univerfity of 
Edinburgh, ftill, on relinquifhing that honourable office, 
he declares his utter inability to unriddle the meaning of 
the author of the Critic. Whoever, therefore, adopts 
this writer for his leading ftar, may imagine that, in fleer¬ 
ing through the vaft fea of Kant’s difcoveries, he is not 
only bound to an unknown port, but to one that a6lu- 
ally does not exift. Enlightened Edinburgh happily af¬ 
ford s 
