PHILOSOPH Y. 
159 
fords an inftance to eftablifti the fad, that the works of 
this true Father of Philofophy are capable of being fully 
comprehended ; and it is very remarkable, that this proof 
of their intelligibility is embodied in. the very fame work 
that is embelliflied with Mr. Stewart’s elaborate Diflerta- 
tion : “ My bane and antidote are both before me.” 
On referring to the article Kant in the fupplemental 
Volume V. of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the folution 
of Mr. Stewart’s difficulty will be found to be fully ac- 
compliftied in a ftriking and comprehenfive view of the 
labours of this great metaphyfician ; fo that Scotland her- 
felf contains a living refutation of the pofition efpoufed 
by the ex-profeflor. This article is the produdion of 
John Colquhoun, F. R.S. E. an advocate at Edinburgh. 
So much for Scotland. In turning our attention to South 
Britain, to difcover what (hare of merit is due to her for 
the efforts ihe has made not only to comprehend but ac¬ 
tually 'to promulgate this falutary philofophy, we find in 
the year 1797, in the fupplementary number of the 
Monthly Magazine, a dilfertation on the “ Origin of the 
Idea of a Caufe diftindly proving our want of a true 
philofophy of the mind, and urging the neceffity of a 
candid examination of the fyftem of Kant. This diflerta- 
tion is figned H. Richter. In 1814, The Morning Chro¬ 
nicle laudably devoted its columns to the diflemination 
of metaphyfical knowledge. It was at the period when 
the admirable account of German literature and of Kant’s 
metaphyfics, in the celebrated work of Madame de Stael, 
entitled “ Germany,” occupied the public mind. The 
intereft which this work created, caufed feveral letters on 
abftrufe fubjeds to appear in the public prints. On the 
12th of March in that year the following very excellent 
and concife account of Kant’s Philofophy appeared in 
the above Journal. 
“ The eloquence of Madame de Stael’s very fplendid 
defcription of Intelledual Germany, cannot fail to pro¬ 
duce a fenfible effed upon the literary part of the Britiffi 
public. Already the appearance in your columns of fo 
obfolete a charader as an English Metaphysician may 
be attributed to this powerful charm. The letters thus 
figned appear to me to fpring from a mind open to truth, 
and pofleffing powers admirably qualified for its attain¬ 
ment and diflemination. The candour with which the 
writer admits excellence in the great German philofopher, 
who is, indeed, the intelledual foul that is beginning to 
dawn upon the long infancy of the world, does him the 
higheft honour, efpecially as his means of knowing that 
excellence appear to be very limited. It is to point him 
to a better fource of information, and to caution your 
readers that fome better information is requifite, that I 
venture to trouble you with a few ffiort obfervations on 
this fubjed. 
“ It has unfortunately happened that many perfons have 
written about this new philofophy, who, in fpite of the 
beft intentions, have never caught a glimpfe of its true fpi- 
rit. They have played, logically, on the furface with the 
mere form of knowledge; not perceiving that Kant had 
dug into the mine below, and was exploring the matter 
of which it confifts ! Thefe mere logicians could not, 
therefore, follow him in his difcovery of an original and 
confitutive ufe of underfunding, whofe exiftence had never 
before been furmiled; but whofe bufinefs is to give an 
intelligible nature to the objeds of knowledge, that is, to 
conftitute them fuch, before any confcioufnefs or logical 
claffification can take place. Kant is, therefore, an idealift , 
but he is totally free from the old abfurdity of attribu¬ 
ting to the Mind the creation of matter. He proves, that 
in acquiring objeds of knowledge w'e are both paffive and 
adive. After having acquired them, it is certainly in our 
own choice, either to examine what Ihare the Mind has 
had in their original produdion, or to take them as 
they appear,, without the trouble of fo abftrufe an en¬ 
quiry. 
“ Doubtlefs, the things by which I am furrounded ap¬ 
pear to me as extended and figured bodies, and I may reft 
content with this appearance; but am I, therefore, war¬ 
ranted to go beyond the appearance, and, by a philofo- 
phical juggle, to conclude, that they are extended and 
figured bodies in tliemjelves independent of my mind! 
“The Passive Faculty of Sense, according to 
Kant, receives the rude matter merely, upon which the 
underftanding, thus ftimulated, neceffarily re-ads, giving 
it all its form and unity, and thus adually conftituting 
what are called objeds of fenfe. This Paffive Faculty it- 
felf, he maintains, is not without its peculiar and fixed 
modes, which limit its capacity for receiving. It can re¬ 
ceive only a variety of parts, but this in a two-fold way: 
it receives parts either co-exifent or fucce five ; that is to fay, 
however harffily it may found, Time and Space them- 
felves are merely the modes of our Senfitive Faculty, and 
are (tamped by 11s upon all the things that we behold. 
This is the true reafon why human knowledge is reftrid- 
ed, as we find it to be, to objeds in Time and Space, and 
that all beyond thofe bounds is unintelligible. The Eng¬ 
lish Metaphysician will no doubt acknowledge that 
this bold ftatement is not defedive, either in fimplicity, 
clearnefs, or force ; he will fay, perhaps, All this may be 
very true, but the proof may alfo be required, and it is 
not given. What proof (hall I give to the geometrician 
that a line can be conceived from the point A to the 
point B ? 
“ When I aflert, of all future experience, that every 
objed of human knowledge muft neceffarily occupy time 
or fpace, does any man ferioufly demand a proof of this 
felf-evident propofition ? And, if one who had never re- 
fleded upon the nature of the mind, or, which is worfe, 
who was moving in the vaft circle of metaphyfical errors, 
now happily accompliffied and clofed in for ever, ffiould 
be furprifed to hear that Time and Space are intrinfic and 
effential qualifications of the Experiencing Faculty itfelf, 
fuch a man could only be told that there are Axioms in 
this negleded and defpifed fcience of metaphyfics. It is 
upon fuch Axioms that the Arch of Tranfcendental Phi¬ 
lofophy refts. 
“ This account of the Faculty of Sense is the Rock 
upon which the whole of Kant’s fyftem (lands; and its 
proof is a very fimple one, namely, the utter impoffibility of 
conceiving a Senfitive Faculty in any other way. It is there¬ 
fore as apodidically certain as that the radii of a circle are 
all equal. 
“Still, however, every thing would be dark and form- 
lefs in this vaft theatre of knowledge, thrown open by the 
paffive nature of man ; all would be diffufed and diffipated 
in an infinite expansion, were there not fome reftridive 
and conneding power to fettle the outlines and the boun¬ 
daries that muft convert the (hapelefs mafs of fenfation 
into a world of intelligible and diftind objeds. This is 
done by the Understanding, which Kant found, upon 
diffedion, to confift of twelve conneding ads. Thefe ads 
are, indeed, the intelled itfelf, concerning which the Eng- 
li(h Metaphyfician very juftly demands a ftrid account. 
“ What Kant terms original notions, or notions h priori , are 
merely the conceptions which we form toourfelves ot thefe 
ads, after having originally performed the ads them- 
felves; and are, therefore, not to be confounded with 
the puerile fancy of innate ideas. Nine of thefe intellec¬ 
tual ads are originally conftitutive; that is to fay, any 
affedion to which our paffive nature is fubjed, muft, in 
order to become an objed of human knowledge, fubmit 
itfelf to the invariable laws of the human mind. Firft, it 
muft fubmit to the preparatory forms of Sense, and fill up 
Space or Time, and then to thefe conneding powers of the 
Understanding. Thus, the fun, while.it (trikes my 
fight, deigns to become expanded in the void of my fenfi- 
tive faculty, as a variety of parts co-exifent: I admit it 
into fpace, and it becomes a fenfation. I next proceed to 
give it an intelligible nature, I affign to this fenfation a 
quantity; I conned its parts either as one, many, or all. 
I give it reality (a being in time) ; I negate it, I (urround 
it by negations ; and it is thus a limited, and fo far an 
intelligible, 
