ICO PHILO 
intelligible, being. I alfo impofe upon this fenfation three 
kinds of Relation ; I bind it as a tranfitory accident in time 
to afubfidnce, or permanent in fpace; I conneft it with 
other realities by the mental chain of canfe and effeCl; and 
I conftitute it a part of a whole by the connefting power 
of aftion and re-aftion ; thereby making the objects of 
nature determine each other’s place in fpace. Thus the 
fun, fo far as it is a fenlible and intelligible objeft, is ori¬ 
ginally generated and conftituted by the mind. To us, 
then, it is a mere phenomenon, and what we fee is not a 
thing initfelf; for of things in themfelves, and indepen¬ 
dent of the limitation prel'cribed to them by our reftrifted 
faculties, we abfolutelv know nothing. 
“ Thus is the vanity of human wifdom for ever hum¬ 
bled, at the fame time that the awful fublimity of our na¬ 
ture mud awaken a high interell in the final deltiny of a 
being-poflefled of fo noble a faculty as the Human Under- 
itanding. 
“ I beg to allure the Englilh Metaphyfician, that the 
procedure here attempted to be fhortly defcribed, is no 
hypothefis arbitrarily affumed, but a fad of internal expe¬ 
rience, clearly exhibited and firmly eftablilhed in Kant’s 
Critic of Pure Reafon, (Critik der reinen Vernunft.) 
“ It is, indeed, fomewhat mortifying, that the labours 
of fo great and patient a philofopher as Kant Ihould (fill 
continue to be eftimated by a few imperfect extrafls and 
feraps, fuch as are to be found in Dr. Willich’s deferip- 
tive catalogue of Kant’s numerous works. I would ear- 
neftly recommend to your ingenious correfpondent a very 
animated treatife, by a warm admirer of Kant, in the 
Encyclopaedia Londinensis: it has, I am happy to 
confefs, given me much light on this fubjeft, and is by 
no means a fuperficial, borrowed, performance, but the 
work of a truly original and'philofophical mind. I will 
even venture to add, from the firmed: conviftion, that 
this Englijh Ejfay would be of the nigheft fervice to many 
readers of Kant’s own works, who, being unfortunately 
occupied in judging the parts, have fuffered the aim and 
intention of the whole to efcape them. The clear and per- 
fpicuous view this treatife affords of the ultimate ten¬ 
dency of Kant’s fyftem, and the enthufiaftic and noble 
defeription of the morality to which it leads, cannot but 
acquire the author the refpeft and love of all good men. 
The Englilh reader may alfo refer with great advantage 
to a treatife by F. A. Nitfch, a learned and excellent man, 
who nearly twenty years ago folicited in vain the atten¬ 
tion of the Britilli public to this new philofophy. Of the 
German works, none, perhaps, exhibits fo minutely, and 
with fuch aftonifning accuracy and clearnefs, the entire 
foundation of Kant’s fyllem, as that entitled, A new 
Theory of Human Reprefentations ; (Vetfuch einer neuen 
Theorie des Menfchlichen Vor/lelliongs vermogens, von Karl 
I.eonhard R< inhold, 1795.) 
“ Should you, fir, favour me by the infertion of this, 
it is my intention to fend you one letter more, in as fhort 
a compafs as poffible, illu(trative of the Faculty of Rea¬ 
son, both J'peculative and prudical; in which I hope to 
fhow that Morals and Religious Faith have at length 
found a fan flu ary in the Human Mind, from whence the 
I'ceptic dare no more raife a hand to difplace them. I am, 
fir, your very obedient fervant, 
A Friend to true Metaphysics.” 
This perfpicuousand highly-valuable account of Tranf- 
cendental Philofophy fhows that its anonymous author 
entered fully into the minutiae of this wonderful difeo- 
very, and felt in the highelt degree the importance of its 
application to Religion and Morality. It affords me 
great fatisfaflion to give to the world the name of this 
“ Friend to true Metaphyfics 5” to claim him as 
my own earlieft and molt valued friend ; and to ftate 
that it was Mr. Henry Richter, who firft intro¬ 
duced me to the notice of my late ever-to-be-revered 
mailer Profeffor Nitfch. On a former occafion I adverted 
to our having attended the leflures of that immediate 
difciple of the founder of true Philofophy, profecuting 
SOPHY. 
our ftudies with united zeal; and that, in all my literary- 
attempts for the promulgation of this Philofophy, I had 
been powerfully feconded by his conftant and indefatiga¬ 
ble aid. This perfevering Friend to True Metaphyfics in 
the year 1817 gave a luminous and fatisfaftory account of 
Kant’s Philofophy in a very original and interefting work, 
entitled, “ Day Light, a recent difeovery in the Art of 
Painting ; with Hints on the Philofophy of the Fine Arts, 
and on that of the Human Mind, as firft diffefled by Ema¬ 
nuel Kant. Pub. R. Ackerman.” In that fpirited little 
fatire, which abounds with originality, our author fays; 
“Time and Space, which have puzzled the philofophic 
world fo long, are merely the modes of our sensitive 
faculty, and are ftamped by us upon all the things that 
we perceive. I maintain further, that this pofition is fo 
felf-evident, that it is utterly impoffible to conceive a Senfi- 
tive Faculty in any other way; and that this is the true 
reafon why human knowledge is reftrifled, as we find it 
to be, and are indeed confcious it ever muft be, to oh- 
jeds in Time and Space; and that all beyond thofe 
bounds is unintelligible.'" In another part of this ani¬ 
mated performance, page 16. note (4.) which contains a 
rapid but very ftriking and original view of the Theory 
of the Fine Arts, our lively author fays ; “ Denner 
thought, and I am afraid even Mr. Dugald Stewart is of 
the fame opinion, but of this I will not fpeak pofitively, 
that every man’s nofe has a precife and particular form of 
its own, not at all affefled by the fpeflator who looks at it; 
and that, to imitate a nofe rightly, we muft give to our 
copy this exafl form, and no other. Poor Denner! what 
were his fpeflacles and magnifying glafles in comparifon 
with the microfcopes to which our elegant hijlorian of 
philofophy may have had recourfe ! And yet I doubt whe¬ 
ther all the opticians in London have enabled Mr. D. 
Stewart toafeertain the abfolute and ultimate form of any 
nofe upon earth ; and it may after all appear, that both 
the painter and the philofopher have fpent their lives in 
the purfuit of a phantom ; and that the objefts of Nature 
have really in themfelves no fuch form as we attribute 
to them ; in fa ft, that sensible objects are known to 
us only as they exijl in the mind and to the mind, beyond 
whofe boundaries the mod powerful microfcope would 
vainly attempt to penetrate. It is delightful to fee Phi¬ 
lofophy, finding at its own abfurdities, come back again 
and Ihake hands with Common Senfe. This excellent, 
though humble, faculty, is ftrengthened and confirmed by 
fuch encouragement, and willingly throws away the fpec- 
tacles which have incommoded it to no purpofe.” In 
p. 62 he continues thus ; “ Of things which are unique 
(fuch as matter, mind, space, time),” fays Mr. Du¬ 
gald Stewart, “ no clarification is pradicable. Indeed, to 
fpeak of claftifying what has nothing in common with any 
thing elfe, is a contradiftion in terms.” He indeed ac¬ 
knowledges himfelf to be precifely in the fame ftate with 
St. Augustine and Locke. “ Don’t afk us,” fay thefe 
three gentlemen, “ what Time is, and we know very well; 
but, Ji quis interroget, if you alk us, we know nothing 
about the matter.” I will not, therefore, put this ftupi- 
fying queftion to Mr. Dugald Stewart, but fupply him 
with the anfwer to it, furnilhed by the Kantefian fyftem. 
“Time and Space are Elements of the Human Mind ; 
the mode of being of ail that can be perceived by the 
Senfes. In other words, the general form of the Senfitive 
Faculty is, a variety of parts in conneftion ; of which 
there are two kinds: 
Parts co-exifting, Parts fucceftive, 
or SPACE. or TIME. 
Thefe are both branches of the Senfitive or Paflive Fa¬ 
culty, and they have this in common ; they are both 
modes of receiving a variety of fenfible parts. 
“ Does Mr. Dugald Stewart really confider thefe two 
puzzling things, or rather thefe nothings—thefe empty 
receptacles for things—thefe two extenfions—thefe in ft 7 
2 nitiesj 
