PHILO 
mties, which are both homogeneal, both continuous, 
both infinitely divifibte, as having nothing in com¬ 
mon ? 
“ I (hould be forry to miftake any ftatement of this 
eloquent writer; but there is, I think, one unequivocal 
affertion in his works, namely, that fpace exifts out of the 
mind. Has he been there to make the difcovery ? The 
mind, alfo, Mr. Dugald Stewart terms unique. This is 
the great Si qnis interroget. 
“ All Philofophy of the Mind confifts in Conscious¬ 
ness, which is a refleflive, that is to fay, a philofophical, a£l. 
When I look at a ftatue, an afl of confcioufnefs immedi¬ 
ately paffes in my mind, in the reflection, ‘ I perceive this 
Statue.’ That this reflection does pafs admits of no 
proof. But, cry the Dogmatifts, the Spiritualills, the Ma- 
terialifts, the Idealifts, the Sceptics, with one voice, 
‘ What is this I of which you fpeak ?’ Gentlemen, you 
have been endeavouring, for two thoufand years at lead, 
to find an aufwer to this and other ftrange queftions, and 
you are ftill juft as far off as you were at firft. Are you 
quite fure that thefe queftions have aconfiftent and intel¬ 
ligible meaning ? The mere thinking faculty of man 
forms chimeras without end; Knowledge is quite ano¬ 
ther affair, and is bound down to drifter laws. Are you 
fure, gentlemen, that it is not a Centaur you are hunting 
after? If it be, this may partly account for the length of 
the chafe. Perhaps you are enquiring about the proper¬ 
ties of a J'quare circle ? This I, of which you admit that 
you are confciousfi what do you wifli to know about it ? 
That it is a neceffary part of all human knowledge; will 
that fatisfy you ? That it is the subject to which every 
aft of knowledge is referred; is that enough? No, give it to 
us as an objebl of knowledge, not only as a knowing but as 
a known thing. Alas! who fiiall catch this Centaur? 
But fuppofe this I were exhibited to you as an object 
by the faculty of human knowledge; would you be then 
content ? No; it mult not be tampered with and modi¬ 
fied by the forms of human knowledge ; let us know it in 
its own abfolute and unknown ftate. Alas! who (hall de- 
fcribe for us this Square Circle ? 
“ Kant deteCled the abfurdity of thefe feemingly-im- 
portant queftions of the logician, which, in truth, a(k 
about nothing. He faw that the matter which fliould have 
been inquired into had never once been touched upon; 
namely, Consciousness itfelf through all its ramifica¬ 
tions. Here he found a firm footing : for the reflec¬ 
tive acts of the mind contain within themfelves their 
own explanation and their own proof; they require but 
to be diffefted and developed ; and this it is their own 
natural office to perform. 
“ The above account of the faculty of the Sense is ob¬ 
tained (imply by analyzing the Confcioufnefs of Senjation 
itfelf. He who makes the refleClion, I perceive this Jlatue, 
the objeCf of further reflection, taking care not to wander 
out of it among the phantoms of (peculation in the idle 
play of logical nypothefis, will find this Ample aCt of the 
mind much richer in its contents than he has probably 
been accultomed to imagine. 
“ The judicious reader will be aware of the danger of 
fuftering his attention to be occupied by mere verbal cri- 
ticifms ; he will be fenfible that a writer who attempts to 
convey an entirely new thought (fuch as that of the Form 
of the Sensitive Faculty certainly is,) cannot ex¬ 
prefs himfelf by adopting rigidly the received and fami¬ 
liar ufe of words. Such a reader will be cautious, there¬ 
fore, not to deceive himfelf by attempting to refute , till 
he is quite certain that he underftands. He will know 
how difficult it is to exprefs a new thought not merely 
with accuracy, but fo as to convey it concifely and at once 
without the danger of mifconception. 
“ I admit, that to profit by this caution in the prefent 
inftance is not eafy; and the difficulty arifes from two 
caufes: firft, the opinions already rooted in the mind of 
the reader, together with the vocabulary eftabliffied upon 
them ; and fecondiy, (hould he have the candour and the 
Vol.XX. No. 1358. 
SOPHY. 161 
ftrength of mind to lay thefe obftacles entirely out of his 
way, there remains ftill a greater difficulty, which he 
whofe objeft is merely to arrive at a fpeedy conclufion, that 
he may rid himfelf of the trouble of the inveftigation, will 
certainly not undertake to conquer. This difficulty lies 
in the drift and clofe connexion which all the Faculties 
of the Mind (land in with one another. 
“ The Form of the Sensitive Faculty, for inftance, 
can never be conceived but by the Understanding act¬ 
ing upon it. And hence it arifes, that any word ufed to 
exprefs a quality of Senfe, mud alfo exprefs fome property 
of the Intellefl. The firft requisite, therefore, is clearly 
to diftinguifti the two things, Sense and Understanding, 
before we pretend to correft the language of any writer 
who treats of them. ‘ Accuracy of language,’ faid an 
obfolete philofopher of our own day, ‘ is a neceffary pre- 
re'quifite to accuracy of thought.’ Yet the ;whimfical 
practice of chriftening the child before it is born, will not, 
I fliould hope, be now very generally revived. 
“Thefe Faculties mull both be known in their general 
charafter before any clear c-r particular knowledge can be 
acquired of either; and the fame thing'occurs in diftin- 
guifliing between Understanding and Reason. Many 
efforts, therefore, and a mod comprehenfive view of the 
Mind, are requifite in order that its parts may be clearly 
diftinguiflied : and yet this fcience is really in itfelf the 
mod Ample thing in the world. 
“ It will appear that I have here confined myfelf ftrictly 
to one (ingle point. My whole view has been to bring 
the fubjeft fairly into difcuffion ; the hafty criticifms hi¬ 
therto publiftied in this country having, in faft, never 
once come into contabl with the Kantelian Theory. I 
have endeavoured merely to render one fingle pofition of 
this fyftem, that refpefting the Senfitive Faculty, diflinCt: 
the following hints may perhaps tend to elucidate it. 
“ To perceive (by the Senfitive Faculty), and to 
perceive in Time and Space, are expreffions ltriftly 
equivalent. The latter is implied in the former ; for to 
perceive, without perceiving in Time and Space, has no 
meaning : and this is really the cafe with the word Per¬ 
ception, as commonly ufed ; that is to fay, it expreffes a 
faft of which we are confcious, but which we have not 
analyzed fo as to attach to it any precife meaning. We 
fay, for inftance, ‘ I perceive this Statue, but in (o doing 
1 do not contribute any thing to the phenomenon before me: 
I give to it neither its extenfion nor its colour, neither 
variety nor conneftion, neither matter nor form : yet I 
own I am in fome way neceffary to the prefence of this 
phenomenon, fo far as I perceive it; that is, I do fome- 
thing towards it which I call perceiving: but what this 
may be I have not the fmalleft idea. In fa ft, Perception, 
wdien I attempt to examine it, feems to have no meaning.’ 
On the prefumed ground, namely, that in perceiving I 
contribute nothing to the phenomenon perceived, it may in¬ 
deed well appear, that the perceiving aft has no meaning, 
for I here prefuppofe that this a£t produces no effebl; 
which is, however, diffidently abfurd ! 
“ If I take theoppofite ground, and admit that in per¬ 
ceiving / really contributeJ'omething to the phenomenon per¬ 
ceived, it will follow’, that l mud either give the matter or 
the form to it; if I do not create the colour of which the 
fenfation confifts, I muftat lead give the extenfion, which 
is the mode of its being. He who refufes to admit this, 
mud be content to return to the primitive (late of afecure 
ignorance, and lay afide the Philofophy of the Mind alto¬ 
gether. 
“ I have thus endeavoured to point out the extremity 
of the clue, which whoever has a touch diffidently deli¬ 
cate may ufe as a fure guide on the narrow fummit of 
thatcaufeway which extends its rocky though unfathom¬ 
able bafe through the obfcure depths of metaphyfics.” 
In Note 9, he adds, “ ‘ Que l’homme rede done dans 
1 ’etroite loge que fon Createur lui a donnfe.’ Villers's 
Philofophie de Kant. —That man (hould confine himfelf to 
the limits appointed him by his Creator, that he fliould 
T t fet 
