PHILOSOPHY. 
163 
tality, Absolute Limitation, and Absolute Ne¬ 
cessity. 
39. Reason, therefore, is a Spontaneity, or Aftive 
Faculty, free from Time and Space ; it unites the Ca¬ 
tegories, which are themfelves out of Time and Space, 
into the fix Ideas. 
123 6 
Abfolute Abfolute Abfolute Abfolute 
Totality. Limitation. Subftance, Necefiity. 
4 
Abfolute 
Caufe, 
5 
Abfolute 
Concurrence. 
40. As the Law's of Nature are founded on the Cate¬ 
gories of the Underftanding, fo the Laws of Morals are 
founded on the Ideas of Reafon, and conftitute the in¬ 
ternal bafis of Religion. 
41. Reason is divifible into theoretical and practical: 
42. Theoretical Reason ftrives to give unity to our 
Knowledge ; 
43. Practical Reason ftrives to give unity to our 
Desires. 
Whatever fuccefs thefe principles may have with the 
learned, one motive, I hope, will at leaft be apparent ; 
namely, that of a wifti to enroll myfelf among the happy 
few who believe that they fully comprehend Tranfceiulevlal 
Philofophy; and thus to rebut the aftertion that Kant’s 
Philqfophi is incomprehenfible: for, until this puerile and 
abfurd prejudice is removed, no progrefs whatever can be 
expeftedin this fcience. 
There is, however, a very ftriking difference between 
the advocates of this new philofophy and its opponents. 
The latterare fatisfiedwith mifunderftanding, reviling, and 
declaring it to be incomprehenfible; while the former are 
not content with fully comprehending the new' doftrine, 
but are defirous to work the fame conviction upon others. 
The happy and beneficial revolution which this new dis¬ 
covery has effected will be long and gratefully acknow¬ 
ledged by fucceeding generations ; and the praftical ad¬ 
vantages that will refult from its endlefs application both 
to phyfics and to morals, will be fo great as to aftonifh by 
their immenfity. 
After a difcovery is once made, it is very eafy to retrace 
the fteps of the adventurer, and to determine whether he 
has taken the right path to fuccefs. We may now judge 
of the wifdom of Columbus in conftantly fleering his 
courfe wefterly for the difcovery of the New World; we 
can alfo now difcover Kant’s wifdom in perfevering in 
his new mode of inveftigation until he had achieved a New 
Pliilojophy of Mind. The aftonifhing benefits that three 
centuries have heaped upon the new world, may induce 
us to hope from time equally great advantages with regard 
to the New Philofophy. It is hardly to be imagined that 
the framer of a new hypothefis, or the difcoverer of a new 
faft, fhould forefee all the benefits that may refult from 
his efforts. Thofe therefore who travel in paths fo hap¬ 
pily pointed out by their ingenious predeceffors have 
amazing advantages over them. Every unlettered feaman 
can now fecurely make his deftined port in the New 
World, though the original difcoverer was not quite cer¬ 
tain that the land itfelf exifted, and had nearly loft his 
life in the adventure. 
We muff, however, conftantly bear in mind, that not 
one fingle ftep can be made in this new philofophy until 
the ever-obtruding notions of Time and Space are com¬ 
prehended in their fulleft extent, and thoroughly and 
completely defined. With this view, Kant has devoted 
the whole of the firft part of the Critic of Pure Reafon to 
the development of thefe two important notions, under 
the title of Efthetics. It is to be hoped that the attentive 
reader will by this time have fo far removed from his 
mind the vulgar prejudice in favour of an independent Space, 
as fully to comprehend the following 
Paradoxes of Transcendental Philosophy. 
1. Time and Space are both limited and infinite. 
2. All the things in Nature may be faid to be at the 
fame time both in the mind and out of the mind. 
3. All the things in Nature may be faid to be at the 
fame time Phenomena or appearances, and Noumena or 
things in themfelves. 
4. Every perfon may be faid to exift both in Time and 
Space and out of Time and Space. 
The inftant Time and Space are refolved into Mental 
Receptivities, as is done in N° 16 of the preceding Prin¬ 
ciples, all thefe unaccountable Paradoxes are convin¬ 
cingly removed : for, if Time and Space are properties of 
the" Mind, it follows that whatever is in them is in the 
mind alfo. Now all the phenomena of nature are in 
Time and Space; therefore all the phenomena of nature 
are in the mind. When a Phenomena is prefent, and 
affefts my fenfes, an Intuition immediately arifes, which 
is only poflible by the prefence of the objeft. As without 
the prefence of the phenomenon no intuition whatever 
can occur, I may apply the term Intuition to the Phe¬ 
nomena, agreeably to the rule, that, where there is no 
danger of confounding, one word may be fubftituted for 
another: thus in familiar life we fay, the Jan rifes, though 
it ftands ftill. The image which I have a b ft rafted from 
a phenomenon or intuition, and which I retain in my 
Mind when the objeft ceafcs to he prefent, for inftance, the 
image of a deceafed friend, whole intuition is no longer 
poflible, is a Conception. Conception therefore implies 
the abfence of the objeft : for, if it be prefent, it is Intui¬ 
tion. So that what we call external objects are nothing 
but mere reprefentations of Sense whole form is Space : 
for inftance, a rofe. He, therefore, who allows that Time 
and Space are forms of the Mind, and yet denies that the 
things in Time and Space are in the Mind, not only con- 
tradifts himfelf, but proves his utter ignoranceof Trans¬ 
cendental Philosophy. The notion of Space is atten¬ 
dant on every outtcard objeft whofe form it conftitutes, and 
that of Time is concomitant with every mental operation. 
It would almoft border on infanity to confound TranJ- 
cendental IdealiJm with the obfolete empirical idealijm 
which denied the exiftence of extended things in Space ; 
for the whole force of all its reafoning is precifely to efta- 
blifli the validity of thefe very things, by proving them 
to be the only real things of which the mind of man can 
take cognizance. It mull, however, be recollected, that, 
if thefe objefts are merely reprefentations, they are J'enfible 
reprefentations; and it would be difficult to prove that we 
can obtain any other knowledge of furrounding nature 
befides that communicated to us through the channel 
of our fenfes. It is indeed already admitted in Natural 
Philofophy, that the fenfations of heat, cold, hard, foft, &c. 
exift only in the fentient being. We have therefore only 
to add thofe of extenfion and figure; and Kant’s Theory 
will appear before us. Does it in the leaft endanger the 
exiftence of the external world, to fay, that all we are at 
prefent permitted to know of it, is mixed up w'ith our 
mode of knowing! Is it not fufficient to latisfy the moft 
fcrupulous mind, to be told, that, while the fame unknown 
caufes conftantly produce the fame known effefts, we may 
regulate our plans with perfeft fafety, and continue fafely 
our fearch after knowledge ? The conditions in the mind 
which operate to bring about this extraordinary refult 
are the difcovery of Kant alone; they conftitute an entire 
whole of knowledge d priori, without which we can never 
boaft of a Philosophy of the Human Mind. 
It is extremely interefting to compare the exertions of 
great men who have been employed in elaborating fyftems 
for the future improvement of the world. In the year 
1670, Locke laid the plan of his “ Ejfay on Human Under¬ 
funding ,” but he did not complete his work for feventeen 
years afterwards. Prec-ifely a century from that period 
Kant laid the foundation for the “ Critic of Pure Reafon ,” 
in his inaugural Diflertation De Mundi Senfibilis aUpie In- 
telligibilis, 
