PHILO 
that is, I have five senses by which I immediately per¬ 
ceive thefe external objefts. I am alfo inftinCtively con- 
fcious that the things in the world Hand in a variety of 
connexions and relations with each other. But Reafon 
is not content merely to trace the connexion of fenfible 
phenomena in the field of poffible experience: it afks 
whether thefe fenfible objeCts are really in themfelves fuch 
as they appear to us? whether they are the fame to all 
reprefenting beings ? whether there be not fome common 
ground in the nature of man which caufes thefe objects 
to appear the fame to all men ? and, if there be, it demands 
what are they in themfelves, independent of our modes of re- 
prefentation ? 
It is evident that all our perceptions are bound down to 
the conditions of Time and Space, fo that out of time and 
lpace we can have no intuitions whatfoever. How does 
this happen ? enquires philofophizing reafon; what are 
Time and Space ? are they properties which adhere to the 
objeCts themfelves ; and is it by means of experience that 
they pafs over to my reprefentatior.s ? Or, if we cannot 
adopt this explanation, becaufeTime and Space are neceffary 
predicates of things fo far as we perceive them, and which 
we cannot exclude even in thought, may not Reafon be 
compelled to allow that Time and Space, as the pure forms 
of all intuitions, exift in us prior to all aCtual intuitions ? 
that, conlequently, every intuition mull fubmit itfelf to 
thefe forms ? that therefore the reafon why we can only 
have intuitions in Time and Space mud lie in the origi¬ 
nal conftitution of our Intuitive Faculty? And 
what (hall we fay with regard to thofe conceptions which 
conftitute as it were the fundamental and effential con¬ 
ditions of all thinking? I allude to the twelve Catego- 
ries, to the conceptions Subfiance, Caufe, Reality, See. 
That I am not able to think anything without thefe, is an 
internal faCt of my confciouftiefs : but what they are, and 
why they are fo indifpenfable to the operations of my un- 
derltandin'g, it is the bufinefs of Philofophizing Reafon 
to find out. It is evident that thefe Conceptions of Under- 
ftanding, which cannot be excluded even in thought with¬ 
out annulling the pofiibility of thinking altogether, have 
not their ground in the objeCts of experience ; for nothing 
empirical is abfolutely univerfal and neceffary. Thofe 
Conceptions, by means of which thinking is alone poffible, 
muff: have their ground in the original and effential con- 
ftruCtion of the Understanding itfelf, and muff: be con- 
fidered as the formal conditions of all ufe ofUnderftand- 
ing, exaCtly as Time and Space muff be allowed to be the 
formal conditions of all our Intuitions. We therefore 
call them pure Conceptions (Conceptions a priori), which 
are in a certain manner independent of experience. The 
independence of thefe conceptions upon experience does 
not mean, however, that in point of time we are confcious 
of them prior to experience; but, that they have their 
ground and origin in certain effential properties of our 
knowing faculty itfelf. This, however, does not contra¬ 
dict the aflertion that we firff become confcious of thefe 
original conceptions by means of experience. Philofophiz¬ 
ing Reafon, thus elevating itfelf above experience, con¬ 
templates not merely the pure reprefentations of Sense 
(Time and Space), and of the Understanding (the 
twelve Categories), but the fix Ideas of Reafon, whence 
originate thofe of the Soul, the Deity, See. Laftly, it de¬ 
termines the validity of all thefe pure Reprefentations, to¬ 
gether with the limits and conditions of their proper ufe. 
As to the queftion why the Reprefenting and Knowing 
Faculty comprifes exaCtly thefe and no other original re¬ 
prefentations as the formal conditions or laws of its ope¬ 
rations ; and how this is poffible ? the anfwer is obvious; 
that, with refpeCt to whatever is original, and not derived 
from any thing elfe, this enquiry is perfectly inadmiffible. 
Every fundamental power is incomprehcnfible, and muff, 
from its very nature, ever remain fo. 
Again, we are confcious that we cannot confider at 
pleafure every conception and definition as true, nor every 
j udgment and conclufion as correCt; but that conceptions, 
SOPHY. 167 
judgments, and conclufions, muff be conftruCted and qua¬ 
lified in a certain manner if we would apply to them the 
predicate of Truth. Whence does this arife ? Doubtlefs, 
becaufe there are certain original rules and laws grounded 
in the nature and effence of the human mind, according 
to which, conceptions, judgments, and conclufions, are 
formed. Thefe laws of thinking, the Understanding 
muff follow in all its operations, if it is to be confident 
with itfelf. 
Another fubjeCt of Philofophy is the nature of Feeling, 
its laws, its connexion with tlie reprefenting and defiring 
faculty, including the principles and maxims of Happi- 
nefs. 
Of all the Feelings, next to the moral feeling, thofe of 
the Sublime and Beautiful are the molt remarkable; and 
indeed they are the molt nearly related to it. The faCt 
of the immediate and difinterelted pleafure which we take 
in the Sublime and Beautiful, is too remarkable to be 
overlooked. Reafon could not refrain from inveftigating 
that free activity and harmonious play of our mental 
powers, of which thefe feelings are but the neceffary con¬ 
sequence; as well as thofe qualities of the objeCts by 
which this play of the faculties is effected. Thefe in- 
veftigations conftitute Esthetics, and the Critic of 
Taste. 
Among all the faCts of confciouftiefs, none is fo remark¬ 
able as that fenten.ee which we pronounce, without the 
lead regard to our own advantage, upon th ejujiice or in- 
juflice, the goodnefs or badnefs, of the principles and aCtions 
of men ; connected with a pure feeling of effeetn for the 
good, and an indifpenfable obligation to will and to do it. 
How is this faCt of confcience to be explained and com¬ 
prehended ? Only by affuming a formal quality origi¬ 
nally inherent in human Reafon, by which it is compelled 
to confider fome fentiments and adtions as reafonabie and 
good, others as unreafonable and bad; juft as there are 
certain formal conditions of the theoretical knowing fa¬ 
culty by which all our thinking and knowing is de¬ 
termined. If we inveftigate further, we find, that that 
form or that Law of Moral Reason is comprehended 
in thofe maxims of the Will which coincide with the uni- 
v erf ally valid rules of human conduSl. Reafon has now a 
wide field opened before it, wherein it can exercife its 
powers in determining the refpeCtive Rights and Duties 
of individuals and of focieties. What are the practical 
laws of Reafon, Liberty, Virtue, Right, Duty, See. but the 
conceivable grounds from which alone the faCt of Con¬ 
fcience can be comprehended ? 
Laffly, it is a univerfally-acknowledged faCt, that all 
nations have at all times affumed fomething fuperfenfible 
and intelligent, as the ground of the exiftence, the dura¬ 
tion, the fuitable concurrence and co-operation, of every 
thing in the world, however widely they may have differ¬ 
ed in their reprefentations of this fuperfenfible being. 
Every man’s own confcioufnefs teaches him that the belief 
in fomething divine is an indifpenfable want. If Reafon 
fearches for the grounds of this remarkable phenomenon 
in the hiffory of the human mind, it finds that thefe 
grounds lie in the effential conftruCtion both of the The¬ 
oretical and the Practical Intellect. Theoretical 
Reafon is compelled to affume, for every feries of caufes 
and effeCts, a firjl and chief caufe, which can no longer be 
confidered as an effeCt. And, when it remarks in this 
cafual connexion of worldly beings, End, Order, and Plan, 
it feels itfelf irrefiftibly forced to confider this firff and 
chief caufe as an intelligent being. But, as a practical 
faculty, Reafon cannot be confident with itfelf, if it do 
not acknowledge the Creator, Preferver, and Governor, 
of the phyfical world, to be, at the fame time, the Author, 
Preferver, and Governor, of the moral world ; and that he 
muff poflefs all the properties and perfections neceffary to 
this high character. By fuch inveftigations philofophiz¬ 
ing Reafon elevates itfelf to the Idea of an all-perfeCl 
Godhead, and of a Moral Theology. But the Moral Law, 
which commands every rational being to realize the 
2 Ideal 
