168 
PHILOSOPHY. 
Ideal of moral goodnefs, would have neither meaning 
nor force if man did not exift for ever, fince an eternal 
exiftence is necelfary to this infinite progreflion. The 
Moral Law, therefore, were irrational, but for theaffump- 
tion of the Immortality of the Soul. By fadts, by 
the wonderful conftrudtion of the external world, by the 
voice of the Moral Law within us, and moreover by the 
necefiity fo uni verfally felt of a belief in fomething higher 
and eternal; Reafon is compelled to form the religious 
ideas of God, Providence, and Immortality. 
Reafon proceeds analytically in going from the con¬ 
ditioned to its conditions, from the perceptible and per¬ 
ceived fadls to their merely rational grounds: this ana¬ 
lytical procedure of Reafon may alfo be called the re- 
grefiive method by which it arrives at fundamental 
conceptions; that is, fuch as require no further ground 
to reft upon, or from which they may be comprehended. 
Thus Reafon afcends from given fadls to their unknown 
fources, the difcovery of which not only explains thole 
fadls, but furnifhes reafon with many ether important 
truths. Thus, from the principle that the pure forms of 
Time and Space are the original conditions of the poffibility 
of all Intuition, we learn not only that we can have no 
Intuitions out of Time and Space, but moreover that 
all mathematical pofitions exprefling the neceffary deter¬ 
minations of Time and Space are univerfally valid and 
apodidtically certain, without requiring the teftirnony of Ex¬ 
perience; and, above all, that all our Intuitions in Time 
and Space procure us no knowledge of the things as they 
are in themfelves, but only as they appear to us. 
Reafon now endeavours to conned: thefe fundamental 
conceptions and principles, together with the truths de¬ 
pendent upon them, into a whole, or to form them into 
a System. Reafon is not fatisfied with a rhapfodical 
knowledge which has no internal connexion, but endea¬ 
vours to unite all knowledge of one fpecies into a whole. 
It lays one fingle principle as a foundation, and fubjoins 
the reft in a regular feries, and in due order, fo as tb give 
clearnefs and certainty both to the parts and to the 
whoie. To produce fuch a fyftem, Reafon ufes the fyn- 
thctieal method ; that is, it proceeds from the condition 
to the conditioned, from the ground to the conlequence, 
from the principle to what flows from it. After it has 
acquired the materials by the analytical or regreffive me¬ 
thod, it makes ufe of the fynthetical or progx-e five method, 
in order to compofe a well-arranged and properly-con- 
nedfed whole of knowledge. The power of Reafon to 
fyftematize its knowledge has obtained it the name of an 
Architectonic Faculty. 
This fearch after the imperceptible and merely-con- 
ceivable principles of the given, and the connection of the 
knowledge attained by it into a whole, is called Philoso¬ 
phizing in the proper fignification of the word; and he 
who does this fuccefsfuliy is a Philosopher. 
Sedl. II. What is Philofophy? Its fource and end ? 
As we have explained the conception of Philofophizing 
to be the forming a fyftem of fundamental Ideas and 
Propoftions; by Philofophy mufl be underftood, aSyflem 
of conceptions and propofitions relative to the merely- 
rational grounds of the internal and external fads of that 
which is given to our perceiving faculty. 
Philofophy is a whole of knowledge, which mult be re¬ 
duced, if not to a fingle principle, at leaft to the fmalielt 
number of principles and fundamental pofitions. It is, 
therefore, no aggregate of knowledge .which has arifen by 
the mere accidental addition of one part to another, 
without any internal and neceffary coherence or com- 
pletenefs. According to the fundamental law of Unity, 
io eflential to human reafon, the rational grounds of the 
various fpecies of the perceptible muft Hand in fuch a real 
connexion, that they fhall mutually fupport, explain, and 
confirm, each other; and by their completenefs afford 
entire fatisfadlion to Reafon. 
i. The fource of all Philofophy is Reafon itfelf. If 
man merely poflefled the fenlitive faculty and the under- 
ftanding, he would diftinguifh the objedts given to him 
by experience, and learn their utility, &c. but he would 
never enquire into their rational grounds. 
2. The object of Philofophy comprifes every fadl both 
within arrd without us. Bur, in the ftridt fenfe of the 
word, Man himfelf, with all his endowments, powers, in- 
ftindls, wants, and end, is the objedt of Philofophy. 
3. The neceflity of Philofophy lies in the nature of 
Reafon itfelf; it is therefore not an accidental but an 
eflential want of man, with which he can as little difpenfe 
as with Reafon itfelf. It is therefore an irrational demand 
of thofe who adhere to what is immediately ufeful, that we 
fhould abftain from all inveffigation which furpaffes the 
Perceptible, and that we fhould limit ourfelves to the ter¬ 
ritory of experience. 
Sedl. III. Philofophy is a Rational Science; or, properly 
fpeahing, a whole of feveral Rational Sciences. 
A Science is a whole of knowledge arranged fyflemati- 
cally. But we muft diftinguifh between Sciences of Ex¬ 
perience and thofe of Reafon. The former include all 
iiiftorical knowledge, as Geography, Natural Hiftory, 
Anatomy, Phyfiology, Chemiftry; in fhort, all forts of 
knowledge the materials of which are taken from expe¬ 
rience. The fciences of Reafon, on the other hand, reft 
upon apodidtically-certain principles, conceivable h priori 
from pure reafon alone. Thus, Mathematics is a fcience 
of Reafon, refting upon pure fundamental conceptions, 
pofitions, and principles, neither taken from experience 
nor requiring experience for their confirmation. Philo¬ 
fophy, therefore, as a fyftem of fundamental conceptions 
and principles relative to the merely-rational conditions 
of the perceptible, is a fcience of Reafon. 
It will be proper here to point out the eflential differ¬ 
ence between Philofophy and the Mathematics. Philofophy 
is the fyftematic knowledge of the merely-rational con¬ 
ditions of the perceptible. We term thefe conditions 
merely-rational, not only becaufe they are not perceived, 
but becaufe no conception of them can be conftrudted, that 
is, can be reprefented by the imagination in the pure in¬ 
tuition of Time and Space. We can, on the contrary, 
reprefent to ourfelves in fpace, by means of the imagina¬ 
tion, or, for the fake of greater diftindlnefs, deferibe a 
circle upon paper; and can demonftrate, by means of this 
intuition, the pofitions, that all the radii are equal, and 
that the diameter divides the circle into two equal parts, 
See. But is it poflible thus to conftrudt the conception? 
and ideas of Philofophy, in order to demonftrate their 
truth ? Can I, for inftance, reprefent in my imagination 
the idea of the human Soul as a Ample fubltance, and as 
the lubftraturn of the various powers of man; or the idea 
of the pure law of Morality ; or the idea of the Deity, 
as the laft ground of the exiftence of all reality ? By no 
means. The reality or validity of thefe ideas cannot be 
proved by an intuitive reprefientation. The Mathematics 
proceed from conceptions to adlual intuitions. They do 
not derive the properties of the circle from its concep¬ 
tion, but from its intuition. Mathematical judgments 
are therefore intuitive ; Philofophical judgments difeurjive, 
derived from mere ideas. Philofophy may indeed illul- 
trate its dodtrines by intuitions,as fimilies, but can draw 
no inferences from them. 
Sedf. IV. DogmatiJ'm, Scepticifm, and Criticifm; Truth 
of the latter of thefe three chief Syjiems. 
We have now to enquire what are the true and ulti¬ 
mate grounds of all perceiving and knowing; andNwhich 
of the various philofophical fyltems is the true one. 
Perception is evidently an internal fact; but are the laft 
grounds of a perception to be fought within or without 
the mind ? or do they lie partly within and partly with¬ 
out ? In order to anfwer this qtieftion, Reafon has taken 
three different ways; and indeed it was natural that it 
fhould do fo. 
