1G9 
PHILO 
Its firft attempt in philofophy was the dogmatical, 
by which it attributed our fuppofed knowledge of objects 
to the objeCts in themfelves, endeavoured to afcertain the 
exiftence or non-exiftence of fuperfenfible things and their 
properties, or profefl'ed really to know them without en¬ 
quiring whether l'uch knowledge be poflible. Dogma¬ 
tism never confidered whether Reafon is able to difcover 
the internal nature of things which lie beyond the reach 
of experience; it did not ftop to examine its principles, or 
the right of extending them beyond that boundary; but 
went on blindly, imagining that it was proceeding upon 
a fure road to the knowledge of the internal nature of 
things. Without the aid of Intuition, the Dogmatift 
took it for granted that all bodies are compofed of atoms, 
or of entirely-fimple indivifible elements ; and that thefe 
original elements (monads) poffefs a power of reprefen. 
tation. By mere thinking, the Dogmatical Philofopher 
imagines that he knows the human Soul and the Deity, 
in the manner in which they are qualified in themfelves; 
and that the reafon why certain objects can only be re- 
prefented in a certain manner, (for inftance, that every 
body mud occupy fpace, and every event have its caufe,) 
is that the things in themfelves are actually fuch as our 
reprefenting faculty exhibits them. . The efl’ence of Dog¬ 
matism, however various the fyftems that have arifen 
from it, confifts in the pofition, that man poflefl’es a fa¬ 
culty of knowing the nature of the things in themfelves. 
Rath as its affertions are, it is obvious that, though they 
cannot be confirmed by experience, they can never be re¬ 
futed by it. 
The groundlefs and unftable nature of the affertions of 
Dogmatifm could not remain hidden from Reafon in its 
progrefiive cultivation. It perceived that the various 
dogmatical fyftems contradict one another in fuch a man¬ 
ner, that all are annihilated ; for that the molt important 
and boafted dogmas are oppofed by contradictory dogmas, 
fupported by equally fpecious arguments. From the re¬ 
petition of the ever-fruitlefs attempts of Dogmatifm, Scep¬ 
ticism has naturally refulted ; a mode of flunking in 
which Reafon proceeds with fuch violence againjl itfelf, 
that, as Kant juftly obferves, it never could have entered 
the mind of man but when reduced to a ftate of abfolute 
defpair. Scepticifm confifts in the affection, that, with 
refpeCt to the laft ground of things, and the exiftence and 
non-exiftence of fuperfenfible objeCts, nothing at all can 
be decided. It can affign, however, no other reafon for 
this defpair than the unfatisfaftory attempts of Dogma¬ 
tifm. 
As Dogmatism neceflarily led to Scepticism, this 
compelled Reafon to have recourfe to Criticism, thus 
opening the way to found fcience. Scepticifm is fo dif- 
trefting to the mind, fo oppofite to the inceffant defire of 
Reafon to agree with itfelf concerning the great problems 
of Philofophy,and either to folve them or to difcover why 
their folution is impoftible, that it cannot reft without 
making Come new attempt to fatisfy itfelf. For this pur- 
pofe it at length undertook an accurate inveftigation of 
the mental faculties. 
The internal and indifputable faCt that we have know¬ 
ledge ft priori, which, fince it announces itfelf in every 
one’s confcioufnefs as vniverfal and necejfary , cannot pof- 
fibly be derived from experience, compels us to conclude 
that this knowledge fprings purely from the nature of the 
mind itfelf. After Criticijm has inveftigated the nature 
of the knowing faculty, ( Senfe, Underjlanding, and theo¬ 
retical Reafon,) it fees clearly that Sense and Under¬ 
standing, by their united operation, reprefent to us the 
objeCts of experience, not as they are in themfelves inde¬ 
pendently of the mind, but merely according to its pe¬ 
culiar mode of reprefentation : that confequently we do 
not know the things as they are in themfelves, but merely 
as phenomena. The form of Nature, as it is knowable 
by us, is therefore determined by the original and unal¬ 
terable legiflation of Sense and Understanding; that 
is to fay, in knowing the things we do not perceive them 
Vol. XX. No. 1359. 
SOPHY. 
in their internal nature, but give to them a reprefentable 
nature, determined by our knowing faculty itfelf. With 
refpedt to Reafon, the Critic teaches us, that this faculty 
neceflarily forms to itfelf certain fuperfenfible Ideas, but 
that it does not obtain by means of them any knowledge 
of the objedts to which they refer, but only belief. 
Befides the Critic of the Theoretical Faculty, a Critic 
of Pradtical Reafon, or of the Rat ional Defiring Faculty, 
is alfo requifite. The latter enquires whether man, in ad¬ 
dition to the fenfually-defiring faculty, poffeffes alfo a 
Rational Will; whether Reafon abfolutely determines 
the will of itfelf, and what are the principles according to 
which it decides upon good and evil? The refult is 
fhortly this: Reafon is (elf-legiflative; it eftablifhes an 
abfolutely-neceflary and univerfally-valid rule for all 
addons. By this Law of Reafon, the Idea of the uni- 
verfal and neceflary aim of all human exertions, that is, 
the Idea of the Higheft Good, is alfo determined. Hence 
arifes the univerfal and neceflary belief in God and Im¬ 
mortality, upon the ftrength of which alone the Mural 
Law can be Supported, and the hope fuftained of accom- 
plifhing the higheft aim of our rational nature. 
Although the enquiry refpeCting the faculties of the 
human foul, and the poffibility or impoflibility of knowing 
the fuper-fenfible, has engaged the attention of philofo- 
phers prior to Kant, yet he was the firft who produced a 
Critic of Theoretical and Pradtical Reafon as a complete 
fyftem refting upon a firm foundation. 
The following paffage of Kant (C. P. 789.) may ferve 
as a recapitulation of what has been here faid : “ The 
firft ftep of Pure Reafon in its infantine age was Dogma¬ 
tical. The fecond, when experience had rendered it 
cautious, Sceptical. A third ftep is neceflary, which 
requires however a matured and manly judgment, found¬ 
ing itfelf upon univerfally-approved maxims. This is 
the Critic of Reason, which determines the value of 
Reafon itfelf, and of its power to generate pure know¬ 
ledge d priori-, thus fixing the determinate limits of 
human knowledge. Scepticism appears, therefore, to 
have been but a refting-place for Reafon, where the might 
deliberate on her dogmatical wanderings, and learn to 
choofe her courfe, in the further profecution of her 
journey, with more certainty; but it is not fit for a per¬ 
manent refidence.” 
We have ftated above, that the fadt of our having 
knowledge a priori forced Reafon into a critical invefti¬ 
gation of its powers. In order to give a more diftinCl 
view of the difference between the Critical and every 
other Philofophy, it may be well to point cut the different 
turn which this fact mult neceflarily give to the whole 
bufinefs of philofophy, when once the human mind had 
become clearly confcious of it. 
When I fee a body filing a fpace, I am immediately 
confcious that all bodies mvjl occupy Spctce ; and, udien I 
fee a fton efall, I am compelled to conceive fomething as 
the caufe of this phenomenon. I am confcious that no 
change within or without me can happen without a caufe. 
Now, this neceffity which the mind feels muft alfo have a 
caufe. Is this caufe independent of the mind, or does it 
confift in mere habit ? Nothing is more eafy than to dif- 
tinguifh the apparent neceffity of certain habitual connex¬ 
ions, which have merely grown familiar to 11s, from that 
real neceffity which adheres to fundamental conceptions 
and principles. An erroneous hypothefis may be de- 
ftroyed ; but what argument can ever overthrow the ne¬ 
ceffity and univerfality of the pofitions, that All bodies muft 
occupy Space, and that .Every event muft have its caufe? 
According to the teftimony of the fenfes, the earth 
ftands fti 11, and the entire fphere of the heavens revolves 
round it. Accuftomed as we are to this appearance from 
infancy, yet how completely is the oppofite conception 
of the earth's motion eftablifhed in our conviction! But 
is it poflible to conceive a body out of fpace, or an event in 
time without a preceding caul’e? Certainly not ! What 
can be more evident than that the univerfal validity and 
X x neceffity 
