170 PHILO 
neceffity inherent in our conceptions lias its ground in 
certain original and formal qualities of the reprefenting 
fubjedl ? In the fame manner it may be proved, that the 
abfolutenefs, the neceffity, and univerfality, of the Moral 
Laws, do not arife from our experience of the relations of 
things to our defires, from education, from habit, from 
civil fociety,&c. but that they reft folely on that effential 
quality of Reafon which renders it a pradical Faculty. 
Criticifm does not in this pretend to know the foul and 
its faculties as they are in themfelves: it merely infers, 
from the univerfality and neceiTity accompanying certain 
conceptions, certain original difpofitions of the mind 
which form the foundation of thofe conceptions. The 
Sceptic cannot therefore accufe the Critic of indulging 
undue pretentions to a knowledge of the Mind as a thing 
in itfelf, and therefore of committing the very fault which 
he cenfures in the Dogmatift; on the contrary, the Scep¬ 
tic is guilty of this fault in common with the Dogmatift, 
by pretending, negatively at leaft, to determine fomething 
concerning (uperfenfible things. The Critic declares all 
philofophizing upon the nature of the things in themfelves, 
and upon fuperfenfible things in general, to be vain and 
fruitlels ; in this he is juftifiable, fince he has afcertained, 
by a profound inveftigation of the original faculties of 
the human foul, that in objedls of experience alone we can 
acquire objective knowledge. But what right has the 
Sceptic, before he has afcertained the powers of the mind, 
to maintain that it is impoflible for Reafon to determine 
what is fubjedive and what objective in human knowledge ? 
The Critical Philofopher is not to be ranked with the 
Dogmatift merely becaufe he gives determinate explana¬ 
tions of the nature and boundaries of the Mental Facul¬ 
ties, in fo far as he knows them from their undoubted 
eiredls. In fine, the higher ufe of Reafon, if it is to lead 
to Truth, muft be grounded upon a critical knowledge of 
the human mind. 
Sedl. V. Of the things in themfelves as the rational grounds of 
Perception given independently of our reprefenting faculty. 
But are the ultimate grounds of the perceptible, and of 
the faff of perceiving, to be accounted for merely by the 
original laws and formal principles of reprefentation ? 
Whoever underftands this queftion muft anfwer it ne¬ 
gatively. The form in which all reprefentible objedls 
muft appear to me is, indeed, completely determined by 
the original conftitution of the mind; but the matter 
which is to appear under this form does not fpring from 
the fame fource. It is an original law of my reprefenting 
faculty, that every thing I perceive I muft perceive in 
Time and Space. 1 muft alfo conceive every event as 
the Effed of a Caufe. But does this determine what I 
fhall perceive in Time and Space, or what I am to con¬ 
ceive as tlie Effed of a preceding Caufe ; that at this 
moment, for inftance, I do not fee a fruit or a flower 
before me, but a watch ; does this depend upon my mode 
of perceiving? By no means. The manner indeed is 
given by the original nature of the reprefenting mind ; 
but the matter muft come from elfewhere. I perceive an 
object at a diftance, unable to determine whether it be 
a tree or a fteeple; that it occupies fpace is indeed ne- 
cefiarily determined by the nature of my mind ; but that 
this objedt, when I approach to it, appears to me not to 
be a fteeple but a tree, cannot certainly depend upon the 
mere conflrudlion of my mind. It is by no means ne- 
cefl'ary that a tree fliould ftand in this particular place, 
though'it is neceftary that the objedt which ftands there, 
be it what it will, fhall occupy fpace: this place might be 
occupied by fomething elfe. 
When I perceive an external objedl, it does not reft 
with myfelf in what manner I fhall form an intuition of it, 
as is the cafe in merely imaginary reprefentations. It is, 
for inftance, quite optional whether by dint of imagina¬ 
tion I reprefent to myfelf, at this inftant, fuch or fuch an 
abfent perfon : but, to convince myfelf that the perfon 
who actually ftands before me is not a young but an old 
SOPHY. 
man, this does not depend upon myfelf. I muft reprefent 
the objedls to myfelf as they are given to me. This fort 
of compulfion, by which I am forced to reprefent to my¬ 
felf that which is prefent to me, and agreeably to its ef¬ 
fect upon my perceiving faculty, is elfentially different 
from the compulfion by means of which I amforced to 
reprefent every thing, whether actually given or fidlitious, 
with certain univerfal and neceftary determinations; for 
inftance, as a body exifting in time and fpace, and con- 
nedted with other things according to certain determinate 
and neceftary rules. This difference confifts herein; that 
I cannot indeed reprefent to myfelf the thing of which I 
have an intuition, that is to fay, a really-exifting thing, 
adting upon my intuitive faculty, otherwife than as it is 
given ; but I can neverthelefs imagine it as not exifting, 
or I can conceive it otherwife qualified, without injuring 
thereby in the leaft the poflibility of perceiving or of in¬ 
tuition in general. But, to imagine Time and Space, 
Caufe and Effedl, Subftance and Accidence, See. deftroy- 
ed, or to annihilate them even in thought, is altogether 
impoflible ; fince the poflibility of thinking and of having 
an intuition at all, would be annihilated at the fame 
time. When I perceive a cloud whence iflue lightning 
and rain, I cannot indeed perfuade myfelf that the cloud 
is not there, and that the fky is ferene ; but I can with¬ 
out any difficulty conceive the cafe that it is not there. 
But once admit that it exifts, and it is abfolutely impof- 
fible to conceive that it occupies no fpace, that it has no 
fize, that it, as well as the lightning, have not arifen from 
certain caufes. 
We have therefore two kinds of Compulfion, wliofe dif¬ 
ference is highly important and remarkable. By the 
former, a particular objedt is forced upon the fenfitive 
faculty, though this object is not in itfelf abfolutely ne- 
ceflary : by the other, we are forced to reprefent whatever 
is given to the reprefenting faculty, wfith certain univer¬ 
fal determinations which cannot be rejedted even in 
thought, and which we know’ to be the conditions of 
reprefentation in general. Thefe two hinds of compulfion 
muft have each its own ground ; in feeking to a [certain winch, 
Reafon is not only jujlifieel, but compelled by its nature. 
The latter cannot be grounded in the objedls; for how 
could the convidtion, that all objedls of knowledge muft 
have certain determinations, enter my mind from the in¬ 
dividual objedls which I have hitherto perceived ? The 
confcioufnefs that every perceptible objed muft exift in Time 
and Space, that it muft be conneded with other things by, its 
cafual relation, See. can therefore only arife from an ob- 
feure internal intuition of the original nature of the 
reprefenting faculty itfelf. For, as this original conftruc- 
tion of the mind remains always the fame, it muft be ab¬ 
folutely impoflible ever to free our reprefentations from 
thofe univerfal conditions which are grounded in it. But 
does it alfo depend upon the original conftrudtion of my 
mind that I am compelled to perceive objedls as they are 
given to me: for inftance, the fetting fun, and then the 
riling moon ? Were this the cafe, I fliould be confcious 
that they muft always exift; juft as I am confcious that 
every objedl muft have Quantity. For how is it to be 
conceived that what is determined by the Knowing Fa¬ 
culty fliould appear fometimes in one way and fometimes 
in another, unlefs influenced by fome extraneous caufe? 
Time and Space are not different to-day from what they 
were yefterday, or from what they will be to-morrow. 
The reafon therefore why I fee the lun in the fky at one 
time, and do not fee it another, is not to be fought in my 
reprefenting faculty, but in lome caufe independent of 
me. It would be highly inconfillent to argue that Time 
and Space have their ground, namely, the original confir ac¬ 
tion of the mind; and at the fame time to aflert that the 
Given in Time and Space has no ground. As I am juftified, 
therefore, in attributing to the original nature of the in¬ 
tuitive and thinking faculty the univerfality and necef- 
fity of Time, Space, Caufality, &c. I am equally jultified 
to adopt fomething without and not within me as the 
foundation 
i 
