PHILOSOPHY. 
foundation of the phenomena of the fun, and of external 
nature in general. What this foniething is in it/elf, that 
I certainly do not know and cannot know ; for, as man, 
I can only know it by means of the peculiar form of my 
mind. 
An excelfive defire to reduce every thing to unity has 
induced Fichte and others to rejeiSl the idea of fomething 
given to the Reprefenting Faculty from without. This 
is highly unphilofophical. If it be pretended that the 
adoption of this j'ometliing is inadmiffible, becaufe we are 
abfolutely incapable of forming the lead conception of it, 
it will follow that we are alfo wrong in adopting original 
powers of the mind as the ground of the necefl'ary forms 
of our reprefentation, for we know juft as little of thefe 
powers. They are the rational conditions of the general 
forms of reprefentation, and this is all we can (ay of them: 
what they are in themfelves, and what that being (the 
Soul) is, in which they exift, of this we know nothing; 
in the fame manner as we know the merely-conceivable 
fubftratum of the phenomena, that it is the condition of 
the poflibility and reality of all that we perceive in the 
objeft, exclufive of thofe general forms. If it were wrong 
to affume fomethivg which has not been generated by the 
reprefenting faculty, but has been given to it, and which 
makes the phenomena poffible, becaufe this occurs in a 
manner inconceivable to us ; it would be equally wrong 
to affirm that the peculiar nature of the Intuitive and 
Thinking Faculties renders poffible the reprefentations of 
Time, Space, Quantity, Caufality, See. for this is certainly 
juft as inconceivable. As we cannot confider the forms 
of the mind, Time, Space, &c. to be mere empty thoughts 
deftitute of all objective truth ; it is equally impoffible to 
relinquiffi the idea of a fuperfenfible ground of the phe¬ 
nomena. In ffiort, the fame rational argument which re¬ 
fers to the things in themfelves as given to my reprefent¬ 
ing faculty, refers alfo to the pure forms of the mind ; 
and we muft either grant the truth of this fuperfenfible 
Realism, or the Critical Idealism itfelf would fall to 
the ground; and thus all philofophizing beat an end. 
We frequently hear the perverters of the Critical Phi- 
lofophy repeat, that “ Criticifm knows abfolutely nothing of 
a fuperfenfible exijlence .” This is certainly true; but the 
author of the Critic of Pure Reason explains this 
matter diftindfly. In his Prolegomena, page no. he 
puts this queftion : “How are Time and Space, and that 
which fills them, namely, fenfible objefls, poffible?” and 
anfwers it thus: “ They are rendered poffible by means 
of the peculiar nature of our fenfitive faculty, which is 
afiled upon by objefls that are wholly unknown, and quite 
different from the phenomena.” Again, in page 163, he 
fays : “ It is the greateft abfurdity either not to admit the 
things in themfelves, or to fet up our experience as the 
only poffible knowledge of the tilings, confequently our 
Intuition, in Time and Space, as the only poffible intu¬ 
ition,” Sic. 
The fyftem here explained bears juftly the name of the 
Critical Idealism, which is diftinguiffied from the 
Transcendent Idealism thus: The former confiders 
the things of the world as they exift for us and in our ex¬ 
perience, not as things in themfelves, but merely as pheno¬ 
mena ; therefore it attributes to them, as known things, a 
merely mental exiftence, although it neceffarily affumes 
fometliing for their foundation which is not phenome¬ 
non, and to which it applies the rational idea of an abfo- 
lute exiftence; it is therefore, in the eye of reafon, a thing 
in itfelf; though doubtlefs a thing totally unknown and 
unknowable. The Tranfcencleni Idealifm, on the other 
hand, acknowledges merely the reprefenting fubjeff, af¬ 
firming that all reprefentations of external objects arife 
from the internal activity of the mind alone. 
Se£l. VI. Critical Philofophy teaches ns the ends of Human. 
hat are, efpecially the jvpreme end or highejt dejiiuatiou 
of Man. ' 
Philofophy inveftigates not only the grounds of intui¬ 
171 
tion, thought, and knowledge, but alfo thofe of feeling, 
defiring, and volition. It forms to itfelf the conception of 
a Defiring Faculty, which is on the one hand fenfible, and 
on the other fuperfenfible, or purely rational. It alfo 
conceives a faculty of feeling of a fuperior and an inferior 
kind. Thefe are the rational conditions and grounds, by 
which the feeling of pleafure and difpleafure, of defire ami 
averfion, of volition and nolition, are rendered poffible and 
comprehenfible. 
The various ends which comprife the deftination of man 
are among the objefls of philofophical refearch. The end 
of a thing is the purpofe for which it exifts. Now for 
what purpofe is it that man poffeffes the faculty of form¬ 
ing intuitions, of thinking, of knowing, of feeling plea¬ 
fure and difpleafure, of defiring, and abhorring? With¬ 
out doubt for this purpofe, that he may know Truth, 
may enjoy pleafure, avoid pain, See. Thefe are confe- 
uently the ends of his nature. He would have been en»- 
owed with other faculties, other original inftinfts would 
have been planted in his foul, had he been intended to 
purfue other ends. 
Philofophy a(ks, Why does man exift ? Is he merely in¬ 
tended to ferve as means for his own fake ? Is he an end 
in himfelf ? Suppofe this to be the cafe, Reafon further 
a(ks, What is that in man which may be confidered as 
the end of his exiftence ? Is it his capacity for pleafure, 
or his faculty for perceiving Truth? Neither: it is his 
power of willing and praStiling that which is good, for 
its own fake ; it is his morally-rational nature which 
makes man worthy of being an end to himfelf. Mora¬ 
lity, or the ever-progreffive cultivation of our rational 
nature, the purer, the more complete, and more willing, 
practice of the morally good, is therefore undoubtedly the 
laft and higheft end for which man exifts. To this prin¬ 
cipal and higheft end of man all his other ends muft be 
fubordinate. 
To difeoverthis laft and higheft end of human nature, 
to reprefent it with the greateft poffible precifion, to fub¬ 
ordinate to it all the other ends of humanity, and to 
(how that in the purfuit of thefe inferior ends we mult not 
fruftrate but rather promote the higher; this is the great 
objeSl of all philofophy; and this Reafon acknowledges 
when once it has become acquainted with its own na¬ 
ture. 
To maintain that virtue is of no other value than as 
a means of happinefs, is impoffible to reafon, provided it 
underftand itfelf. The abfolute worth and dignity of 
man reft upon his moral faculties ; by which, as a rational 
being, he does not exift as a means to other ends, but as 
an end in himfelf, and for his own fake. Hereby even in 
the eyes of the Deity he muft have a worth above all ir¬ 
rational beings. It is the deftination and duty of man to 
procure for himfelf an abfolute dignity, by cultivating all 
his powers, and fubordinating them to the great and abfo¬ 
lute end of his nature. Philofophy muft therefore fubor¬ 
dinate all the departments of knowledge to that, which 
treats of this higheft end and final deftination of man. 
Pure praftical philofophy muft rank above all that is 
theoretical, though the latter obtains a high degree of 
worth from its reference and connexion with the former. 
If we deny the confcioufnefs of the abfolute worth of the 
moral Will, Philofophy has no longer any thing to do with 
the noble and th e good, but only with the conceivable, the 
comprehenfible, and the true: Moral or Practical Philofophy 
is at an end. What elfe can be the aim of philofophy, 
but to dilcoverthe fupreme unconditioned end of huma¬ 
nity, that end which is capable of no higher reference; 
and to fubordinate to this all inferior ends, thus reprefent¬ 
ing the totality of human ends, as a rational and fyftematic 
whole ? Man, at once of a fenfual and a fpiritual nature, 
is the only being that can fall into dfagreement with 
itfelf. Reafon, in this its higheft office, reconciles without 
fuppreffing any of the effential impulfes of human nature, 
overlooking none of its ends, but affign.ing to each its, 
place and its limits, in order that the highelt end of hu¬ 
manity 
