173 
PHILO 
afe neither internally nor externally perceptible. This 
Idea produces the matter for Rational or Tranfcendental 
Cosmology. The next idea which belongs to Tranf- 
cendent Phyfiology, is that of a being independent of 
Nature s and upon whom Nature, or the world, with 
refpedl to its exigence, its duration, and its entire con- 
ftrudlion, depends. This being is called God, and confti- 
tutes the object of Rational Theology. 
The entire fyftem of Metaphyfics confifts therefore of 
four chief parts; Ontology, rational Physiology 
(which comprehends rational Phyfics and rational Pfycho- 
logyj, rational Cosmology, and rational Theology. 
This divilion is both necefl'ary and permanent. 
Of all the metaphylical fciences, there is none which 
can have an applied parr, except Phyfics and Pfychology. 
The applied or empirical phyfics, which is commonly called 
Natural Philofopy, conliders and explains the objedls of 
external fenfe, under the guidance of the tranfcendental 
principles of rational Phyfics. An immenfe field is here 
opened for future invefiigation. We yet poffels a fcien- 
tific knowledge of only very few of the innumerable ob- 
jedls of Nature, and of the laws according to which they 
operate. Only the mechanical powers and laws of bodies 
are at prefent fyftematically treated: hence the term 
Physics is chiefly applied to the knowledge of the mecha¬ 
nical powers. Chemiftry, Anatomy, Botany,Zoology,&c. 
fcarcely deferve the name of Sciences. 
Empirical Psychology explains, under the guidance 
of the principles of rational Pfychology, the objects of 
internalJ'enfe, or the effects of the foul perceptible in ex¬ 
perience. When, in treating of this fcience, we take 
into view the corporeal conditions under which the foul 
operates, it is called Theoretical Anthropology. 
Empirical Pfychology muff indeed be connected with the 
Rational, but it muff by no means be confounded with it, 
as empirical Phyfics may with rational Phyfics. Empiri¬ 
cal Pfychology muff be entirely excluded from Metaphy- 
fics. If, agreeably to the ufe of the fchools, we allow it a 
place there, this is done, as Kant obferves, becaufe it is 
not fufnciently copious to form a ftudy of itfelf, though 
too important to be wholly omitted; and, were it other- 
wife difpofed of, it might perhaps be claffed with matters 
to which it is lefs nearly related. 
We muff here add Esthetics, or the Doctrine of Tafle, 
which, though not commonly introduced among the 
Metaphyfical fciences, belongs rather to theoretical than 
praftical philofophy. For, of all the feelings of the mind, 
exclufive of the moral feeling, there is none more remark¬ 
able than the immediate lenfe of pleafure we derive 
from the contemplation of the beautiful and the fib lime. 
The Philofophy of Taste inveftigates not only the nature 
and effential properties of thofeobjefts which we confider 
as beautiful and fublisne, but determines the nature of 
the pleafure arifing from them, charaiSleriftically diftin- 
guifliing it from all ethers. It alfo fhows what faculties 
of the mind are employed in judging of the beautiful and 
fublime. EJihetics in their applied part eftablifh pfyclio- 
logical though empirical rules for the faculty of talte, in 
order more corredily to explain its nature, to facilitate 
and to feclire its operations. Laffly, it determines the 
effence and aim of the Fine Arts in general, and of each 
in particular. This fcience eftablifhes the principles upon 
which genius arrives at the higheft eftheticnl excellence. 
Seft. IV. Pradical Philofophy, 
As pure theoretical philofophy inveffigates the Lift 
principles of thinking and knowing, without regard to 
the influence which thefe aits may have upon our condudl; 
Pure Practical Philosofhy examines the foundation 
of the conceptions of good, evil, right, wrong, duty, &c. 
by which the will is determined. This partof philofophy 
is called the Metaphysics of Morals. 
As the laft ground of the theoretical, univerfal, and 
neceffary,conceptions, (Subftance, Caufe, &c.) were found 
Vol. XX. No. 1359. 
SOPH Y. 
to be in the formal nature of the knowing faculty itfelf ; 
fo the laft ground of the equally neceffary and univerfal 
pradical conceptions are found to confift in the original 
nature of reafon, which determines what we muff defire, 
and what we ought to do. This is called the pure Legis¬ 
lation of Reason. We are immediately confcious, that 
we ought to regulate our conduit, as well as our wifhes, 
according to rational principles. Were this not the cafe, 
Reafon would be merely theoretical; it would tench us 
only what is real or poffible ; but the praitical conceptions 
of right and duty, with all that depends upon them, would 
have no meaning. Reafon could then do no more than form 
maxims and rules of conduit for the probable advance¬ 
ment and prefervation of our temporal happinefs. 
The effential Legiflation of Reafon is developed by Pure 
Praftical Philofophy. The deduition in the Metaphy¬ 
sics of Morals from this pure legiflation of the various 
duties, with a conftant regard to the peculiarities of our 
fenfual nature, and to the relations in which man mult 
live' and ait in the world, is termed applied moral 
Philosophy, or Ethics; the objeit of which is to (how 
that the fubjeitive end of a fenlitive as well as a rational 
being, that is to lay his happinefs, muft always be fubor- 
dinated to the objective ends of Reafon, or to its pure 
laws. Ascetics furnifli the principles and rules for the 
promotion of virtue; they fliow the means by which the 
obfervance of duty is facilitated, and the temptations to 
evil overcome. The impediments which the inclinations, 
and inftindls oppofe to the obfervance of the moral law, 
together with the means of removing them, are treated 
under the head of Practical Antropology, a fcience 
which combines the refults of moral Philofophy with em¬ 
pirical Pfychology. 
The philofophical dodlrine of Rights comprifes the 
duties which a rational being is authorized to exadt from 
his fellow-creatures; thefe refer to what are called Natu¬ 
ral Rights, or Rights of Reafon. To this department 
belong, firft, the Laws of Pure Reason, which explain 
and lay the foundation of the conception of Right i’epa- 
rafed from the objedisofits application. When we apply 
this univerfal conception of Right and Duty to the 
various relations and circumftances of mankind, we muff 
diftinguifh Private Rights, fuel) as belong to man in a 
ftate of Nature, and Public Rights, which belong to 
him as a member of fociety. The latter comprehend the 
Rights of States, the Rights of Nations, and the Cofmopoli- 
ticnl Rights. 
From the application of the pure practical laws to the 
particular relations of human lociety, arife various ap¬ 
plied practical disciplines; for inftance, Education, 
Legislation, &c. Thele difeiplines, being altogether 
grounded in experience, and depending upon the acci¬ 
dental relations, conditions, and wants, either of indivi¬ 
duals or of whole focieties, may be infinitely varied. 
Thefe difeiplines cannot become fciences, fince nothing 
in them is firm, unchangeable, or univerfally valid, except 
the Moral Laws which ferve as their leading principles. 
This applies alfo to the moral dodtrine of Prudence or 
Policy, which diredls man how to promote his happinefs 
without infringing upon the moral laws. The dodtrine of 
happinefs determines the comparative value of the various 
kinds of pleafure of which man is fulceptible. It forms 
an Ideal of happinefs which includes the greateft poffible 
number of the llrongeft and moil: lafting pleafures, and 
which, if it merits that name, muff chiefly comprife thofe 
feelings which refer to the more noble faculties of a 
being at once fenfual anil rational, feelings which diftin- 
guifh themfelves by a decided worth above all that belongs 
to the mere animal nature. Hence arife certain univerfal 
precepts for the realization of this Ideal: every one muft 
judge according to his own individual charadter, fituation, 
and circumftances, how he fhall apply thefe precepts. 
We may here mention alfo the philofophical dodtrine of 
States, which treats of the more particular application 
Y y ‘of 
