174 
PHILO 
of the doCtrine of Morals, of the rights of Reafon, and of 
the fubordinate policy, to great focieties, and provides for 
tiieir regulation and adminiltration. 
Laftly, Philosophical Religion alfo fprings from 
Practical Reafon. It proves the neceffity of the belief in 
God, the perfeCt being, the Creator, preferver, and ruler, 
of the phyfical and moral world, the facred lawgiver and 
juft judgeofall moral beings. Itfhows the neceflity alfo of 
the belief in the immortality of the foul, and in an atone¬ 
ment for fin as the moft urgent want of our rational or 
moral nature. By leading us into this belief, it gives life 
and conftancy to virtue. 
A Critic of Theoretical as well as of Practical 
Reason, tnuft, however, be the propadeutic to the erection 
of a fyftem of philofophical fciences ; in other words, a 
well-grounded examination of Reafon itfelf muft pro¬ 
ceed to (how whether, and how far, Reafon poffeffes the 
faculty to produce fuch fciences. A Critic of Judgment 
is alfo a neceftary part of this propadeutic. 
PART III. 
Of the Connexion of the Philosophical Sciences with 
the other Departments of Human Knowledge, and 
of their Influence upon the Perfection and Happi¬ 
ness of Individuals and of Society. 
Some men, from a miftaken idea of practical utility, 
confuier philofophy as frtiitlefs, if not injurious. They 
imagine nothing to be of real value, which cannot be 
grafped by the hands, or ufed as a means to fome fenfual 
enjoyment. Thefe enemies to Phiiofophy fhould confi- 
der, however, not only that the faculties requifite to phi¬ 
lofophical inveftigations are actually bellowed upon man, 
but that a natural tendency to this kind of intellectual 
occupation univerfally manifefts itfelf upon even a mode¬ 
rate degree of rational cultivation. The mere favage 
may indeed enjoy the benefits of the fun without reflect¬ 
ing what it is, but no man vvhofe reafon is awakened can 
be indifferent, either to the operations of Nature in ex¬ 
perience, or to their rational and fuperfenfible grounds. 
Where was there ever a people, emerged from childifh 
ignorance, which has not philofophized on the origin of 
all things, on the author of the world, on its conltruc- 
tion, prefervation, government; on the nature of that 
being within us which feels, thinks, and wills ; on its 
deftination and fate after death, &c. ? Each has had its 
philofophical hypothefes or its chimeras. What man of 
the leaft reflection can be indifferent to the queftions re- 
f peCting the invifible power from which this world derives 
its exiftence and its duration; the condition of the Soul 
after death, &c. ? How many would willingly give up all 
other knowledge, could they but acquire a knowledge of 
thefe fuperfenfible things that would perfectly fatisfy their 
Theoretical Reafon, and pofiefs mathematical certainty ? 
It is not true that Nature has deftined man merely for 
aCtion and enjoyment. She has alfo deftined him to 
think; otherwiie fhe would not have planted in him the 
faculty or the irrefftible propenfity. It is a great error, 
and one which degrades human nature, to confine the 
conception of utility merely to that exercife of the think¬ 
ing faculty which immediately tends to the prefervation 
of our fenfible exiftence, and the promotion of our earthly 
welfare. Since there is no doubt that the rational and 
Spiritual ends of man are the higheft and moft dignified, 
how then dare we venture to under-rate that application 
of our mental faculties without which none of thofe no¬ 
ble ends can be attained ? what would have been our 
knowledge of morality, but for Philofophy ? 
It is a truth acknowledged by all who are acquainted 
with the intellectual nature of man, that the effential ef¬ 
fort of Reafon is to give unity, harmony, and complete- 
nefs, to all our knowledge. The unity and harmony of 
man with himfelf, of his fenfual with his intellectual na¬ 
ture, muft therefore be the great end of Philofophy. If 
it be true that man perceives no-where around him fo 
SOPHY. 
much contradiction and inconfiftency as he difcovers ire 
himfelf; how ftrong an inducement muft this.be to him 
to make himfelf thoroughly acquainted with his fenfible 
and intellectual nature, his powers, inftinCts, wants, and 
ends, in order if poftible to attain to that higher ftation, 
whence his whole being, with all the original deftinations 
of his fenfible and fpiritual felf, may appear to him in 
complete harmony ! What can be more intolerable to 
man, than the conftant difcord and contradiction which 
he feels within him ? His very nature feems contrived for 
difcord and felf-combat. He is in the conftant fearch af¬ 
ter truth, by his original inftinCt for knowledge; yet he 
lives in a world where he is ever in danger of falling into 
the moft degrading and dangerous errors: he ftrives to 
penetrate into the interior of things, yet merely their ex¬ 
terior prefents itfelf to his view. As a rationally-moral 
being, he knows and feels the all-furpafling abfolute 
worth of pure goodnefs; but how eafily may he be 
tempted by the intoxicating charms of fenfuality, to con¬ 
fine his views merely to the things of this world ; and 
not only to deny his moral deftination by his conduCl, 
but to confider even the idea of it as an empty chimera ! 
Thus fubject to internal contefts and contradictions, 
what could be more interefting to him, than a profound 
and cotnprehenfive view of all his faculties and inftinCts, 
together with their relations and ends, enabling him to. 
form a correCt conception of his whole deftination, to re¬ 
concile what in a partial view appears fo ftrikingly con¬ 
tradictory in his nature by confidering it as a great con¬ 
nected whole, and thus to be enabled to realize more and 
more perfectly, in the entire of his conduCl, the ideal of 
his moral exiftence, by a due fubordination of the infe¬ 
rior inftinCts and ends of his being to the fuperior ? 
It is true, that very few perfons are fo happy as to ob¬ 
tain, by the moft perfevering labour in the field of philo- 
fophy, a complete and fyftematic knowledge of the prin¬ 
ciples of perception, thought, and will, fo as thoroughly 
to comprehend their own nature and their entire deftina¬ 
tion. But this does not lefl'en the value of philofophy; 
for, though but few men are able to penetrate the depths 
of it, (till the attainments of thefe few may become ufe- 
ful to the many, and gradually diffufe amongft the multi¬ 
tude the moft beneficial refults. The chief truths, of ge¬ 
nuine philofophy are fo well adapted to the reafon, even 
of the uncultivated ; they fulfil fo completely the demands 
of his moral, intellectual, and even of his fenfual, nature, 
that it requires but little trouble to induce any man of 
found common fenfe, not perverted by fcepticifm or fpu- 
rious wifdom, to adopt them. Thus may the light kin¬ 
dled by a few thinking men be communicated to the mul¬ 
titude, and a philofophic fpirit be propagated and gra¬ 
dually diffufed over nations through a long feries of ages. 
SeCt. I. Of the Advantage of Philofophy to Man as an intel¬ 
ligent Being. 
No fcientific exercife contributes more to the develop¬ 
ment and perfection of the intellectual powers than the 
ftudy of philofophy, none more effectually tends to fit 
man for all other occupations which require a perfevering 
attention, and a judgment qualified for profound invefti- 
gation. Even the mathematics, the great utility of 
which in fharpening and cultivating the underltanding 
has at all times been acknowledged, (fo that even the 
moft famous philofophers of antiquity did not allow any 
one accefs to their fchools who had not previoufly inured 
his mind to attention and orderly thinking by mathema¬ 
tical ftudies,) are neverthelefs in this refpeCt very infe¬ 
rior to philofophy. For, not to mention that the mathe¬ 
matics, even in their deepeft refearches treat merely of 
the^wre intuitions, Time and Space, confequently do not 
require that elevation of thought requifite in our invefti- 
gating of the laft grounds of all intuition ; philofophy af¬ 
fords a far greater variety of occupation to the mind than 
mathematics. For, while the latter treats merely of the 
conftruCtion and analyfis of its conceptions of quantity, 
i the 
