175 
PHILOSOPHY. 
the formerexercifes the powers of the mind in the moft 
various inveftigations. It examines the nature and the 
grounds of all that is externally perceptible, the princi¬ 
ples of what we perceive in ourlelves, of fenfation, think¬ 
ing, knowing, feeling, defiring, See. It not only invefti- 
gates whatman is, according to his fenfitive and intellec¬ 
tual nature, but alfo what is to be his end. It (hows his 
proper deftination, both in this and in the future life, and 
puts him into the way that leads to this deftination. 
Philofophy even extends over the territory of the beauti¬ 
ful and fublime, and to that of the fine arts. It is not 
confined to the individual man, his faculties, powers, 
wants, ends, duties, and hopes; but embraces alfo the 
intereils of nations. It develops the nature and the ob¬ 
ject of thefe focieties, the true principles of their confti- 
tution and government, and the beft means of promoting 
their lading welfare. It determines the rights and duties 
which fuch focieties ought to obferve towards each other, 
&c. It proceeds even to confider the human race as a 
whole, and furnilhes the principles according to which it 
is to be brought nearer and nearer to a date of lading 
peace; to the higheft degree of phyfical, intelleftual, and 
moral, cultivation, and of proportionate happinefs. 
This immenfe variety of objects included within the 
fphere of philofophical inveftigation mud neceffarily af¬ 
ford cultivation to the entire faculty of thinking and 
knowing. And, if we confider the clofe connexion of 
the higher faculties of the foul with all thofe of the un- 
derftanding, we mud be fenfible that the cultivation of 
the latter cannot but tend to develop, to heighten, and 
to ennoble, all the powers of the feeling and of the will. 
What mental occupation is fo calculated to limit and pu¬ 
rify the imagination, to govern the affedlions, to awaken 
and enliven the moral and religious fentiment, as the 
calm and well-regulated ftudy of philofophy, guided by a 
fincere love of truth and virtue ? 
The ftudy of the philofophical fciences informs us cor- 
redlly of the nature, the end, and the limits, of our know¬ 
ing powers, teaching us their right ufe, and the faults and 
abufes to be avoided in their exercife. That this is no 
trifling advantage we (hall be eafily convinced, when we 
confider the great aberrations of fpeculation which have 
arifen merely from a defective and imperfect knowledge 
of our mental faculties, and of what they can and cannot 
perform. Dogmatifm, which pretends to know the things 
tfs they are in themfelves, would not fo long have main¬ 
tained its ground had we poflefled correft and diftindt no¬ 
tions of the nature and extent of our mental faculties. We 
fhould then have perceived that all our knowledge a pojle- 
riori, as the common refult of our intuitive and intellec¬ 
tual faculties, is determined by the nature of thefe facul¬ 
ties; that objedls are indeed, to vs, human beings, en¬ 
dowed with certain peculiar powers of mind, really fuch 
as we take them to be, but by no means fuch in themfelves. 
We fliould have perceived that, as all real knowledge re¬ 
quires certain materials to be received by fenfe, merely 
arbitrary combinations of conceptions, though involving- 
no contradiction, and therefore capable of being thought, 
afford no proof of their exidence. We fliould therefore 
have avoided all idle endeavours to know what does not 
come within the limits of fenfe, namely Time and Space. 
And had fcepticifm, inftead of defpairing of all infight 
into truth, firft enquired into the nature of truth, and for 
this purpof'e afeertained the nature of the mental faculties, 
it would never have funk under the melancholy idea that 
■man mud for ever remain in uncertainty refpeifting what 
is moft dear and facred to him as a moral being. For, as 
Philofophy, by inveftigating the theoretical faculties of the 
foul, determines the bounds of knowledge, fo, by invefti¬ 
gating our practical faculty, it affords us a conviftion, fuf- 
ficient for our moral perfection and mental tranquillity, 
of the truth of thofe objeCts of faith pre-eminently dear 
to us, but which, being fuperfenfible, are beyond the 
reach of our theoretical reafon. 
Se< 5 h II. Of the great Advantage of Philofophy to Man as a 
Moral Being. 
The fame critical inveftigation of the mental faculties 
which convinces us of the high advantages that man pof- 
feffes, as an intelligent and rational being, over the mere 
animal,informs us alfo of the efl’ential qualities and pow¬ 
ers of our moral nature. We do not indeed, in the firft 
inftance, learn from philofophy that man is a moral be¬ 
ing; this every one’s confidence immediately tells him: 
but philofophy is alone competent to defend this great 
truth againft all attacks. Powerfully as the moral law 
announces itfelf in the foul of every man, yet it no lei’s 
requires a protestor and an advocate againft the dangerous 
arguments of a fophiftical fpeculation which would fain 
deprive the beft and moft facred gift that man pofleffes of 
all reality, and convert it into an empty pfychological de¬ 
ception. This falfe and deftruftive wifidom, which de¬ 
clares the moral law to be the mere precept of a rational 
felf-love, calculating prudently its true advantage, not 
merely with a view to the prefent, but to the future and 
remote confequences of aftions; now confidering it as 
the effeft of education and early habit, now as a refult of 
politics and civil fociety ; thus deftroying, as it were, with 
one ftroke, the whole abfolute worth of human nature ; — 
how can this dangerous error be refuted but by a true 
philofophical development of all that is contained in our 
moral confcioufnefs, that immediate part in the inmoft 
foul ? From this it appears, that the ground of morality 
is quite independent of our inftinft for happinefs, as well 
as of all arbitrary regulations. It lies folely in Reafon, 
as a felf-legiflative faculty. Whence can we derive uni- 
verfally-valid and unconditioned rules of conduft, fuch 
as we know the moral laws to be, but from fome intrinfic 
and original quality of Reafon, which regulates its pradi- 
cal ufe, juft as the original forms of Senfe and Underftand - 
ing determine its theoretical ufe. Now, if Philofophy fe- 
cures the abfolute dignity of human nature by reducing 
all moral conceptions to a purely-rational moral law ; it 
confirms virtue, and fatisfies reafon, by laying down, as a 
bafis to our religious faith, the eternal and unfhaken prin¬ 
ciples of our moral nature, while at the fame time it re¬ 
pels every theoretical attack upon the fundamental 
truths of religion and morality, by freeing the objects of 
them from the fphere of theoretical knowledge. 
Thus philofophy determines the true point of view 
from which man muft be confidered with refpedt to his 
higher nature, and to the end of his exiftence; and in- 
fpires the mind with a genuine efteem for humanity, both 
in the individual and in the whole race. So long as man 
confiders himfelf as exifting only for enjoyment, and ca¬ 
pable of being rendered harmlefs or ufeful to his fellow- 
creatures by the impulfe of hope and fear, as a being 
which after a fliort, uncertain, and often very-painful, ex¬ 
iftence, is deftined for ever to perifh ; he may indeed Hill 
cordially fympathife in the fate of his fpecies, and with 
every individual ; he may be attached to his equals, and 
wifti to promote the welfare, or to leffen the fufferings, of 
others : but this natural feeling is not fufficient to beget 
a mode of thinking and afting ever true to itfelf, invaria¬ 
bly juft, and beneficent towards all ; it is infinitely dif¬ 
ferent from that fentiment which attributes to every man, 
the loweft as well as the higheft, an abfolute worth ; infi¬ 
nitely different from that love of mankind which is 
grounded on a pure and unconditional efteem of man as 
a moral being, and which leads us to contribute our ut- 
moft to the general improvement and happinefs. This 
higher view of human nature, which genuine philofophy 
alone affords, teaches us alfo to judge rightly of the value 
of human life; of our own as well as that of others ; it 
teaches us that we mult not take our criterion of its va¬ 
lue from the happinefs or mifery of our prefent exiftence; 
but that there is fomething of far higher importance of 
which our earthly exiftence is but the condition ; n?.mei 
i*. 
/ 
