176 PHILO 
ly, the ever-inereafiv.g improvement of our faculties, parti¬ 
cularly of the intelleblual and the moral: true philosophy 
therefore condemns a mode of thinking that would un¬ 
dervalue our earthly exiftence, however burthened with 
miferies, fince it is the condition of fo extremely import¬ 
ant an end. 
If true praElical phiiofophy con fid in this, that man 
rightly know, and conftantly keep in view, his ultimate 
deftination ; that he refer his will and his aftions entirely 
to this idea; that he meafure by this criterion the worth 
or un worthinefs of all things; limit and govern by it all 
the inftinbt of his nature; fubjeft all the aims of his fenfes 
to that higheft end ; and efteem all the goods of life only 
fo far as they oppofe no hindrance to the attainment of 
that higheft good; further, that he raife himfelf, with 
equal ftrength and greatnefs of foul, above the charms of 
pleafureand the prefl'ure of Suffering, above hope and fear; 
that he neither feek or find his happinefs in fenfual ex- 
ceffes, which, though merely tranfient, often punifh them- 
fielves with t lie bitterefl pain; nor in the pofitflion of un¬ 
certain and perilliable goods, or the futile fplendour of 
external relations; but that he feek within himfelf the 
clear infight of an enlightened mind, the well-regulated 
and refined feelings, inclinations, and inftinbts, of a cul¬ 
tivated heart, the peace and tranquillity of an elevated 
and noble foul:—if this be true wifdom, there is certainly 
nothing that tends to infpire man more fully with its fa- 
cred fpirit than the found and perfevering lhidy of Philo- 
fophy, carried on with a lincere love of truth and a pure 
fentiment of virtue. 
As to thequeflion, which is the bed mode of purfuing 
this obje£f,and what are the duties, by the observance of 
which good principles and Sentiments can be confirmed 
and evinced; calm rtfledfion alone can furnifh the true 
and Satisfactory anfwer. He who would give himfelf up 
to the influence of an oblcure feeling, would certainly 
choofe a very unfafe guide. I find in myfelf a natural in¬ 
clination to participate in the fate of others; to benevo¬ 
lence and beneficence: but I alfo feel an inclination to 
felfifh pleafures and a regard to my own well-being, which 
far over-balances my defire to promote the happinefs of 
others. 
Were I to follow the impulfes of my nature, I Should 
in mod cafes ad as a decided egotill, whofe regard to his 
own reft and comfort would fuperfede every inclination 
direCfed to the well-being of others. Or, were I even Su¬ 
perior to all merely-felfifh feelings, either by natural con¬ 
futation, by education, habit, and example; or fuppofe 
that, by a fort of fenfual generofity and ftrength of mind, 
I were enabled to prefer the welfare of others to my own, 
would not this noble enthufiafm be apt Sometimes to lead 
me too far in disregarding myfelf? Should I not be in con¬ 
stant danger, notwithstanding my warm and difintereftecl 
zeal for the welfare of others, to do here too much, and 
there too little; for inftance, to Sacrifice my indigent 
brothers or children, nay even myfelf, to the Suffering and 
diftrefied who might implore my compaffion at the mo¬ 
ment ? or, on the other hand, to forget my duties to my 
fellow-citizens, to my country, to humanity, in the per¬ 
formance of what I might confider as duty to my family 
under the influence of a ftreng natural afFeClion ? or to 
negleCf the duties of juftice for thofe of beneficence? 
Thus various (and who indeed can name them all ?) are 
the errors to which he is expofed who cheofes mere feeling 
for his guide. The light which phiiofophy affords can 
aione guard againft them. This determines, according to 
the eternal principles of practical Reej'on, upon the rights 
and duties of men in their mutual relations; it marks 
the boundary of each moral duty fo ftriClly and diftinftly, 
that nothing is left to accident, or, which is little better, 
to a blind and changeable feeling. The ftrift laws of 
Morality, derived from practical Reafon itfelf, alone render 
true virtue pofiible : for it is not a generally-ufeful con- 
duCt, arifing from the in voluntary impulfes of our nature, 
that conflitutes true morality; but a good conduCt fpring- 
SOPHY. 
ingfrom pure and difinterefted obedience to the univerfitl 
precepts of reafon, which implies a conflict with the incli¬ 
nations, though thefe may often be in themfelves both 
amiable and noble. 
Phiiofophy teaches us alfo the means by which man 
may promote and confirm true virtue in himfelf -and in 
others. 
Seift. III. Of the great Influence of Phiiofophy upon Human 
Happinefs. 
If Phiiofophy, as we have fhowm, awakens in man the 
fenfe of his own greatnefs and dignity; if it fill him with 
ftrength of foul and courage to elevate himfelf above the 
pleafures and adverfities ,of life, fo as neither to be en- 
flaved to earthly enjoyments nor deprefled by their lols, 
and caff down to pufillanimity and defpair; if phiiofophy 
purifies our inclinations and inftin&s, tames our paffions, 
and fubjedls our defires to the dominion of reafon ; if it 
thus fecures the peace of the foul, it undoubtedly con¬ 
tributes to the true and lading happinefs of man. 
But this is not all that can be faid in praife. of phiiofo¬ 
phy. It tends alfo to the acquirement and prefervation 
of happinefs by correctly defining its conception, and fix¬ 
ing the value of every kind of enjoyment in proportion as 
it adds to the fum of our well-being upon the whole of 
our exiftence. It fhows, therefore, the great advantages 
of mental pleafures ; thofe of a cultivated underftand- 
ing ; of a good, benevolent, and noble, heart; of a refined 
imagination and tafte, in comparifon with all that merely 
delights the fenfes ; becaufe the former are more within 
our power, and may be longer enjoyed, fince they neither 
tire nor excite difguft, nor exhault our powers fo eafily. 
Phiiofophy further teaches us, in the purfuit of happinefs, 
to confider not merely the prefent, but the future ; to 
deny ourfelves many prefent pleafures for the fake of a 
future, more noble, and halting, enjoyment; to undergo 
many a prefent fuffering in order to avoid a future evil 
or to obtain a future good ; and to regulate all our endea- 
vous after happinefs according to a rational plan, partly 
by a carefully calculating prudence, partly by a wife fu- 
bordination of our felf-love to the Laws of Morality. 
Hence arifes a doubly-great advantage : man may eafiiy 
tranquillize himfelf, whether his endeavours fucceed or 
not, in the confcioufnefs of having afted upon rational 
grounds ; or, which is ftill more important, he cannot 
but feel himfelf amply confoled and indemnified by the 
maintenance of his virtue and of an unblemilhed con¬ 
fidence, for the failure even of his deareft hopes. 
Nor is it a fniall benefit that phiiofophy confers on hu¬ 
man happinefs by placing in a clear light the vanity of 
certain merely-imaginary advantages, and preventing the 
great injury which the over-rating them does to morality. 
Thus it exhibits the extreme folly of facrificing all the 
joys and tranquillity of life for the fake of amafiing in¬ 
ordinate wealth, of which a man can only enjoy a very 
fmall part; or of wafting his ftrength, his time, and almolt 
every true enjoyment, for the fake ot ambition, vanity, or 
fame. The injury which this folly infiidts upon human 
happinefs can only be furpalfed by the extent ot that mo¬ 
ral depravity which too often fprings from it : h r nothing 
is more certain, according to the principles ot true phi¬ 
iofophy, than that the depravity of taking imaginary ad¬ 
vantages for real, and means for ends, not only deltroys 
the very poflibility of true happinefs, but generates a 
hoft of vices, which, when once they have gained domi¬ 
nion over the pnind, deitroy every germ of what is good 
and noble in it, and are more holtile to virtue than even 
the molt unreftrained fenluality : for, (boner or later, fen- 
fuality rellrains itfelf; whereas the propeniity to drive af¬ 
ter the means and to forget the end, predominates the 
more the longer it laths; and the rnind, governed by 
deeply-rooted prejudices and paflions, finds it more and 
more difficult to return to-nature and truth in its judg¬ 
ment on the value of things, and in the direction of the 
will. How much then does philolophy contribute to the 
morality 
