PHILOSOPHY. 
morality and to the happinefs of mankind, by teaching us, 
whatever we do, always to preferve the confcioufnefs of a 
rational intention ! 
Se£V. IV. Of the true Relation of Philofophy to the other 
Sciences; and of its Influence upon the Study of them. 
Pliilofophy not only proves the poflibility of all fcien- 
tific knowledge by an accurate inveftigation and deve¬ 
lopment of the mental faculties, but alfo furniihes the 
fundamental notions and principles of the fciences, either 
in the abdraft or in connexion with experience; it more¬ 
over afligns the true relation and connexion of every fci- 
ence to the end of human nature. 
As from theimperfeftion of human nature it frequently 
happens that the doflrines of religion are more or lei's 
blended with error and fuperdition, it requires a philofo- 
phical mind to fix upon the mod favourable point of view 
from which they can be contemplated, in order, by guard¬ 
ing them from every immoral perverfion, to eltablilh 
their claim to our efteem, or at lead; to obtain for them 
an impartial judgment. And if, as Reinhold fays, (ad 
Letter on Kant’s Phil.) the philofopher cannot deny the 
exiflence of great imbecility in the human mind, notwith- 
ftanding the traces of that innate morality which he re¬ 
veres in it; no more can he refrain from admiring, in the 
hidory of religion, a wife inftitution for education, com- 
menfurate with that imbecility ; or deny that, even where 
it deviates from the law of reafon, it affords the benefit of 
an externally-guiding hand, which is and will be indif- 
penfible to mankind fo long as they fhall not be fufficiently 
enlightened to be able to guide themfelves by the pure 
and internal law of their independent powers. 
The influence of pliilofophy upon pofltive law, legiflation, 
and flate-policy, is no lefs evident and important than 
upon pofitive theology. Whence but from pliilofophy 
can we obtain the conceptions of right and wrong? and 
liow can thefe conceptions be applied without an exten- 
five and well-grounded philofophical knowledge of the va¬ 
rious relations, fituations, and adlions, of man, in order 
to judge accurately of his conduft, and to dire< 5 t it by de¬ 
terminate and fafe precepts ? Again ; it is impoflible to ex¬ 
plain the judifiablenefs of coercion, and to aflign the cafes 
where it muft be applied, unlefs, by a deep ftudy of practical 
pliilofophy, we have accurately comprehended the difference 
between juflice and morality. Without this, we fhall 
always be in danger, both in legiflation and in the admi- 
niftration of the laws, and of government in general, of 
making an illegal and an irrational ufe of power; and of 
attempting to effect by coercion and conftraint many 
things which neither can nor ought legally to be enforced. 
We are too apt to forget that virtue, as virtue, cannot be 
obtained from man by force. Only a found pliilofophy 
can guard us againft this and fimilarerrors, to which even 
the bed-principled adminidrators of the legiflative, juri¬ 
dical, and executive, power, are mod expofed by their ar¬ 
dent defire to do good. How, but from pliilofophy, fhall 
we learn the grounds of the legality of the focial date, &c. ? 
It fhows us how the mutual relations of men are changed 
by their focial union; what are the reciprocal duties of 
citizens to each other, and thofe which fubfid between 
the date and its citizens. It proves that, notwithdanding 
all the legal demands of the date upon its citizens, and 
the limits it impofes upon their arbitrary will, civil liberty 
mud dill be held facred, fince its exidence and preferva- 
tion are the chief object of the union of men in dates. 
Ladly, pliilofophy places the relation of dates to each 
other in its true light, and proves that the very fame rights 
and duties exid between them, by which individuals liv¬ 
ing without the bond of civil fociety are dill connedled to 
each other: it confequently rejefts all wars whofe object 
is offence or conqued, every felf-intereded breach of con- 
traft, every date-intered which is incompatible with juf- 
tice. No truth is better edablifhed by pliilofophy than 
this; that no pofitive right could exid if there were not 
naturally and originally a right and wrong grounded in 
Vol. XX. No. 1360. 
177 
reafon itfelf. Without this, we could never appeal to 
any other right but of that of the dronged ; it is equally 
certain that no pofitive inditution, no conditution or im¬ 
provement of the date, no connexion or treaty between 
dates, would be legal, and merit the approbation of rea¬ 
fon, unlefs a principal regard had been paid to the nature 
and dedination of man, as afeertained by philofophy; 
that, unlefs we prefuppofe certain rights and claims never 
to be transferred or lolt, the legality of pofitive laws, the 
facrednefs of compa&s, nay, the right of property itfelf, 
cannot be either proved or even conceived. 
Pliilofophy, after a long and painful cultivation of the 
powers of reafon, has at length become equally familiar 
with the rationally-moral nature of man, and with his hif- 
tory; and thus qualified itfelf to decide between the 
diametrically-oppofite aflertions of the friends and defen¬ 
ders of natural right, and of thofe who will acknowledge 
none but pofitive right. If the former fay that the inter¬ 
nal legiflation of the moral nature of man is much older 
than the external legiflation of fovereigns, that the rights 
and duties of man are older than thofe of the citizen; 
and if, on the other hand, the latter affert that the pofitive 
right is every thing, and the natural nothing ; or that 
this can at bed be valid only fo far as it is confirmed by 
the former; a found philofophy alone is able to fettle the 
difpute, by fhowing it to have fprung from the confufion 
of that which is purely grounded in the original nature of 
man, with that which is determined by certain received 
and acknowledged forms. As philofophy grants, on one 
hand, that pofitive right really preceded natural right, 
a fadt which hidory proves, and which the limited nature 
of the human mind rendered neceflary; as alfo that civil 
focieties have more frequently arifenand been maintained 
by the right of the dronged than by legal agreements and 
compafts ; that therefore the real validity of the laws 
depends not on their rationality and legality, but on the 
prudence and drength of thofe in power; fo philofophy 
alfo proven, on the other hand, that morality in the ra¬ 
tional nature of man has been effeitual from the earlied 
commencement of civil fociety, and that dates owe, if 
not their origin, at lead their gradual amelioration and 
clofer correfpondence with the ends of human nature, to 
the principles of all right and of morality in general, ori¬ 
ginality implanted in Reafon. 
As to thofe fciences which invedigate Nature, the ad¬ 
vantage they derive from the fludy of Philofophy appears 
in a great meafure from what has already been fhown. 
A few further obfervations may be fufficient. The great 
importance of a found Logic in the invedigation of 
every department of human knowledge is no-where more 
evident than in Natural Philofophy : for much depends 
on a correct determination and found development of the 
conception of Nature, of the law of Nature, the powers 
of Nature, &c. No-where is it more important than here 
to know what are the requifites to a complete, accurate, 
and fafe, experience; what are the conditions of its 
poflibility, its reality, and certainty; according to what 
principles true inferences may be derived from thefe con¬ 
ditions ; and by what means errors may be guarded againd. 
We owe it folely to Philofophy that fo many fabulous 
tales, fuperditious notions, and deceptions of all kinds, 
have been banillied of late from the territory of Natural 
philofophy and Hidory. We need fcarcelyadd, that phi¬ 
lofophy is pre-eminently ufeful to Medicine, the fcience 
which has for its object the redoration and prefervation 
of health. Where indeed is it more neceflary than here, 
to be guided by correct principles in our experiments 
and oblervations, and in the inferences to be drawn from 
them ? where is the want of attention and confiderate 
examination, and where are the deceptions arifing from 
prejudice or precipitation, more injurious than here? 
The conception of health (as the harmony and agreement 
of the parts in the nature of a living organized being), 
and of its oppofite illnefs, form the foundation of the whole 
fcience of medicine : but is it to be fuppofed that any one 
Z z would 
