178 PHILO 
would be able properly to apply, or even correctly to 
comprehend, thefe conceptions, without a philofophical 
cultivation of his mind ? Nor can the phylician, without 
a fuperior cultivation of the intellect, judge of the in¬ 
fluence of the different ftates of the mind, of the feelings, 
paflions, defires, &c. upon the body; and converfely on 
the efFeCts and influence of the different ftates of the body 
upon the mind ; or on the conditions and laws of this 
mutual connexion. Nothing but a found philofophical 
infight can guard the phyfician againft the vain and dan¬ 
gerous paflion for fyftem-making, or teach him the im¬ 
portant truth, that he muft attend folely to the knowable 
phenomena of phyfical organization. Indeed every one, 
who does not entertain a wrong idea of the eflence, the 
ends, and importance, of medicine, muft eafily perceive 
that the phyfician, above all men of bufinefs, ftands moft 
in need of a ready and refined faculty of correCtly combi¬ 
ning ideas, comparing, and judging. 
Hiftory, as the mere narrator of events, may feem to 
ftand lefs in need of Philofophy. Still it cannot difpenfe 
with it, if it is to be pragmatical, that is, to promote the 
phyfical and moral welfare, the intellectual and moral 
improvement, of individuals as well as of ftates. A prag¬ 
matical hiftory (whether a biography, or the hiftory of a 
people, or of a particular period,) muft treat of events not 
merely as objeCts of memory, but as materials for think¬ 
ing, calculated to render man wifer and better. This 
hiftory can only do by pointing out the caufes of events, 
difeovering the fources of aCtions, in the inclinations, 
fentiments, and paflions, of the aCt^rs ; by developing 
the characters and difpofitions of remarkable perfonages 
from their conduCt, or their actions, intentions, fchemes, 
maxims, See. from their natural conftitution, their innate 
character and its cultivation ; laying before our eyes the 
confequences of events and aCtions fo far as they promote 
or impede the welfare of individuals and focieties. It muft 
not, however, confine itfelf to the development of the 
accidental influence which the conduCt of nran has had 
upon his own or others’ well-being, without any merit or 
demerit in himfelf: it muft be its principal bufinefs to 
notice whatever is moral or immoral in the will or aCtions 
of man ; it muft difplay whatever is great and noble in 
itfelf, or its oppofite, in their thoughts and intentions ; 
the worth and worthiefl'nefs of characters; it muft exhibit 
the ftrength of mind, the greatnefs of foul, and noblenefs 
of fentiment, in fortunate or unfortunate fituations, for 
our imitation; and the mean felfiffinefs and contemptible 
depravity of mind'by which the moft fplendent talents 
are often obfeured, .and the moft praife-worthy deeds 
debafed, as a ufeful warning. Now the queftion is, How 
can Hiftory perform all this, if the hiftorian have not 
derived from philofophy a thorough knowledge of man 
according to his fenfuous and intellectual nature, of his 
wants and ends, of his noble endowments and efforts, as 
well as of his weaknefs and degeneracy ? How can it 
fuccefsfully combat prejudices and fuperftitions of all 
kinds, and how can it at the fame time ftiow the folly of 
an inconfiderate and hsfty enlightening, if it be not truly 
enlightened itfelf by philofophy? How can it recommend 
by well-feleCted inftances the maxims of true happinefs, 
if it had not learnt from philofophy in what true happi¬ 
nefs confifts ? Laftly ; how can it reprefent what is good 
and great in all its excellence and dignity, what is bad 
and mean in all its depravity, if it have not derived from 
praCIical philofophy the principles and rules according 
to which all moral worthinefs and unworthinefs muft be 
determined, and if it have not received from this practical 
philofophy the ideals of wifdom and morality according 
to which fentiments, characters, and aCtions, muft be 
eftimated ? How can the hiftory of mankind be rightly 
treated until philofophy has decided what are the effential 
charaCteriftics of human nature; whether man exifts 
merely for enjoyment, and for the acquifition of the means 
to this enjoyment; or for his intellectual and moral im- 
2 
SOPHY. 
provement ? The conception of humanity muft be cor- 
reCtly defined before we can (how how it has gradually 
developed itfelf from century to century ; what means 
Providence has employed in order to promote this deve¬ 
lopment; what difficulties and obftacles have impeded it, 
&c. The hiftorian, therefore, cannot difpenfe with a 
found knowledge of Philofophy ; but Philofophy ftands al- 
moftjin equal need of a comprehenfive knowledge of hiftory; 
and perhaps no two fciences can be named in which the 
mutual fupport they afford to each other is more fenfibly 
felt. Philofophy and Hiftory muft go in hand to bring 
humanity to perfection. 
From wh.it has already been obferved on the Critic of 
Tajle, we may perceive the great influence of the ftudy of 
Philofophy in forming the mind for the beautiful and 
fublime, and in the development and heightening of genius; 
whether for judging and eftimating, or for producing, 
efthetical works of art. He who is not intimately ac¬ 
quainted with the rules and principles of the beautiful, 
derived from tafte and genius, may not, indeed, be with¬ 
out all feeling for efthetic excellence, as many perfons 
have a very fine feeling for what is morally good and bad, 
without diftinCtly knowing the laft grounds of morality. 
The unphilofophical artift may, by the frequent enjoy¬ 
ment of the beautiful, and a long acquaintance with the 
mafterly works of art, attain a conliderable number of 
rules, depending indeed more upon feeling than upon 
diftinCtly-conceived principles. He will alfo be able to 
furnilh productions of his own that will not unfrequentiy 
bear the ftamp of an uncommon genius: but he never 
will be able, without a fcientific knowledge of the Philo¬ 
fophy of tafte, to eftimate with accuracy the works of 
others, and to determine the rank due to them in propor¬ 
tion to their intrinfic value, nor will he be able to guard 
himfelf in his own productions againft errors that at the 
firft glance will ftrike every competent judge, or approach 
with a firm (tep to perfection. The following remark 
feems here to be particularly important. Without the 
affittance of Philofophy, an equally-increafing intereft 
would fcarcely maintain itfelf with an increafing intel¬ 
lectual improvement. The more a nation, or even an 
individual, is matured in the ufe of his mental powers, 
and the more the higher faculties of the Underftanding 
and the Reafon are developed, the lefs pleafure will be 
taken in the play of the fenfes and of the iimagination. 
Thefe will feem childifti amufements, and they will lofe 
their attraction in proportion as the mind advances to¬ 
wards rationality, and the more fenfible it becomes of the 
w'ant of intelleClual occupation. In order that the fine 
arts may not lofe theideftimation in times of high cultiva¬ 
tion but retain undiminilhed their natural intereft; it is 
requifite that they aflume a higher character. They muft 
feek dignity and fame, by rendering intuitive as far as 
poflible the conceptions of the underftanding, even the 
more abftraft; and by clothing even the higher ideas of 
reafon in a fenfible drefs, yet without leflening their dig¬ 
nity. This principally applies to the arts of Oratory and 
Poetry. 
But to carry this to the higheft perfection requires an 
intimate acquaintance with Philofophy, particularly 
with thofe parts of it which reprefent man as a member of' 
a higher order of things, and as a being deftined for a 
fuper-fenfible exiftence. 
That the ftudy of Language is greatly promoted by 
Philofophy, thofe only can doubt who have never reflected 
that a correCt and decided mode of expreffion, governed by 
fixed rules, is impoflible, without clear conceptions; and 
that to fpeak diftinCtly, coherently, and with propriety, 
requires great practice and readinefs in thinking accu¬ 
rately and diftinCtly. Philofophic or univerfal grammar 
applicable to all languages muft intimately correfpond 
with the general rules of thinking, or Logic. It has been 
long fince truly aflerted, that the regular ftudy of any 
cultivated language in which reference is conftantly 
made 
