186 
PHILO 
call Metaphyfics would amount to a merely-fiftitious and 
pretended in,fight of reafon, borrowed in fadt from expe¬ 
rience, and to which habit has given an appearance of 
neceffity; a pofition deftruflive of all pure philofophy, 
which he never would have fallen upon had heconfidered 
our problem in its univerfality; for he would have perceived 
that, according to his argument, there could be no pure 
mathematics, becaufe thefe certainly contain fyntlietical 
pojitions A priori, an aflertion againft which his good fenle 
would have guarded him. 
In the folutionof the preceding problem is alfocompri- 
fed the pollibility of the pure ufe of reafon, in founding 
and conftrudting all fciences that contain theoretical know¬ 
ledge A priori of objects. That is the anfwer of the quef- 
tions, “ How is pure Mathematics pofiible ?” and “ How 
is pure Natural Philofophy poffible ?” 
Concerning thefe fciences as they really exift, it may 
with great propriety be afleed, koto they are poffible; for 
that they muft be pofiible is proved by their reality. With 
regard to pure natural Philofophy, we might doubt this 
latter aflertion. However u>e need only confider the dif¬ 
ferent pofitions which occur in the beginning of what is 
ltriClly or empirically called Phyjics, as that of the per¬ 
manence of the fame quantity of matter, of the vis inertia, 
of the equality of adlion and re-adtion, &c. and we (hall 
foon be convinced that they conftitute pure rational 
Phyjics, which well deferve to be treated of feparately, as a 
diftinCl fcience, and that, in its whole extent, whether 
narrow or wide. As to Metaphyfics, every one mult ra¬ 
tionally doubt of its poliibility, not orfiy on account of 
its bad progrefs hitherto, but becaufe we cannot fay of 
any one fyitem of this fcience hitherto propounded, par¬ 
ticularly as to their efiential end, that it really exilts. 
But this kind of knowledge, in a certain fenfie, however, 
may be confidered as given ; and Metaphyfics is, if not as 
a (cience, yet as a gift of nature, (Metaphyfica naluralis,) 
real. For human reafon proceeds continually, not urged 
by the mere vanity of knowledge, but impelled by its 
natural wants, to fuch queftions as cannot be anfwered 
by any empirical ufe of reafon, and confequently not by 
any borrowed principles; fo that there really alivays has 
been in man, ever fince reafon extended to {’peculation, 
fome fort of metaphyfics; and this will laft for ever. 
In other words, “ How do, the queftions arife, which 
pure reafon propol'es to itfeif, and which it is impelled by 
its own wants to anfwer as w ell as it can?’’ 
Notwithftanding all the attempts hitherto made to an¬ 
fwer the inevitable queftions of Metaphyfics, fuch as, 
“ Whether the world had a beginning, or has exifted from 
eternity,” &c. have led to nothing but unavoidable con tra¬ 
ditions, we ftili cannot but expedt from the mere natural 
difpofition to Metaphyfics, that is to fay, from the pure 
faculty of Reafon itfeif, whence fome fort of Metaphyfics, 
be it what it may, actually arifes, that it mull be poffible 
to come to a certainty, either of the knowledge or of the 
impoffibility of knowing the matters in queftion; that is, 
either to anfwer the queftions, or to afeertain the inability 
of reafon to judge any-thing refpedling them ; confe¬ 
quently, either faiely to extend pure realon, or to give it 
determined and certain limits. The ultimate queftion to 
which the preceding univerfal problem leads, is this, 
“ How are Metaphyfics as a Science pofiible ? 
The Critic of Pure Reafon, therefore, leads at laft 
neceflarily to Science ; but the dogmatical ufe of Reafon, 
without a Critic, leads to groundlefs afiertions, which 
may be oppofed by others equally fpurious, confequently 
to Scepticifm. 
This Icience cannot, however, be of an alarming extent, 
becaufe it has not to do with theobjedts of Reafon, which 
are of infinite variety, but merely with Realon itfeif, wfith 
problems which arife folely on its own territory, and not 
from the nature of the things, which’are very different 
from it. When Reafon has completely acquired the 
knowledge of its own pow r ers, wfith regard to the objects 
prefented to it in experience, it muft be eafy to determine 
SOPHY. 
the extent and the bounds of its ufe, when it endeavours 
to furpafs the limits of all experience. 
We therefore may, and indeed muft, confider all the 
attempts hitherto made to produce Metaphyfics dogmati¬ 
cally, as if they had never taken place ; for what in any of 
thefe attempts is analytical, or a mere difledtion of the con¬ 
ceptions which dwell in reafon a priori, is only prepara¬ 
tive to true Metaphyfics, whofe objedt is the extenfion of 
knowledge it priori fynthetically, as quite ufelefs to thift 
end, fince they merely fhow what is contained in thele 
conceptions, but not how we arrive at them A priori, or 
the ground of their valid ufe with regard to the objedrs 
of knowledge. . It requires but little felf-denial to give 
up all thefe old pretenlions, fince the undeniable, and in 
the dogmatical procedure unavoidable, contradiction of 
Reafon with itfeif, has caufed every fyftem of Metaphyfics 
hitherto produced long fince to lofe its credit. More, 
refolution, however, is requifite to prevent our being 
deterred by the internal difficulty, or by any external 
obltacle, from promoting a fcience indifpenfable for 
human Reafon, from which we may indeed iop every 
branch, but cannot extirpate its root, and from labouring 
to cultivate its profperous and fruitful growth, by a 
treatment entirely oppofite to that hitherto purfued. 
VII. Idea and Divifion of a particular Science, to be culled 
the Critic of Pure Reason. 
From all that has preceded, the idea of a particular 
fcience arifes, that may be called the The Critic of Pure 
Reafon. For Reafon is the faculty which furnifhes the 
principles of knowledge A priori; Pure Reafon is therefore 
that which contains the principles of knowing fomething 
ablolutely A priori. An Organon of Pure Reafon would 
be an aggregate of thole principles, according to which all 
pure knowledge A priori could be acquired and really 
brought about. The complete application of fuch an 
Organon would furnifn a Syjleni of Pure Reafon. As this 
is, however, requiring a great deal, and as it is ftili un¬ 
certain whetherit is here poffible to extend our knowledge, 
and in what way ; we may confider a fcience of the mere 
examination of pure Reafon, its fources and limits, as a 
propadeutic (preliminary) to the fyftem of Pure Reafon.. 
Such a propadeutic would not be a Doll fine, but muft be 
called a Critic. of Pure Reafon; and its ufe with regard 
to fpeculation would really be only negative; that is, 
not ferve to extend, but only to purify, our reafon, and 
keep it free from errors, which would indeed be mod de¬ 
finable. I call all knowledge tranfcendental whichrefpefts 
not the objects, but our mode of knowing them, in fo 
far as this is conceivable A priori. A fyftem of fuch con¬ 
ceptions may be called Transcendental Philosophy. 
This appellation in the firft inflance is too extended; 
for, as fuch a fcience ought to form a complete whole of 
analytical as well as fyntlietical knowledge A priori, it 
would lead beyond our prefect objedl. We ffiall not 
now, therefore, venture to puffi the analyfis further than 
is indifpenfably neceflary in order to comprehend in their 
whole extent the principles of the fynthefis <5 priori. 
This inveftigation, which cannot properly be called a 
fcience, but only a tranfcendental Critic, becaufe its objedl 
is not the extenfion of knowledge, but only its correction, 
muft ferve as a touch-done of the value or worthleflhefs 
of all knowledge A priori »_ Such a Critic is therefore a 
preparative, if poffible, for an Organon; or, fhould this be 
unattainable, at lead for a Canon, according to which 
perhaps hereafter the complete fyftem of the Philofophy of 
pure Reafon, both in the extenfion and limitation of know¬ 
ledge, may be reprefented analytically and fynthetically. 
For, that this is poffible, nay, that fuch a fyftem could not 
be fo extenfive as that we need defpair of its com¬ 
pletion, is evident; fince it is not to treat of the nature 
of the things, which is inexhauftible, but of the mere 
Underjlanding itfeif in its judgment on the nature of 
the things, and this only with regard to its knowledge A 
priori. As this is not to be looked for externally, it cannot 
x well 
