190 PHILO 
in themfelves. Time is therefore a mere fubjeftive condi¬ 
tion of human Intuition, (which is always fenfitive, 
fince it implies that we are affedted by objedls;) and is in 
itfelf, independently of our fubjeft, nothing at all. Ne- 
verthelefs it is, with regard to all phenomena, confe- 
quently to all things which can occur to us in experience, 
neceffarily objective. We cannot fay, “all things are in 
time,” becaufe, when we conceive things generally, we 
abftradl from all intuition of them, whereas intuition is 
the very condition which connedls Time with the repre¬ 
sentation of objedls. Now, if this condition be added to 
the conception, and it befaid, “ All things as phenomena 
(as objedls of fenfible intuition) are in time,” then the 
principle has its true objedtive corredtnefs and univerfal- 
ity h priori. 
We affirm, therefore, the empirical reality of Time ; 
that is, its objedtive validity with regard to all objedls 
that can ever affedl our fenfes. And, as our intuition is 
always fenfible, no objedl can ever be given in experience 
that does not come under the condition of Time. On 
the other hand, we deny to time all claim to abfolute rea¬ 
lity, as ifit belonged to the things in themfelves as their 
quality, or property, without any regard to the form of 
our sensible intuition. Whatever properties the 
things may have in themfelves, they can never be commu¬ 
nicated to us through our fenfes. Herein confifts the tranf- 
cendenlal ideality of time, according to which, if we ab¬ 
ftradl from the ftibjedfive conditions of fenfible intuition, it 
is nothing at all, and cannot be applied to the objedls in 
themfelves, independent of our intuition, either adhe¬ 
rently or inherently. Yet this ideality is no more to be 
ranked with the illufions of fenfe than that of /pace, be¬ 
caufe in them we prefuppofe of the phenomenon, toge¬ 
ther with the predicates we give to it, that it has objec¬ 
tive reality in itfelf, which in our tranfcendenf.nl view 
we deny to the things, except in fo far as their reality is 
merely empirical, that is, as the objedl itfelf isconfidered 
merely as a phenomenon. 
Illustration. —Againft this theory, which concedes 
the empirical reality of Time, but denies its abfolute and 
tranfcendental reality, I have heard an objedtion fo una¬ 
nimous from intelligent men, that I fuppofe it muft na¬ 
turally be found in every reader unaccuftomed to fuel) 
contemplations. It is this. Changes are real; (this is 
proved by the alteration in our own reprefentations, even 
if we deny all external phenomena and their changes.) 
Now changes are only pofiible in Time ; Time is there¬ 
fore fomething real. The ar.fwer to this is eafy. I admit 
the wdiole argument. Time is undoubtedly fomething 
real, namely, the real form of Internal Intuition. It has 
therefore a fubjedlive reality with regard to our internal 
experience; that is, I have really the reprefentation of 
time,-and of my own condition in it; lo that it is not 
to be conlidered as a real objedl, but as the mode of re- 
prefenting our own felves as objedls. But, if we could 
intuit ourfelves without this condition of fenfe, the fen- 
fations which we now reprefent to ourfelves as changes, 
would furnifh fome kind of knowledge, in which the 
reprefentation of Time, confequently of change alfo, 
would not occur at all. The empirical reality of Time, 
therefor^, is confirmed as the condition of all our expe¬ 
rience. But abfolute reality cannot be conceded to it, 
according to what has been above Hated. It is nothing 
but the form of our internal intuition. I may indeed fay, 
“My reprefentations follow one another ;” but this only 
means that I am confcious of them, according to the 
form of my internal sense, as occurring in a fuc- 
cefhon of time. Time is not on that account a thing in 
itfelf, nor any determination objedlively inherent in the 
things. If we take away from Time its quality of being 
the peculiar condition of the fenfitive faculty, the con¬ 
ception of it vanifhes ; for it does not adhere to the ob¬ 
jedls in themfelves, but merely to the fubjedf which in¬ 
tuits them. 
The reafon why this objedtion is fo generally ftarted, 
SOPHY. 
and indeed by thofe who yet have nothing intelligible to 
oppofe to the ideality of J'pace, is this. They defpair of 
proving apodidlically the abfolute reality of /pace, becaufe 
the arguments of the idealifts Hand oppofed to them, 
which fliow, that the reality of external objedls is inca¬ 
pable of a ftridl proof: whereas they admit that the ob¬ 
jedl of our internal fenfe, my own felf and my own Hate, 
is immediately evinced by confcioufnefs. External ob¬ 
jedls may be a mere appearance ; but this objedl of our in¬ 
ternal fenfe, in their opinion, is undeniably fomething 
real. They did not refledl, that both the internal and 
external objedls, without difputing their reality as re¬ 
prefentations, are Hill only phenomena which may be 
conlidered in two points of view ; firlt, when the objedl is 
confdered in itfelf, independently of our mode of intuit¬ 
ing it, but which on that very account muft always re¬ 
main unknown ; fecondly, when we take into account ova- 
mode of intuiting this objedl, which mult not be fought for 
in the objedl in itfelf, but in our own fubjedt, to which i^ 
belongs, although it is really applied to, and neceffarily 
modifies the appearance of, this objedl - . 
Time and Space are therefore two fources from which 
may be deduced it priori a variety of fynthetical know¬ 
ledge, of which pure mathematics, or the laws of fpace and 
its relations, afford a ftriking example. As the pureforms 
of all fenfible intuition, they may well render fynthetical 
politions h priori poffible. 
But thefe fources of knowledge h priori, being merely 
conditions of Sense, fix their own limits; that is, they 
refer to objedls as phenomena, but not as things in them¬ 
felves. The field of phenomena is the only field of their 
validity, which when we quit, no further objedlive ufe of 
them is to be met with. This reality of Time and Space 
does not affedl the certainty of our experimental know¬ 
ledge; for of this w’e are perfedtly certain, whether thefe- 
forms belong neceffarily to the things in themfelves, or 
only to our intuition of them. Thofe, on the other 
hand, who maintain the abfolute reality of Time and 
Space, whether they take it to be J'ubfiftent, or only inhe¬ 
rent, muft neceffarily contradidl the principles of experi¬ 
ence itfelf. For, if they decide for the former, wdiich the 
mathematical natural philofophers ufually do, they are 
obliged to adopt two eternal and infinite nonentities as felf- 
fubfilting (Time and Space,) which, without beingthem- 
felves any thing real, exiit merely in order to contain in 
them all that is real. If they adopt the fecond opinion, 
as fome metaphyfical natural philofophers do, and hold 
Time and Space to be relations of the phenomena, co- 
exiftent or fucceflive, derived from experience, though 
indeed confufedly reprefented in the abftradl, they muft 
deny to the mathematical principles cl priori, the valid¬ 
ity of their application to real things in fpace; at leaft 
their apodidlical certainty, fince this can never arife 
d pofieriori; and the conceptions <1 priori of Time and 
Space are, according to this opinion, only creatures of 
the imagination, originating in experience ; from the ab¬ 
ftradl relations of which the imagination has formed fome- 
thingwhich indeed comprifes theiruniverfalcharadleriftics, 
but which can never really occur in experience without the 
reftridtions wdiich nature has connedled with them. The 
former have this advantage, that they open for the ma¬ 
thematics the field of the phenomena. On the other 
hand, they are greatly encumbered with their two non¬ 
entities, when the underftanding willies to go beyond 
this field. The latter, indeed, have the advantage, when 
they wifti to judge of objedls not as phenomena but by 
the underftanding alone, that the reprefentations of time 
and fpace do not impede them ; but they can neither ac¬ 
count for our having mathematical knowledge it priori, 
(fince they are deftitute of a true and objedtively-valid in¬ 
tuition it priori ,) nor prove the neceflary agreement of 
experience with the mathematics. In our theory of the 
two original forms of fenfe, all thefe difficulties are re¬ 
moved. 
That Tranfcendental Efthetics can have no other than 
the 
