191 
PHILO 
the two elements Time and Space, is clear, becaufe all 
other conceptions which relate to fenfe, even motion, 
which combines both, prefuppofe fomething empirical. 
Motion prefuppofes the perception of fomething move- 
able. But in Space, confidered in itfelf, there is nothing 
moveable : hence the moveable mud be fomething found 
in fpace by experience, confequently an empirical datum. 
In the fame manner we cannot confider change as one of 
the data il priori of Tranfcendental Efthetics; for Time 
itfelf does not change, but only that which is in time. 
Change requires the perception of fome fubftance, and 
the fucceflion of its empirical determinations. 
General Remarks on Transcendental Esthetics. 
I. It will be neceffary carefully to explain our mean¬ 
ing with regard to the fundamental qualities of fenfible 
knowledge in general, in order to prevent mifconception. 
We have faid ; that all our intuition is nothing but a 
reprefentation of phenomena; that the things which we 
intuit are not in themfelves fuch as we intuit them, nor 
their relations in themfelves fuch as they appear 
to rs; and that, if we annul our own fubjeft, or 
only the fubjeftive nature of fenfe in general, it would 
follow, that all the qualities and relations of objefts 
in time and fpace, nay even time and fpace themfelves, 
would vanilh; for, as phenomena, they cannot fubfift of 
themfelves, but only in us. What relations there may 
be in objects in themfelves, independently of the recepti¬ 
vity of our fenfitive faculty, is entirely unknown to us. 
We only know that mode of apprehending which is pecu¬ 
liar to ourfelves, which needs not neceffarily belong to 
every being, though it does to every man. With this 
mode we have folely to do. Time and Space are the pure 
forms of our fenfitive faculty; fenfation is its matter. 
Thefe forms alone are knowable ft priori, i. e. prior to all 
actual perception, and they are therefore called pureintui- 
tio 7 is. Senfalion, on the contrary, is that which is known 
a pojleriori, and is called empirical intuition. The former 
adheres neceffarily to our fenfitive faculty, however our 
aftual fenfation may vary. Could we carry our intuition 
to the higheft degree of diftinftnefs, wefhould not thereby 
advance in the lead towards a knowledge of the objefts 
in themfelves. We could but know perfectly our mode 
of intuition, that is, our fenfitive faculty, and its condi¬ 
tions Time and Space as originally inherent in the mind. 
What the objects may be in themfelves could never be¬ 
come known to us by the cleared knowledge of the phe¬ 
nomena which alone are given to us. 
To fay that the fenfitive faculty furnifhes but a con¬ 
futed reprefentation of the things, containing indeed 
folely what belongs to them in themfelves, but with an 
accumulation of marks and partial reprefentations of 
which we are not clearly confcious, is to pervert and ren¬ 
der void the whole conception of fenfe and of phenomena. 
The difference between an indiftinft and a diftinft repre¬ 
fentation is merely logical, and does not concern its mat¬ 
ter. The common conception of Right contains no 
doubt all that the mod fubtle fpeculation can develope 
from it, though, in practical ufe, we are not confcious of 
the various reprefentations involved in it. Yet we can¬ 
not fay, on this account, that the common conception is 
fenfible, and contains merely a phenomenon; for right 
cannot be perceived ; its conception lies in the Under- 
danding, and reprefents a moral quality of aftions which 
belong to them in themfelves. On the other hand, the 
intuitive reprefentation of a body contains nothing that 
could belong to an objeft in itfelf, but is merely a pheno¬ 
menon blended with our receptivity, or mode of being 
affefted ; a part of our knowing faculty which is 
called Sense, and which can never furnifli a knowledge 
of the objeft in itfelf, were vve to examine the phenomena 
for ever. 
The philofophy of Leibnitz and Wolf, therefore, took 
up the inveftigations of the nature and origin of our 
knowledge in a wrong point of view, fince it confidered 
SOPHY. 
the difference between the fenfible and the intelle£liim 
merely as a logical difference, whereas it is evidently 
tranfcendental, and does not merely conlid in diftinftnefs 
or indiftinftnefs, but in their different origin and nature ; 
fo that the things in themfelves are not indiftinftly known 
by the faculty of fenfe, but they are not known at all by it; 
and the moment we take away our fubjeftive nature, the 
reprefented objeft, together with the properties which our 
fenfible intuition inveded it with, is no where to be found, 
fince this very fubjeftive nature of the mind gives it its 
form as a phenomenon. 
We didinguifli in phenomena that which is effential to 
our intuition of them, and to every fenfitive faculty, from 
that which is only connected with the intuition accident¬ 
ally, and not inherent in fenfe in general, but depending 
upon a particular difpofition or organization of the faculty 
in the individual. We are accudomed to confider the 
former as a knowledge of the objeft in itfelf, but thelatter 
only as its phenomenon. This difference is however merely 
empirical. If we dop here, and do not confider,as we ought, 
that every empirical intuition is a mere phenomenon, 
no part of which belongs to the thing in itfelf; our tranf¬ 
cendental diltinftion is lod, and we ftill believe that we 
know the things in themfelves, though, in our deeped in- 
vedigation of the objects of the fenfible world, we are 
confined entirely to phenomena. Thus we call the rain¬ 
bow a. mere phenomenon, and the rain the thing in itfelf, 
which is indeed correft, phyfically, according to the dif¬ 
ferent fituations, of the ienfes, but always in the intuition, 
and not independent of it. But, if we alk generally, 
Whether the rainbow reprefents an objeft in itfelf? (not 
whether it reprefents drops of rain, which are indeed, as 
phenomena, empirical objefts,) thequedion then becomes 
tranfcendental; and we not only confider thefe drops them¬ 
felves as mere phenomena, but the very fpace through 
which they fall as nothing but the bafis of our fenfible 
intuition ; the tranfcendental objeft ftill remains unknown 
to us. 
Another important circumftance refpefting our tranf¬ 
cendental efthetics is, that it does not infinuate itfelf 
merely as a plaufible liypothefis, but is as certain and in¬ 
dubitable as we can require any theory to be in order to 
ferve as an organum. To render this completely evident, 
let us take the following cafe. 
Suppofe Time and Space to be objective, and condi¬ 
tions of the polTibility of the things in themfelves. It is 
well known that both of them, but particularly fpace, fur- 
niffi a great number of apodiftical and fynthetical posi¬ 
tions ft priori; and we will therefore take /p«ce as an exam¬ 
ple. As the pofitions of geometry are known fyntheti- 
cally ft priori, and with apodiftical certainty, I afk. 
Whence do we derive thefe pofitions, and upon what does 
the underftanding found thefe evidently-neceffary and 
univerfally - valid truths ? They rauft reft either upon 
conceptions or upon intuitions; and thefe are either ft priori 
or ft pojleriori . Thelatter, or empirical conceptions, as 
well as that on which they are grounded, the empirical 
intuition, canfurnifh no fynthetical pofition which is not 
alfo merely empirical, that is, a mere pofition of experience. 
Such pofitions, therefore, can never contain necefiity and 
abl'olute univerfality, which however charafterize all the 
pofitions of geometry. The only means of arriving at 
fuch knowledge mull be by conceptions or intuitions 
ft priori ; but it is clear that from mere conceptions no 
fynthetical knowledge can be derived, but only fuch as is 
analytical. Take the pofition, that “by two ftraight 
lines no fpace can be enclofed,” and that confequently 
no figure can be formed by them, and try to derive this 
from the conception of ftraight lir.es'and the number two; 
or even take the pofition, that “ from three ftraight lines 
we can compofe a figure,” and try to derive this in the 
fame manner merely from thefe conceptions. All your 
efforts are vain, and you find yourfelf compelled to have 
recourfe to the intuition which is always employed in geo¬ 
metry. You rnuft therefore take the objeft in the iutui- 
i ^ tion; 
