192 
PHILOSOPHY. 
(ion; but of what kind is this intuition ? is it a pure in¬ 
tuition A priori, or an empirical one ? If it were the latter 
merely, the polition never could become univerfaliy valid, 
much lefs apodidtical: for experience cannot furnilh fuch. 
You mud therefore take the objedt A priori in the intui¬ 
tion, and ground upon this your J'ynthetical pojition. Now 
if there were not a faculty in you- to have intuitions 
A priori; if this fubjedtive formal condition were not at 
the fame time the univerfal condition d priori, under 
w hich alone the objedt of the external intuition itfelf is 
poftible ; if the objedt (the triangle) were fomething in 
itfelf independent of you; how could we fay that thofe con¬ 
ditions which lie in your fubjedtive mode of conltrudting 
a triangle muft alfo neceflarily apply to the triangle in it¬ 
felf? for, becaufe you add the new circumftance of figure 
to your conception of three lines, it does not neceflarily 
follow' that this fhould be in the objedt, wdiicii exifts prior 
to your knowledge, and not by means of it. If therefore 
Space and Time alfo were not the mere forms of your 
intuition, which contains conditions a priori under which 
alone things may be external objedls to you, which, with¬ 
out thefe fubjedtive conditions, are nothing in themfel ves; 
you could not have any fynthetical knowledge d priori 
of external objedls. It is therefore certain, and not merely 
probable, that Time and Space are merely the fubjedtive 
conditions of our intuition; and therefore all objedls of 
experience are mere phenomena, and not things in them- 
felves. For this reafon much maybe faid of them A priori 
as to their form, though nothing of the things in 
themfeives which may be the foundation of thefe pheno¬ 
mena. 
II. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality both 
of external and internal fen fe, confequently of all the objedls 
of the fenfes, as mere phenomena, the following remark 
may be ufeful. Every thing in our knowledge which 
belongs to intuition (1 exclude therefore, the feeling of 
pleafure and difpleafure, and of the will, which are not 
knowledge) confifts of mere relations, of the places of an 
intuition (extenfion), of the change of places (motion), 
and of the laws by which this change is determined 
(moving powers). But, as to the thing which is prefent 
in fpace, or what it effects, further than a change of place, 
or as concerns-the things in themfeives, it is not intuited. 
By mere relations a thing is not known in itfelf: we 
ought to confider therefore, that, as external fenfe fur- 
r.ifhes nothing but mere reprefentations of relation, it can 
only reprefent to us the eftedt of an objedt upon the mind, 
ahd not the intrinfic qualities which may belong to the 
thing in itfelf. With regard to internal intuition, the 
cafe is exactly the fame; not only becaufe the external 
intuitions are properly the materials which occupy the 
mind, but Time, in which we place reprefentations pre- 
vioufly even to our confcioufnefs of them in experience, 
and which is the ground of our mode of arranging them 
in the mind, contains in itfelf the relations of fucceftion, 
of co-exiftence, and of perdurability. Now that repre- 
fentation which precedes'the act of thinking, is intuition; 
and, as the mere form of intuition contains relations 
only which reprefent nothing except the placing and 
arrangement of a thing in the mind, this form can be 
nothing elfe but the mode in which the mind is affected 
by its'own adtivity, in this very placing of its reprefenta¬ 
tions; it is therefore the form of internal fenfe. Every 
thing which is reprefented by a fenfitive faculty muft of 
courfe be a phenomenon ; and therefore we muft either 
rejedt an internal, fenfe altogether, or reprefent our own 
felt the objedt of this fenfe merely as a phenomenon, not 
as we fhould judge of that felf, were our intuition of it a 
pure mental adtivity that is wholly intellectual. The 
whole queftion then refcl ves itfelf in to this, How it is poftible 
for us to have an internal hit uition of ourfelves ? Thisdif- 
ficulty, however, is common to every theory. Se!f-con- 
feioufnefs is the Ample reprefentation ; and, if this entirely 
• originated in our felf-adtivity, our internal intuition would 
be intellectual. In man this confcioufnefs requires the 
internal apprehenjion of the variety which muft be given 
to him; and the manner in which this is received, Inde¬ 
pendently of all mental fpontaneity, muft be called Sense. 
That the faculty of felf-confcioufnefs may apprehend 
what is in the mind, the mind muft firft be artedted by it, 
it cannot othervvife produce any intuition of itfelf. 
The form pf intuition, however, which lies in the mind 
A priori, eftablifhes Time itfelf as the mode in which the 
variety exifts in the mind. It intuits itfelf then, not im¬ 
mediately and fpontaneoufly, but according to the mode 
in which it is internally affedled ; confequently, as it 
appears to itfelf, not as it is intrinfically. 
III. If I fay that our intuition represents, in Time and 
Space, not only the external objedls, but the mind itfelf, 
fo far as it affedts our Senfes, that is, as it appears ; this 
does not imply that thefe objedls themfeives are mere ap¬ 
pearances. For, in the phenomenon, we always confider 
the objefls, and even the properties which we attribute to 
them, as fomething really given: only, as this depends 
on our mode of intuiting, and on the relation of the 
given obje-dt to the mind, this objedt as a phenomenon is 
diftinguifhed from the fame objedt confulered as a thing 
in itfelf. That bodies are merely external appearances 
to me, or that the foul is only an appearance in my con¬ 
fcioufnefs, is' by no means to be inferred from the afler- 
tion that Time and Space, in which I place them as the 
condition of their existence, belong entirely to my mode 
of intuiting, and not to the objects in themfeives. It 
would be my own fault were I to make a mere phantom 
of what I ought to confider as a given phenomenon. 
The predicates of a phenomenon may be applied to the 
objedt itfelf in its relation to our fenfes; for inftance, the 
red colour, or the fmell to the rofe; but a mere appearance 
can never be attributed to the objedt, fince it would refer 
what belongs to the objedt only in its relation to our 
fenfes, unconditionally to the objedt in itfelf ; for inftance, 
the two handles that were formerly attributed to Saturn. 
That which can never be found in the objeEl itfelf, but 
which is always found in its relation to us, and is mfepa- 
rable from our reprefentation of it, is Phenomenon. Time 
and Space, therefore, are rightly attributed to objedls of 
fenfe ; and this produces no falfe appearance. On the 
other hand, when we attribute to the rofe in itfelf the red 
colours, to Saturn the handles, or to all external objects in 
themfeives extenfion, without limiting our judgment to 
the relation of thefe objedls to us; then a mere phantom 
arifes. 
But this is not the cafe with our principle of the ideal¬ 
ity of fenfible intuitions. On the contrary, if we attri¬ 
bute to our forms of reprefentation objedtive reality, we 
inevitably convert every thing into mere phantoms. For, 
if we confider Time and Spa'ce as effential and neceffary 
properties of the things in themfeives, and refledt upon 
the abfurdity in which this involves us, by fetting up two 
infinite things, which are neither fubftances nor really 
inherent in fubftances, yet which muft ftill exift as the 
neceffary conditions of the exiltence of all things, and 
even though all exilting things fhould be annihilated ; 
we could hardly blame poor Berkeley for degrading 
bodies into mere phantoms, fince we fhould thus convert 
our own foul into a phantom by making it dependent on 
the felf-exifting non-entity, time: an abfurdity of which 
no one has hitherto been guilty. 
IV. In Natural Theology, where we treat of an objedt, 
(God,) which can not only be no objedt of intuition to us, 
but which cannot in fadt be any objedt of fenfible intui¬ 
tion at all ; we are careful not to attribute Time and Space 
the conditions of our intuition, to his intuition ; for his 
knowledge muft include intuition, and not be mere 
thought, which would imply a limited faculty. But with 
what right can we do this, after admitting that Time and 
Space are forms of the things in themfeives; and that, as 
conditions of the exiltence of things if priori, they would 
even remain if the things themfeives were annihilated; 
for, if they are the abfolute conditions of all exiftence, 
