193 
PHILOSOPHY. 
they muft alfo be conditions of the exiftence of God. 
But, if we do not choofe to make them the objedive forms 
of all things, there is no alternative but to confider them 
as the fubjedive forms of our external and internal intui¬ 
tion, which is called fenfible, becaufe it is not originative, 
that is, fuch that the very objects of intuition are gene¬ 
rated by it; a fort of intuition which we can only conceive 
to belong to the Deity. Our intuition, on the contrary, 
requires the objeft to be given. 
Nor does it follow that intuition in the forms of Time 
and Space is confined to man ; it is pofiible that all finite 
thinking beings may be fubjeft to the fame law, though 
on this we cannot decide. The intuitive faculty would 
not, however, on account of this extended validity, lofe 
its fenfitive nature. It is dill receptive (intuitus derivati¬ 
ve), and not originative (intuitus originarius) ; confe- 
quently not an intelleftual intuition, which latter, as 
liriftly initiative, can only apply to the original being, but 
by no means to one dependent both for his exiftence and 
his intuition, and who knows himfelf only relatively to 
the objefts given to him. The latter remark, however, 
muft be confidered only in the light of explanation, and 
not as a proof of our Theory of Efthetics. 
Conclusion. —We have now advanced one ftep towards 
the folution of the great problem of Tranfcendental Phi- 
lofophy: How are fynthetical pofitions <1 priori pojfible? We 
have eftabliflied Time and Space as pure intuitions P 
priori. In fynthetical judgments d priori we go beyond 
our conception of the objeft, to add to that conception 
fomething that cannot be found in it by analylis. This 
can only be done by means of intuition ; but on this very 
account, thefe judgments are limited to fenfible objefts, 
and are valid only of objects of poflible experience. 
PART II. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 
I. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTICS. 
In feeking to afcertain the conditions of experience, 
we have difcovered thofe of intuition, by means of which 
Un objed can be given or prefent to us. But we have (till 
to difcover thofe conditions by which an objed may be 
thought. ObjeCts of experience muft agree with the con¬ 
ditions of the reprefenting faculty ; that is, muft be given 
or prefent in time and fpace ; and here the mind fliows 
itfelf as a mere pafiive faculty, or Receptivity ; this faculty 
of receiving the imprdfions of objects, is called Sense. 
The aft of receiving the given variety, is accompanied by 
the “ I think." But this is not yet fufficient to reprefent 
the variety as connefted with an objeft. Another aft is 
ftill to be confidered, by which the given empirical variety 
is reprefented as connefted into an objeft; and here the 
mind fliows itfelf as a Spontaneity. 
The fcience of the rules of thinking is Logic. It may 
be of two kinds ; it may either treat of the univerfal or 
the particular rules of the underftanding. Univerfal 
Logic abftrafts from all difference of the objefts, and ex¬ 
hibits the rules of thinking in general. The Logic of 
the particular ufe of underftanding fliows the application 
of thefe rules to a particular clafs of objefts. 
Univerfal Logic is either pure or applied. The former 
treats of thinking in general. It is therefore altogether a 
fcience a priori, andisacanon ofReafonand Underftand¬ 
ing. On the other hand, in applied Logic, we confider 
thinking under the empirical conditions of man, and 
attend to the influence which imagination, memory, 
habit, and the paflions, have on thinking. The ground of 
divifion into pure and applied is here the fame as in other 
fciences ; for inftance, Pure Mathematics confiders quan¬ 
tity in itfelf; applied, on the other hand, confiders quan¬ 
tity in empirical objefts. Thus pure morals treat of the 
univerfal moral laws of a free will; applied morals, on the 
other hand, or virtue, confider the fame principles as 
laws for human beings affefted by inclinations. 
Tranfcendental Logic, of which we have here to treat, 
Vol. XX. No. 1361. 
refembles univerfal pure Logic, in not limiting itfelf to a 
particular clafs of objefts. It does not reprefent the laws 
of thinking under empirical conditions, confequently it 
will be pure Logic ; but it will have in view one thing 
which pure Logic has nothing to do with, namely, to 
point out thofe laws by which the thinking of an objeft, 
or the reprefentation of the fenfible variety as connefted 
in an objeft, is poflible. In the courfe of this inveftigation, 
certain conceptions will develope themfelves which refer 
d priori to objefts, fince they are neceflary to render the 
very conception of an objeft poflible. 
Book I. Analysis of Conceptions. 
In comparinga Conception with a Judgment, we perceive 
that they may be quite alike with regard to the reprefenta- 
tions which they contain. Thus, for inftance, the com¬ 
pound Conception, “the white wall,” contains the fame 
reprefentations as the Judgment, “the wall is white.” 
We eafily perceive that the connexion of the reprefenta¬ 
tions is in the Conception confidered as already effefted ; 
whereas in the Judgment the connexion itfelf is formally 
reprefented. 
That aftion of the mind by which one reprefentation 
arifes from feveral, is the very connexion here mentioned, 
and confifts in this, that the variety is accompanied by 
confcioufnefs, namely, by the “ I think,” which is identi¬ 
cally the fame in all the parts of the variety. In this 
manner only is a unity of confcioufnefs, that is, a whole 
ot feveral reprefentations, poflible. 
Now we fay ; “ In the conception the reprefentations are 
connefted into a fubjeftive unity of confcioulnefs; the 
judgment of experience, on the other hand, is the aftion 
of bringing the fenfible reprefentation to an pbjeftive 
unity of confcioufnefs.'’ If I think the conception “ the 
white wall,” the connexion of the reprefentations (white 
and wall) is thought merely problematically, confequently 
fubjeftively, without afligning an objeft which corre- 
fponds to this connexion. On the other hand, in a judg¬ 
ment, the connexion of reprefentations is referred to an 
objeft. If I fay, “ the wall is white,” I at the fame time 
indicate, that every one muft find it fo, fince this con¬ 
nexion is not made optionally, but has been determined 
experimentally by the objeft. 
We therefore fee, that, in order to inveftigate the 
aftion of the mind, according to which it refers a whole of 
reprefentations to an objeft, and thus thinks an objed, we 
muft attend to the judgment; and that, in order com¬ 
pletely to know every kind of objeftive connexion, 
nothing more will be neceflary than a complete exhibition 
of all the modes of judgment. But every judgment is 
complete, when it has been determined according to its 
Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. 
Quantity. 
Singular, 
Particular, 
Univerfal. 
Table of Judgments. 
Quality. 
Affirmative, 
Negative, 
Infinite. 
Relation. 
Categorical, 
Hypothetical, 
Disjunctive. 
Modality. 
Problematical, 
Affertorical, 
Apodiftical. 
With refpeft to this Table, it is neceflary to make the 
following remarks. 
Firft : In a univerfal judgment the fubjeft has a fphere 
of which we predicate fomething generally, and confe¬ 
quently of every one of its members. In a fingular judg¬ 
ment the fubjeft has no fphere. The univerfal judgment 
confequently agrees with the Angular in this, that both 
predicate fomething of the fubjeft generally, without 
exception. Since, however, our intention is to exhibit 
the aftion of the objeftive reference, and as this may be 
different in the two judgments, that difference muft not 
be overlooked. 
Secondly: An infinite judgment is, according to its 
form, always affirmative, and is therefore in univerfal 
logic juftly ranked with the affirmative; the fubjeft of 
3D an 
