195 
PHILOSOPHY. 
tion of the conception ; confequently the enquiry concern¬ 
ing the right of applying this conception to objefts is 
unneceffary. 
But, if there are conceptions which have not arifen 
from experience, and yet are always applied to objects of 
experience, thefe certainly require a deduction. We 
muft be able to fay how we come to refer thefe reprefen- 
tations to objefts, fince experience gives us no right. 
Now we have already fhown, that the reprefentations of 
Time and Space, and of the Categories, have no empirical 
origin. With refpeft to thefe, therefore, it is the duty of 
the “ Critic” to (how the ground and the right upon 
which the underftanding fupports itfelf, when it makes 
ufe of thefe conceptions. 
If we feek in experience for the firft inftances of our 
confcioufnefs of thefe reprefentations, we enter upon that 
path of inveftigation which Locke purfued. We may 
thus poflibly difcover the firft occafions which excite in 
us the confcioufnefs of thefe reprefentations ; but, when 
we have really accomplifhed this, we muft not perfuade 
ourfelves, w'ith Locke, that we have difcovered the 
empirical origin of thefe reprefentations. Experience 
can indeed aflure us of their pofleffion, which requires no 
inveftigation of their caufal occafions, but only attention 
to this or that experience; but thefe conceptions cannot 
fpring from experience. The reprefentations of Time and 
Space, for inftance, are entirely independent of all tjiat is 
empirical, fince Time and Space themfelves are quite 
independent of all objects of experience ; and the Catego¬ 
ries are conceptions whofe origin lies in the logical func¬ 
tions of judgment. 
We eafily perceive, that thofe fciences which treat of 
quantity, of Time and Space, (Geometry and pure Mecha¬ 
nics,) would lofe nothing of their evidence, though the 
deduction of thefe conceptions had not been made. For, 
foiong as thefe fciences remain in their own proper field, 
there is nothing that can diminifti their intuitive certainty. 
But, udthout this deduction, we might poflibly doubt the 
right to apply them to objefts of experience ; nay, this 
has really happened, as the hiftory of Philofophy affords 
us a remarkable inftance. 
The deduftion of the reprefentations of Time and Space 
is already given in Tranfcendental Efthetics. It is there 
fhown, that Time and Space are the neceffary conditions 
of the intuition of empirical objefts ; confequently they 
are infeparable from every intuited objeft. This deduc¬ 
tion leads, therefore, to the tranfcendental path, which is 
in faft the only poflible one, in an enquiry, not into the 
ufe, but the legality of the ufe, of thefe reprefentations. 
Our view' with regard to the Categories would be ob¬ 
tained, could it be clearly fhown, that, by means of thefe 
reprefentations alone, an objeft can be thought; in other 
words, could it be proved, that thefe conceptions give 
obje£livity to our reprefentations. Now we are already 
allured of the tranfcendental deduftion of thefe concep¬ 
tions, provided we admit the correftnefs of the above ex- 
pofition of judgment. 
Tranfcendental Deduction of the Categories of Underfunding. 
The firft aft of the Understanding, from which all 
ufe of underftanding begins, is connexion. Sense fur- 
nifties us with a variety, but connexion can never be ob¬ 
tained by means of Senfe. As it is an aft of Jpontaneity, 
it muft therefore be afcribed to the underftanding. In 
the reprefentation of an objedl, the variety of it is repre- 
fented as already connefted. But the reprefentation of 
this connexion is however only poflible, fo far as the un¬ 
derftanding connefts the reprefentations themfelves. 
Connexion prefuppofes a variety that is connefted, and 
raifes the conception of unity. This unity is not how¬ 
ever the Category Unity ; for all the Categories prefup- 
pofe connexion, and confequently unity ; and their ope¬ 
ration is not merely to conneft, but to reprefent connex¬ 
ion as objeftive. 
Now let us contemplate this aftion of the mind, which 
confifts of connexion, in a nearer point of view. It does 
not arife merely from our being confcious of various re¬ 
prefentations; but it arifes when the confcioufnefs that 
accompanies each of thefe reprefentations, in their fyn- 
thefis, is reprefented as identical. Therefore reprefenta¬ 
tions are connefted with one another when the mind adds 
one reprefentation to another, and is confcious of doing 
fo. This latter fynthefis, therefore, is to be diftinguiftied 
from the former; for it confifts in the pafling over of con¬ 
fcioufnefs from one reprefentation to another, and in the 
confcioufnefs that is equally difperfed in both reprefent¬ 
ations pafling into one. Now this confifts in that aft 
which reveals itfelf when I fay I think, and is perhaps in¬ 
capable of further explanation. The chief principle of 
the Underftanding is therefore, that the I think muft ac¬ 
company all our reprefentations ; becaufe our confciouf¬ 
nefs in them is reprefented as identical. 
The I think, that accompanies all our reprefentations, 
mm It be called original confcioufnefs. It muft be diftin- 
guilhed from the empirical confcioufnefs of individual re¬ 
prefentations, as it is a felf-confcioufnefs, that is repre¬ 
sented, as identical in each empirical confcioufnefs; and 
muft in this refpeft be termed pure confcioufnefs. The 
refult of the connexion of reprefentations is the unity of 
confcioufnefs. 
Thus much is now evident, that the reprefentation of 
this unity always prefuppofes a fynthefis. For only by 
adding one reprefentation to another, am I confcious of 
thefe reprefentations themfelves. In this regard it muft 
be called the fynthetic unity of confcioufnefs. But, if 
this fynthetic unity is already there, then is it firft of all 
poflible to find, converfely, the original confcioufnefs in 
every partial reprefentation. In this reference the unity 
of confcioufnefs is called analytic. The analytic unity is 
therefore only poflible under the prefuppofition of the 
fynthetic. 
But, though the original confcioufnefs renders every 
connexion poflible, there is however no variety contained 
in it. This is worthy of remark, and, with refpeft to 
what follows, important. An underftanding whofe pure 
I am contains in itfelf a variety would be intuition. Oar’s 
can only think becaufe it receives the variety by means of 
Senfe; and the I think expreffes only an aftion that is ex- 
ercifed on a given variety, and is therefore of itfelf an 
empty reprefentation. 
In the fame manner as Time and Space are the neceffary 
conditions under which the variety of the empirical intui¬ 
tion can be given to us, fo is the tranfcendental unity of 
confcioufnels the neceffary condition under which it can 
be connefted, and its contents reprefented. In the exa¬ 
mination of that aft of the mind by which we reprefent 
to ourfelves an objeft, the confideration of this original 
fynthetic unity of confcioufnefs is the firft thing that we muft 
attend to. For, as no objeft can be given to us, other- 
wife than in the intuition, which is a variety; it is by 
means of this original confcioufnefs that the reprefenta¬ 
tions of the aggregate of this variety is poflible; and this 
confcioufnefs precedes all reference of reprefentations to 
an objeft. The fecond aft of the Underftanding, is this 
reference of the unity of confcioufnefs to an objeft. 
Knowledge is the determinate reference of given reprefen¬ 
tations to an objeft. The mere variety, whether of pure 
or empirical Space, is not knowledge. In order to know 
an objeft in Space, for inftance a line, I muft really draw 
it. By this a variety is given, that is not yet an objeft. 
By means of original confcioufnefs, this variety muft be 
connefted into a whole. The third aft, which differs 
from both the former, is alfo a particular aft, by which the 
reprefentations connefted into a unity of confcioufnefs 
are reprefented as neceflarily connefted ; thus the line is 
reprefented as an objeft in fpace; and this aftion is the 
objedfive reference of reprefentations,as will foon be made 
more evident. 
The tranfcendental unity of confcioufnefs is the con¬ 
nexion arifing from the contents of reprefentations. This 
determination 
