196 
PHILO 
determination leaves it ftill undecided, whether the con¬ 
nexion is to be confidered as neceffary, or only as acci¬ 
dental. But it mult be called the objective unity of felf- 
confcioufnefs, when the reprefentations are considered as 
neceffarily belonging to one another. This objective 
unity of confcioufnefs may therefore very eafily bediftin- 
guiflied from the fubjeCtive. When we unite feveral repre¬ 
fentations to one conception ;as for inftance, the hot iron. 
This connexion can only be reprefented as problematical. 
Now the effence of a judgment is, that it connedts re¬ 
prefentations to the objective unity of confcioufnefs. If 
I fay, “ The iron is heavy,” I require that every one elfe 
fhould find it the fame; and this connexion of reprefent¬ 
ations muft not be confidered as arbitrary, but neceffary. 
The logical fundtion of judgment, therefore, reprefents 
the connexion of the variety in an intuition. The Cate¬ 
gories are merely logical fundtions, in fo far as the vari¬ 
ety in an intuition is neceffarily connedfed by them; 
which explains that thefe Categories of themfelves are 
empty conceptions, and imply only an adt of neceffary 
connexion. They refer to intuitions, from which they 
receive their variety, or matter. It is evident, therefore, 
how thefe pure conceptions of underjlanding can refer to 
objedl s. They refer to them fince they reprefent the con¬ 
nexion of the variety in an intuition as neceffary, and thus 
produce a reprefented objedf. 
We do not mean to fay, however, that by means of the 
logical fundfions of judgment this connexion takes place 
previous to all perception, and before the variety in an in¬ 
tuition is given; for that is impoffible. The judgment, 
TheJlone is heavy, is neceffary and valid for every body, 
but not without reference to perception ; for ct priori we 
cannot form this connexion. But, though it refts upon 
perception, it is ftill a judgment of experience, that is, 
one in which the reprefentations received by means of 
perception are neceffarily connedfed ; it is therefore dif- 
tinguifhable from a mere judgment of apprehenjion, in 
which a fubjedfive connexion is thought, which maybe 
very different in different perfons, and might, in the pre- 
fent inftance, be properly thus expreffed : “When I lift a 
ftone, I feel that it is heavy,” 
By the Categories, therefore, the variety in an intuition 
is reprefented as neceffarily connedfed to a unity of con¬ 
fcioufnefs. But this intuition muft be fenfible; that is, 
its variety muft be given, and not previoufly contained in 
the pur el think; for this would make it an intellectual 
intuition, in refpedf of which the Categories would be of 
no ufe. We muft now abftradt from the particular mode 
of this intuition. In the fequel we fliall fliov.' how the 
Categories connedt the variety of empirical intuition to 
the objedlive unity, in order to generate a knowledge of 
empirical objedfs ; and thus the objedf of the dedudfionof 
the Categories will be fully attained. 
Now we may explain what is meant by the expreffion to 
know a thing. The knowledge of an objedf means fome- 
thing more than merely thinking it. In thinking an ob¬ 
jedf, it is merely required that a variety be reprelented as 
neceflarily connedfed. This variety can only be that con¬ 
tained in a fenfible intuition. If, however, the objedf is 
not given and prefent in an intuition, then it is thought 
indeed according to its form, but it is not known. Now 
all poflible intuitions are either pure or empirical. By 
the application of the Categories to the former, we at¬ 
tain the knowledge of mathematical objedfs. Thefe, how- 
ever, are only formal objedfs, Time and Space. They are 
the pure conditions of all knowledge, and are reprefented 
jointly with the variety of the empirical intuition, when 
it is connedfed to the objedtive unity of confcioufnefs, 
which only takes place by means of the Categories ; and 
in this manner Knowledge is produced. Oar fenfible and 
empirical intuitions alone therefore give fenfe and mean¬ 
ing to the Categories. 
We have fliown that the Categories form the founda¬ 
tion of every objedtive connexion, fince they are concep¬ 
tions developed from the mere form of a judgment, the 
SOPHY. 
adi by which reprefentations are connedfed to the objec¬ 
tive unity of confcioufnefs, and that by their means only 
the variety in a fenfible intuition can be reprefented as 
neceflarily connedfed. We have fhown that they are 
conditions d. priori of all reprefented objedfs; for as, in 
the reprefentation of objedts, the parts in the intuition 
muft be thought as neceflarily belonging to one another, 
it is evident how the Categories can apply to objedfs of 
experience, though without arifing from experience. But 
the queftion regarding the objective reality of thefe con¬ 
ceptions is independent of this, and ftill remains to be an- 
fwered. For, granting that the variety of empirical in¬ 
tuitions can be connedfed to a neceffary unity of con¬ 
fcioufnefs only by means of the Categories, it may ftill 
be alked, how we come to form fuch a connexion in the 
intuition. 
The fynthefis of the variety both of pure fpace, and of 
filled fpace, implies a condition d priori in us, that be¬ 
longs to Senfe; namely, time. This renders it poflible, 
that the fynthetic objedfive unity of confcioufnefs can be 
thought as the condition under which the objedf ive unity 
of every poflible intuition muft (land. The underftand- 
ing, in adding one part of the variety to another, affeCis 
internal J'enfe, whence arife.s a variety different from the 
preceding, and which conftitutes time. 
As therefore every poflible intuition muft (land under 
this form as its condition, it is clear alfo, that the con¬ 
nexion of the variety, as neceffarily thought, can only take 
place by means of that neceffary unity of confcioufnefs 
which is a determination of Time & priori. As this objec¬ 
tive unity can only be reprefented by the Categories, 
they will have objedtive reality fo far only as they repre¬ 
fent the connexion of the variety to be neceffary in refe¬ 
rence to time. If, for inftance, I determine an empirical 
intuition by the relation of fubftance and accident, and 
thus know an objedf; I aik how I came to this determina¬ 
tion of thought, fince I find no affinity between it and 
the given variety. I find, however, that its application 
extends only to the conception of a fubftance as the per¬ 
manent in time, to which, as to a fubftratum, the change¬ 
able accidents adhere. Hence it muft be evident that 
the Categories have meaning and objedtive validity only 
in reprefenting the connexion of the variety as neceffary 
in reference to Time. 
The fynthefis of the variety reprefented as neceffary by 
the Categories in reference to the form of internal fenfe, 
may figurately be called a fynthefis of the fpecies. We fe- 
parate it from that neceffary connexion, reprefented by 
means of the Categories, (not as a determination of time,) 
which is called a connexion of the underjlanding, or intel¬ 
lectual fynthefis. They are both tranfcendental, as they 
render the reprefentation of an objedf and knowledge, 
poflible. Even this figurative fynthefis is called the tranj- 
cendentalfynthefis of imagination, by which appellation its 
peculiarity is more nearly indicated. Imagination is the 
faculty to reprefent an objedf without its prefence in 
the intuition. An objedf can be reprefented only 
by this figurative fynthefis; yet a given intuition is ne¬ 
ceffary, without which an objedf is only reprefented ac¬ 
cording to its form; and this may occur when it is ab- 
fent. Imagination belongs to Sense, fo far as it repre¬ 
fents the connexion of a given variety, as neceflary to the 
form of internal fenfe. On the other hand, confidered 
as a fpontaneity, it is no other faculty than the under- 
ftanding itfelf. It is however a tranfcendental faculty, 
and therefore to be completely diftinguifhed from repro¬ 
ductive imagination, of which Pfychology treats; and on 
this account may be called productive imagination. 
Now it muft be completely evident, that we know our- 
felves only as we appear, and not as we are in ourfelves. 
The latter would be the cafe, if the reprefentation 1 think 
contained in itfelf its objedf, matter, or variety. But we 
only become confcious of ourfelves in the fynthefis of a 
given variety, and without it there can be no confcioufnefs 
at all. As" the underftanding connedts the variety, it af- 
fedts 
