PHILO 
fefts internal fenfe, and produces an intuition in which 
the mind intuits itfelf, that is, its own aftivity. This is 
likewife a fenfible intuition, for its variety is as much 
given as that in an external intuition. Therefore I with 
to reprefent myfelf fo far as I am given to myfelf; that is, 
fo far as I am a phenomenon to myfelf. In order clearly 
to fee this pofition, let us defcribe a line in thought . In 
fo doing, we mull add one part to another. In this ac¬ 
tion the mind affefts itfelf; that is, the underftanding af¬ 
fefts our internal fenfe in fuch a manner, that the mind 
receives a variety of unities or connefting afts within its 
own knowledge. By the reprefentation “ I think,” I 
neither know how I am in myfelf, nor how I appear 5 I 
am only confcious in it of my connefting faculty. But a 
variety is firft required in order to excite a connexion, 
and to lead to this fort of knowledge of myfelf. 
It will now be eafy to Ihow, how, by means of the Ca¬ 
tegories, experience, that is, a knowledge of empirical ob- 
jefts, is brought about. With this view, Set us call the 
fynthefis of a fenfible or given variety, the Synthefts of Ap- 
prehenfion. It is the connexion of an empirical variety, 
not however confidered as a neceflary connexion. Ap¬ 
prehenfion is a merely-fubjeftive connexion of-the va¬ 
riety of an empirical intuition 5 and therefore different 
from experience, in which this connexion is confidered 
as neceflary. Now, if apprehenfion is to become experi¬ 
ence, a conception of underftanding mu ft be applied to it, 
by which the connexion of this variety, in reference to 
time, is reprefented as neceflary. An empirical intuition 
is only poflible under the condition of a pure intuition. 
It prefuppofes, therefore, the connexion of an empirical 
variety in a neceflary manner, as well as a fimilar connex¬ 
ion of the pure varieties Time and Space, which can be 
confidered as neceflarily connefted only by the Categories; 
and thus all objefts of experience neceflarily ftand under 
the Categories. 
When I fee an objeft in Space, for inftance a houfe, 
the fynthefis of apprehenfion, that is, the fynthefis of the 
empirical variety in Space 5 the reprefentation of the 
neceflary connexion of the empirical variety grounds 
itfelf upon the neceflary unity of Space itfelf, in the fame 
manner as this refts upon the neceflary unity of time. If 
I abftraft, not only from the empirical variety, but alfo 
from time and /pace, there remains merely the reprefenta¬ 
tion of a neceflary connexion of a homogeneous variety, 
that is, the Category of Quantity. 
When I perceive water in a ftate of ice, and afterwards 
in a fluid ftate, this occurs by means of the fynthefis of 
apprehenfion. But in apprehenfion thefe reprefentations 
are only accidentally connefted with each other. In 
order to reprefent this connexion as neceflary, it mull be 
thought by the Categories, which reprefent the two ftates 
fo connefted as to determine which of them precedes and 
which fucceeds; and this is nothing but the Category of 
CavJ'e and EffeSl. If in this cafe I alfo abftraft from Time, 
there merely remains the relation of the ground to its 
confequence, whofe applicability to empirical intuition 
however cannot then be perceived. 
A fummary View of this Decludion of the Categories. 
The logical afts of judgment conneft our reprefenta¬ 
tions neceflarily. The aftion by which the variety of a 
fenfible intuition is reprefented as neceflarily connefted, 
is that by which alone we can think of an objeft. It de¬ 
pends therefore on thofe conceptions which form the 
foundation of the connexion reprefented as neceflary by 
judgment, and which, with regard to a given variety of 
fenfible intuition, are called Categories. But as a form of 
fenfible intuition, comprehending fpace, as well as the 
empirical objefts in fpace, lies as a foundation in us, the 
connexion of the variety of this intuition muff be repre- 
fented by the Categories as neceflarily in reference to this 
form 1 i.e. to Time. It is eafy to perceive, therefore, 
how thefe pure afts of the underftanding refer to objefts 
of experience; for, according to this deduftion, they 
Vol. XX. No. 1361. 
SOPHY. 197 
refer to objefts becaufe it is by their means alone that ob¬ 
jefts can be reprefented. 
It is this deduftion alone that can fupply an anfvver to 
the queftion. What is a given or fenfible objeft ? It is the 
aggregate of the variety of an empirical intuition as re¬ 
prefented, i.e. connefted, by the Categories. 
Book II. Analysis of Principles. 
Univerfal Logic treats of thinking; and, as this confifts 
of Conceptions, Judgments, and Conclusions, it 
develops thefe three modes, and is thus capable of being 
a completely-perfeft analytical fcience, feparated from all 
other parts of philofophy. It excludes all matter of 
thought; and, though it may illuftrate the developed 
rules by examples, ftill it pays no regard to the particular 
aftion by which we think of an objeft. On the other 
hand, it is the province of Tranfcendental Logic to ex¬ 
plain this aftion. 
This fcience, as we have already feen, refembles Univer¬ 
fal Logic in its commencement; both begin with con¬ 
ceptions. This fimilarity, however, lies merely in method. 
Univerfal Logic has only to explain the conception of a 
conception ; Tranfcendental Logic, on the other hand, 
has to explain thofe remarkable conceptions by which the 
neceflary unity of the variety, not only of conceptions, 
but of objefts themfelves, is reprefented. As to the fimi¬ 
larity of the two faiences in their progrefs, Tranfcenden¬ 
tal Logic has alfo to produce a doftrine of Judgments in a 
tranfcendental point of view. With refpeft to conclu- 
fions, however, it will appear in the fequel, that the 
faculty of Reafon cannot be tranfcendental; and that, 
when,contrary to the warning in the “Critic,” it fan¬ 
cies it knows fomething h priori of objefts, it is dialectic. 
As to the tranfcendental faculty of Judgment, it wall 
here be evident, that, as the firft part of this fcience, as a 
property of Tranfcendental Underftanding, contains 
certain conceptions; fo this judging faculty will contain 
particular judgments, which, like thofe conceptions, tend 
to make experience poflible. In Univerfal Logic, it is 
quite the reverfe. This has only to develope the con¬ 
ception of a judgment; but it cannot teach rules for 
judging, becaufe judgment is a talent of applying rules, 
and we mult therefore prefuppofe, that he who is to be 
benefited by the inftruftions for judging is capable of 
judging without them. Tranfcendental Philofophy, 
however, has this advantage, that it can (how not only 
the pure conceptions of underftanding, but alfo their 
application h priori; and this arifes from their referring 
to objefts purely h priori. When we draw rules from 
experience by analogy, (for inftance, that it would not be 
prudent to believe every one,J the judgment exercifed by 
examples learns readily to hit the application of them in 
occurring cafes. But the rule is not « priori, and may 
admit of many exceptions; it can therefore comprehend 
no rules under it. It is becaufe the Mathematics are a 
pure fcience of reafon, that their pofitions are univerfal 
rules. This fcience, therefore, determines all poflible 
cafes of their application. The cafe is the fame with 
Tranfcendental Philofophy. The Categories reprefent 
the univerfal conditions of the knowledge of all objefts 
of intuition. It mull therefore determine, & priori, the 
cafes of their application. 
Now this doftrine of Tranfcendental Judgment will 
contain two chief parts. The firft will treat of the fen¬ 
fible conditions, under which alone the pure conceptions 
of Underftanding (Categories) can be ufed, that is, of the 
fchemata of the underftanding; the fecond, of the lynthe- 
lical judgments, which according to thefe conditions de¬ 
termine the application of the Categories it priori. 
Chap. I. The Schemata of the Categories. 
When one reprefentation is fubfumpted u nder another, 
the latter is included in the former as being identical 
with a part of it. Thus the conception Man is fubfump¬ 
ted under that of mortal, and we confider the latter as a 
3 E partial 
