198 PHILO 
partial reprefentation of the former. We then fay, that 
one of thefe conceptions is thought by means of the other, 
or that the one is applied to the other. 
Now, if we attempt to reprefent the application.of the 
Categories to the intuition, and the fubfumption of the 
latter under the former, this appears to be an impoffibi- 
lity ; fince not the lead fimilarity can be found between 
the two, and no partial reprefentations of the intuition 
can be identical with the Categories. We ihould, for 
example, not be able to think any riling, if we were to fay 
that the conception Cause could be intuited. The 
deduction of the Categories has however proved, that, in 
order to reprefent the neceffary unity of the intuition, 
that is, of the objeft, the connexion of the variety by 
means of the Categories mult be thought, confequently 
the Category muff be applied to intuition. How then is 
this application and the fubfumption of the intuition 
under the Categories poffible? 
In order to complete this deduction, we have already 
taken one ftep which will enable the reflefting reader to 
overcome this difficulty. For we have ffiown that, as a 
univerlal form, grounded in the receptivity of the repre- 
f’enting faculty itfelf, lies at the bottom of all fenfible 
intuition, the Category is able to reprefent the connexion 
of the variety in the intuition in relation to this form; 
and thus the application of the Category to the intuition 
is poffible. To render this evident is the proper objeft 
of this chapter. 
When one reprefentation is to be applied to .another, 
that is, when a relation between two reprefentations, 
which are completely heterogeneous, is to be thought, it 
is clear that this cannot be done but by means of a third 
different from both, and yet Handing in connexion with 
both. What then will be this third intermediate repre¬ 
fentation between the Category and the Intuition? 
This is no other than Time ; for, on the one hand, it 
is the univerfal form of every intuition, even of Space 
itfelf, fince it is the condition under which the mind a fi¬ 
fe ft s itfelf in joining together the variety of an intuition 5 
on the other it Hands in connexion with the Categories, 
becaufe the whole bufinefs of the latter is to reprefent the 
connexion of the variety as neceffary, and this reprefen¬ 
tation is founded upon the Form of Internal Senfe. Thus 
it is evident, that the Categories cannot be applied to in¬ 
tuition without the condition of Time. A Category 
under this condition is called the Tranfcendental Se/iema 
of that Category; and the procedure of the underffanding 
w ith thefe fphemata, the fchematifm of pure underHanding. 
A Schema is the image of a conception. Thus we fay, 
we have a fchema of a Temple, or a Pagoda, when we can 
produce an image or pifture correfponding with this 
conception. The image is a given fenfible reprefentation, 
and therefore always contains more than the conception, 
to which this image never can be completely adequate. 
No images indeed can correlpond with the Categories. 
The fchema of a Category cannot indicate the aft of the 
Category in producing this image of itfelf; but it will 
fiiow the mode in which the Category connedls the fen¬ 
fible condition, Time, and thereby becomes applicable to 
Intuition. We ffiall now explain thefe Schemata in the 
order of the Categories. 
The fchema of Quantity is number in general, or the 
fynthefis of time. It is the neceffary unity of an homo¬ 
geneous variety of an intuition, in the procluttion of Time 
itfelf- 
The fchema of Quality is a degree in general, or the 
fynthefis of fenfations in Time. Reality is that with 
which fenfation correfponds in the intuition. Now there 
is an infinite number of degrees between every fenfation 
and the abfence of fenfation. This continued produftion 
of fenfation is the fchema of reality by which it is repre» 
lented as filled time ; and negation, on the other hand, as 
empty time. 
The fchema of Substance is the perdnrability of a reality 
in-Time, which remains while its accidents change. 
SOPHY. 
The fchema of the Category Cause is the determinate 
fucceffwn of realities in Time; fo that, when one takes 
place, another muff neceffarily follow. 
The fchema of the Category Concurrence is the co-ex - 
ijlenee of realitiesin Space, fo that one determines the place 
of the other in fpace. 
The fchema of Possibility is the coincidence of the 
fynthefis of various reprefentations with the conditions of 
time in general, or the being in any time. 
The fchema of Existence is the being of a reality in a 
certain time. 
The fchema of Necessity is the being in all time. 
From this view- of the Schemata of the Categories, it is 
evident in what manner the reprefentation of a connexion 
of the variety, confequently the reprefentation of an ob- 
jeft, is poffible. The Categories, as pure intelleftual 
conceptions, are-not fufficient to render this poffible ; but 
it is done by the Schemata of the Categories, by which 
the neceffary unity of a given variety is reprefented. The 
fchema of Quantity expreffes this neceffary unity with 
refpeft to the form of intuition, fince by means of it we 
determine the form of the intuition, and fix objeftively 
and in a univerfally-valid manner how often the intuition 
contains the repetition of onej'that is to fay, we reprefent 
the quantity of the objeft by means of Time. 
In the fame manner objeStivity arifes in the intuition, 
with refpeft to its matter, by means of the fchema of 
Quality, as the degree of fenfation in reference to time 
isdetenninately reprefented by it. The Category Subfance 
is foreign to intuition till Time is joined to it, and the 
application of it is obtained only when a relation of the 
perdurable to the changeable is reprefented. The Cate¬ 
gory Cause, as well as that of Concurrence, are concep¬ 
tions between which and the intuition there is no fimilar¬ 
ity. On the other hand, it is evident how the intuition, 
in reprefenting an objeft and the merely-fubjeftive con¬ 
nexion exiffing in the apprehenfion, paffes over into an 
objeftive connexion of experience, by our combining 
with them the condition of time, as both Categories re¬ 
prefent the relation of one reality to another, in reference 
to time, as neceffary. The Categories of Poffibility, Ex- 
iftence, and Neceffity, in a logical fenfe, are eafily ex¬ 
plained; but they acquire a real meaning in fo far as they 
are reprefented as conceptions rendered fenfible,,by time. 
Logical poffibility is that which does notcontradift itfelf; 
real poffibility, on the contrary, is that which agrees with 
the conditions of time in general; for inffance, oppofite 
determinations of a thing cannot be united in one con¬ 
ception, and contradift themfelves; but, in reality, this 
contradiction commences when thefe determinations are 
fimultaneous ; but, on the contrary, it does not occur 
when the oppofite accidents are fucceffive. 
The Schemata, therefore, are the Categories rendered 
fenfible by means of time; and it now appears in the 
cleareff manner, that every given objeft muff neceflariiy 
Hand under thefe fchemata. It is indeed perfeftly true, 
that the Categories are thofe conceptions which render 
poffible every union reprefented as neceff ary, and therefore 
objeSive; but, as an objeft can never be given to us other- 
wife than by intuition, confequently this union cannot be 
reprefented otherwil'e than by means of the variety ; and 
this is only done by the fchema, and not by the categories 
alone. The pure origin of the Categories does not affiff 
us, becaufe we cannot at all perceive, in its fuperfenlible 
form, whether it relates to any objeft or.not. From their 
derivation from the logical funftions of Judgment, it fol¬ 
lows, that, when we would think of an objeft problema¬ 
tically, which is not an objeft ofintuition, (a noumenon,) 
we may think of it by means of the Categories; but fo 
little are we able to predicate any thing of it, (for, though 
we think by means of the Categories, we predicate nothing 
by them, as they are not parts of knowledge, but only 
modes of thinking of an objeft in general,) that we muff 
confider the entire objeft as merely a problematical 
thought, which it really is. 
1 
The 
